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Operational Poverty Targeting by Proxy Means Tests 
Models and Policy Simulations for Malawi 
 
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
There is a long standing belief that accurate targeting of public policy can play a 
major role in alleviating poverty and fostering pro-poor economic growth. Many 
development programs fail to reach the poor in that a sizeable amount of program benefits 
leak to higher-income groups and a substantial proportion of poor are excluded. This is also 
the case in Malawi, one of the poorest countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. In response to 
widespread poverty and endemic food insecurity, the country decision makers enacted 
various programs, including free food, food-for-work, cash-for-work, subsidized 
agricultural inputs, etc. To target these programs at the poor and smallholder farmers in the 
country, policy makers rely mainly on community-based targeting systems in which local 
authorities, village development committees, and other community representatives identify 
program beneficiaries based on their assessment of the household living conditions. However, 
most of these programs have been characterized by poor targeting and significant leakage of 
benefits to the non-poor due to a number of factors, including various local perceptions, 
favoritism, abuse, lack of understanding of targeting criteria, political interests, etc. Almost all 
interventions are poorly targeted in the country. 
Therefore, this research explores potential methods and models that might improve the 
targeting efficiency of agricultural and development policies in the country. Using the Malawi 
Second Integrated Household (IHS2) survey data and a variety of estimation methods along 
with stepwise selection of variables, we propose empirical models for improving the poverty 
outreach of agricultural and development policies in rural and urban Malawi. Moreover, the 
research analyzes the out-of-sample performances of different estimation methods in 
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identifying the poor and smallholder farmers. In addition, the model robustness was assessed 
by estimating the prediction intervals out-of-sample using bootstrapped simulation methods.  
Furthermore, we estimate the cost-effectiveness and impacts of targeting the poor and 
smallholder farmers. It is often argued that targeting is cost-ineffective and once all targeting 
costs have been considered, a finely targeted program may not be any more cost-efficient and 
may not have any more impact on poverty than a universal program. We assess whether this is 
the case using household-level data from Malawi. More importantly, we evaluate whether 
administering development programs using the newly developed models is more target- and 
cost-efficient than past agricultural subsidy programs namely the 2000/2001 Starter Pack and 
the 2006/2007 Agricultural Input Support Program (AISP).  
Estimation results suggest that under the newly designed system, mis-targeting is 
considerably reduced and the targeting efficiency of development policies improves compared 
to the currently used mechanisms in the country. Findings indicate that the estimation 
methods applied achieve the same level of targeting performance. The rural model achieves 
an average poverty accuracy of about 72% and a leakage of 27% when calibrated to the 
national poverty line of 44.29 Malawi Kwacha (MK). On the other hand, the urban model 
yields on average a poverty accuracy of about 62% and a leakage of 39% when calibrated to 
the same poverty line. The results are also confirmed by the Receiver Operating Characteristic 
(ROC) curves of the models which show that there is no sizeable difference in aggregate 
predictive accuracy between the estimation methods. The ROC curve is a powerful tool that 
can be used by policy makers and project managers to decide on the number of poor a 
program or development policy should reach and ponder on the number of non-poor that 
would also be wrongly targeted.  
Calibrating the models to a higher poverty line improves its targeting performances, 
while calibrating the models to a lower line does the opposite. For example, under the 
Executive summary 
 
xiv
international poverty line of US$1.25 (i.e. MK59.18 in Purchasing Power Parity), the rural 
model covers about 82% of the poor and wrongly targets only 16% of the non-poor, whereas 
the urban model covers about 74% of the poor and wrongly identifies 26% of the non-poor. 
On the other hand, using an extreme poverty line of MK29.81 disappointingly reduces the 
model’s poverty accuracy and leakage: the rural model yields a poverty accuracy of 51% and 
a leakage of 39% while the urban model yields a poverty accuracy of about 48% and a 
leakage of 68%. Furthermore, a breakdown of targeting errors by poverty deciles indicates 
that the models perform well in terms of those who are mistargeted; covering most of the 
poorest deciles and excluding most of the richest ones. These results have obvious desirable 
welfare implications for the poor and smallholder farmers. It is all important to mention that 
the models selected cannot explain but predict poverty. A causal relationship should not be 
inferred from the results. 
There is compelling evidence in favor of targeting since considering all costs does not 
make targeting cost- and impact-ineffective. Findings suggest that the new system is 
considerably more accurate and more target-efficient than the currently used mechanisms for 
targeting agricultural inputs in the country. Likewise, simulation results indicate that targeting 
the poor and smallholder farmers is more cost- and impact-effective than universal coverage 
of the population. Better targeting not only reduces the Malawian Government’s direct costs 
for providing benefits, but also reduces the total costs of a targeted program. Though 
administrative costs increase with finer targeting, the results indicate that the overall benefits 
outweigh the costs of targeting. Likewise, finer targeting reduces the costs of leakage by a 
sizable margin and produces the highest impacts on poverty compared to universal regimes. 
However, the finest redistribution does not consistently yield the best transfer efficiency, nor 
does it consistently improve post-transfer poverty.  
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Furthermore, the newly designed system appears to be more cost-efficient than the 
2000/2001 Starter Pack and the 2006/2007 Agricultural Input Support Program (AISP). While 
the Starter Pack and the AISP transferred about 50% of total transfer, under the new system 
about 73% of transfer is delivered to the poor and smallholder farmers. Likewise, under the new 
proxy system the costs of leakage are cut down by 55% and 57% for the Starter Pack and AISP, 
respectively. Thus, under the new system it is possible to reduce leakage and undercoverage 
rates and improve the cost and transfer efficiency of development programs in the country.  
The proxy indicators selected reflect the local communities’ understandings of poverty 
and include variables from different dimensions, such as demography, education, housing, 
and asset ownership. These indicators are objective and most can be easily verified. However, 
the collection of information on those indicators might entail an effective verification process. 
Likewise, the emphasis put on proxy means tests in this research does not imply that other 
potential targeting methods should be disregarded. Indeed, proxy means tests are not perfect 
at targeting; the system developed can be combined with other methods in a multi-stage 
targeting process. Furthermore, targeting can be a politically sensitive issue; the system 
developed does not take into account the reality that policy makers, program managers, or 
development practitioners may adjust eligibility criteria due to political, administrative, 
budgetary, or other reasons.  
The models developed can be used in a wide range of applications, such as identifying 
the poor and smallholder farmers, improving the existing targeting mechanisms of agricultural 
input subsidies, assessing household eligibility to welfare programs and safety net benefits, 
producing estimates of poverty rates and monitoring changes in poverty over time as the 
country and donors cannot afford the costs of frequent household expenditure surveys, 
estimating the impacts of development policies targeted to those living below the poverty line, 
and assessing the poverty outreach of microfinance institutions operating in the country. This 
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broad range of applications makes the models potentially interesting policy tools for the 
country. However, the models developed are not sufficient. They must also be coupled with 
investments in education, rural infrastructure, economic growth related sectors, and strong 
political will to impact on the welfare of Malawian people.  
The research also provides a framework for developing and evaluating a simple and 
reasonably accurate system for reaching the poor and smallholder farmers in Malawi, but the 
methodology can be useful in other areas of applied research and replicated in other 
developing countries with similar targeting problems. 
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Operationelle Armutsbekämpfung durch Proxy Means Tests 
Modelle und Politik Simulationen für Malawi 
 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Es ist eine generell akzeptierte Annahme, dass öffentliche Politikmaßnahmen eine 
wichtige Rolle bei der Armutsbekämpfung und bei der Entwicklung von Wirtschaftswachstum 
spielen können. Als Antwort auf die weitverbreitete Armut und endemische 
Ernährungsunsicherheit haben die Entscheidungsträger Malawis verschiedene Programme, 
insbesondere die Subventionierung landwirtschaftlicher Betriebsmittel, die ein wichtiges 
Element der Entwicklungspolitik des Landes darstellen, entwickelt. Um diese Programme 
gezielt auf die Armen und Kleinbauern des Landes auszurichten, bauen die Verantwortlichen 
meist auf gemeindebasierte Systeme bei denen lokale Behörden Programmbegünstigte auf Basis 
der Beurteilung der jeweiligen Lebensbedingungen der Haushalte identifizieren. 
Die meisten dieser Programme sind jedoch durch eine schlechte Zielgenauigkeit 
gekennzeichnet und hohe Anteile des Nutzens der Programme gehen aufgrund verschiedener 
Faktoren, darunter lokale Vorstellungen, Vetternwirtschaft, Missbrauch, Mangel an 
Verständnis für die Zielkriterien, politische Interessen etc, irrtümlicherweise an Nicht-Arme. 
Fast alle Maßnahmen im Land leiden unter einer unzureichenden Zielgenauigkeit. 
Daher untersucht diese Arbeit potenzielle Methoden und Modelle, die die 
Zielgenauigkeit von Agrar- und Entwicklungsmaßnahmen des Landes verbessern können. 
Darüber hinaus schätzen wir die Kosteneffektivität und Auswirkungen einer Fokussierung auf 
Arme und Kleinbauern. Es wird häufig argumentiert, dass zielgruppengenaue Programme nicht 
kosteneffektiv sind und dass, wenn sämtliche Kosten der Zielgruppenfindung berücksichtigt 
werden, ein gut abgestimmtes zielgruppenorientiertes Programm nicht kosteneffizienter wäre 
und keine größeren Effekte auf die Armutsreduzierung hätte als ein generelles Programm. Wir 
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untersuchen diese These anhand von Haushaltsdaten aus Malawi. Darüber hinaus bewerten wir, 
ob die Administration und Durchführung von Entwicklungsprogrammen mit Hilfe der neu 
entwickelten Modelle zielgruppengenauer und kosteneffizienter ist als bisherige Programme zur 
Subventionierung von landwirtschaftlichen Betriebsmitteln, insbesondere das Starter Pack von 
2000/2001 und das Agricultural Input Support Program (AISP) von 2006/2007.  
Unter Verwendung von Daten des Malawi Second Integrated Household Survey (IHS2) 
und einer Reihe von Schätzmethoden mit schrittweiser Auswahl von Variablen entwickeln wir 
empirische Modelle zur Verbesserung der Armutsminderung durch Agrar- und 
Entwicklungsprogramme im ländlichen und städtischen Malawi. Zusätzlich analysiert die Arbeit 
die über die Stichprobe hinausgehende Güte der verschiedenen Modelle bei der Identifizierung 
der Armen und Kleinbauern. Die Robustheit der Modelle wurde darüber hinaus mit Hilfe von 
Bootstrapping-Simulationen für die Vorhersageintervalle außerhalb der Stichprobe geschätzt.  
Die Schätzergebnisse legen nahe, dass mit dem neuentwickelten System eine 
fehlgerichtete Ausrichtung erheblich reduziert werden kann und dass die 
Zielgruppenausrichtung von Entwicklungsmaßnahmen im Vergleich zu bisher im Land 
genutzten Mechanismen verbessert werden kann. Die Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass die 
angewendeten Schätzmethoden alle die gleiche Zielgenauigkeit erreichen. Das ländliche Modell 
erreicht bei Kalibrierung auf die nationale Armutslinie eine Genauigkeit bei der Erreichung von 
Armen von 72% und ein Durchsickern an Nichtzielgruppen von 27%. Auf der anderen Seite 
erreicht das städtische Modell im Durchschnitt eine Zielgruppengenauigkeit von 62% und ein 
Durchsickern von 39% (ebenfalls bei Kalibrierung auf die nationale Armutslinie). Diese 
Ergebnisse werden ebenfalls durch die Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Kurven der 
Modelle bestätigt, die keine beträchtlichen Unterschiede zwischen der aggregierten 
Vorhersagegenauigkeit der Schätzmodelle zeigen. Die ROC-Kurve ist ein mächtiges Werkzeug 
das von Programmverantwortlichen und Projektmanagern zur Entscheidungsfindung darüber 
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genutzt werden kann, wieviele Arme ein Programm oder eine Entwicklungsmaßnahme 
erreichen soll und wieviele fälschlicherweise begünstigte Nicht-Arme gefördert werden.  
Die Kalibrierung der Modelle  auf eine höhere Armutslinie verbessert ihre 
Zielgenauigkeit, während eine Kalibrierung auf eine niedrigere Linie zum Gegenteil führt. 
Zum Beispiel erreicht das ländliche Modell bei Verwendung der internationalen Armutslinie 
von 1,25 USD (d.h. MK 59,18 PPP) etwa 82% der Armen und fördert fälschlicherweise nur 
16%  der Nicht-Armen. Auf der anderen Seite verschlechtert die Verwendung einer extremen 
Armutslinie von MK 29,81 die Genauigkeit und das Durchsickern der Modelle: Das ländliche 
Modell erzielt eine Armutsgenauigkeit von 51% und ein Durchsickern von 39% während das 
städtische Modell eine Genauigkeit von 28% und ein Durchsickern von 68% erreicht. Darüber 
hinaus deutet ein Herunterbrechen der Fehlausrichtungen nach Armutsdezilen an, dass die 
Modelle in Bezug auf die fälschlicherweise Begünstigten gut funktionieren: Sie decken die 
meisten der ärmsten Dezile ab, während die meisten der reichsten Dezile nicht berücksichtigt 
werden. Diese Ergebnisse haben naheliegende wünschenswerte Wohlfahrtseffekte für Arme 
und Kleinbauern. Es ist wichtig zu erwähnen, dass die ausgewählten Modelle Armut nicht 
erklären sondern lediglich voraussagen können. Ein kausaler Zusammenhang kann auf 
Grundlage der Ergebnisse nicht hergestellt werden. 
Es bestehen zwingende Anhaltspunkte zu Gunsten von Zielgruppenorientierung da 
auch die Berücksichtigung sämtlicher Kosten die Zielgruppenorientierung nicht kosten- und 
ergebnisineffizient werden lässt. Die Ergebnisse legen nahe, dass das neue System erheblich 
genauer und zieleffizienter ist als der bisher verwendete Mechanismus zur 
zielgruppengenauen Programmgestaltung für landwirtschaftliche Betriebsmittel. Ebenso 
deuten die Simulationsergebnisse an, dass die Fokussierung auf Arme und Kleinbauern 
kosten- und ergebniseffektiver ist als eine globale Erfassung der gesamten Bevölkerung. 
Bessere Zielgruppenausrichtung verringert nicht nur die direkten Kosten der Regierung 
Zusammenfassung 
 
xx
Malawis für unterstützende Maßnahmen sondern reduziert auch die Gesamtkosten eines 
Programms. Obwohl die administrativen Kosten mit genauerer Zielgruppenausrichtung 
ansteigen, zeigen die Ergebnisse, dass die Vorteile insgesamt die Kosten überwiegen. Ebenso 
verringert eine genauere Ausrichtung die Kosten für das Durchsickern in großem Maßstab 
und sorgt für die größten Auswirkungen auf die Armut verglichen mit generellen Verfahren. 
Mit steigender Genauigkeit der Ausrichtung erhöht sich jedoch weder in jedem Fall die 
Verteilungseffizienz, noch verringert sich in jedem Fall die Folgearmut.  
Weiterhin scheint das neu entwickelte System kosteneffizienter zu sein als das Starter 
Pack von 2000/2001 und das Agricultural Input Support Program (AISP) von 2006/2007. 
Während das Starter Pack und das AISP etwa 50% sämtlicher Mittel an Arme und 
Kleinbauern verteilen, erreichen unter dem neuen System etwa 73% der Mittel Arme und 
Kleinbauern. Ebenso werden unter dem neuen System die Kosten des Durchsickerns um 55% 
gegenüber dem Starter Pack und um 57% gegenüber dem AISP gesenkt. Unter dem neuen 
System ist es daher möglich, Durchsickern und Fehlallokation zu verringern und die Kosten- 
und Verteilungseffizienz von Entwicklungsprogrammen des Landes zu verbessern. 
Die ausgewählten Indikatoren spiegeln das Armutsverständnis lokaler Gemeinden 
wider und beinhalten demografische Variablen ebenso wie Bildung, Lebensverhältnisse und 
Eigentum. Diese Indikatoren sind objektiv und die meisten können leicht verifiziert werden. 
Die Sammlung von Informationen bezüglich dieser Indikatoren könnte jedoch effektiv einen 
Überprüfungsprozess darstellen. Es sollte erwähnt werden, dass der Schwerpunkt in dieser 
Arbeit zwar auf Proxy Means Tests gelegt wurde, was aber nicht impliziert, dass andere 
mögliche Methoden zur Zielgruppenfokussierung abgelehnt werden sollten. Proxy Means 
Tests sind tatsächlich nicht einwandfrei bei Armutsidentifizierung und das entwickelte System 
kann in einem Mehrstufenprozess mit anderen Methoden kombiniert werden. 
Zielgruppenfokussierung kann darüber hinaus eine politisch sensible Angelegenheit sein; das 
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entwickelte System berücksichtigt nicht die Tatsache, dass Programmverantwortliche und 
Projektmanager oder Entwicklungshelfer die Kriterien zur Anspruchsberechtigung aufgrund 
von politischen, verwaltungs- und haushaltsbezogenen oder anderen Gründen anpassen. 
Die entwickelten Modelle können in einem weiten Spektrum von Fällen verwendet 
werden, z.B. bei der Identifizierung von Armen und Kleinbauern, bei der Verbesserung 
bestehender Vergabemechanismen für subventionierte landwirtschaftliche Betriebsmittel, bei 
der Beurteilung der Anspruchsberechtigung von Haushalten, zur Schätzung von Armutshöhe 
und beim Monitoring von Armutsveränderungen im Zeitverlauf. Da sich das Land und 
Geldgeber die Kosten häufiger Untersuchungen zu den Lebenshaltungskosten der Haushalte 
oft nicht leisten können, sind die Modelle auch hilfreich bei der kostengünstigen Schätzung 
der Auswirkungen von Entwicklungsprogrammen die auf Bedürftige unterhalb der 
Armutslinie abzielen und bei der Beurteilung der Armutsbekämpfung von im Land tätigen 
Mikrofinanzinstitutionen. Diese große Bandbreite von Anwendungen lässt die Modelle zu 
potenziell interessanten Politikinstrumenten für das Land werden. Die entwickelten Modelle 
sind jedoch nicht ausreichend. Sie müssen einhergehen mit Investitionen in Bildung, ländliche 
Infrastruktur, Wirtschaftswachstum in verwandten Wirtschaftssektoren und mit einem starken 
politischen Willen, die Wohlfahrt der Bevölkerung Malawis zu steigern. 
Diese Arbeit stellt ein Grundgerüst für die Entwicklung und Bewertung eines 
einfachen und recht genauen Systems zur Identifizierung von Armen und Kleinbauern in 
Malawi bereit, doch die Methodik kann auch in anderen Bereichen angewandter Forschung 
nützlich sein und kann in anderen Entwicklungsländern mit ähnlichen Problemen bei der 
Zielgruppenfokussierung repliziert werden. 
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Ciblage Opérationnel de la Pauvreté et des Politiques de Développement 
Modéles et simulations appliqués au Malawi 
 
RESUME 
Le ciblage des politiques de développement et des régimes sociaux en faveur des petits 
agriculteurs et des pauvres est considéré depuis fort longtemps comme crucial pour réduire la 
pauvreté et soutenir une croissance économique pro-pauvre. Le ciblage consiste à concentrer 
les resources limitées dont disposent les Etats et les bailleurs de fonds sur les pauvres et ceux 
qui ont le plus besoin d’une assistance au sein de la population. C’est donc un moyen plus 
efficace et moins coûteux de lutte contre la pauvreté. Le ciblage effectif est devenu impératif 
avec l’avènement des programmes d’ajustement structurels dans les années 80 et plus 
récemment de la crise financière internationale qui a contraint beaucoup de pays en 
développement à réduire de facon drastique les dépenses publiques. 
Le Malawi est sans doute l’un des pays les plus pauvres en Afrique au sud du Sahara 
avec un taux de pauvreté de 52,4% en 2005. En réponse à une pauvreté endémique et à 
l’insécurité alimentaire grandissante, les décideurs politiques Malawites ont initié plusieurs 
programmes sociaux et de développement tels que les aides alimentaires, les travaux publics à 
haute intensité de main-d’oeuvre et les subventions agricoles (engrais, semences, etc.) qui 
constituent une politique de choix en matière d’amélioration des conditions de vie des 
ménages dans le pays. Pour identifier les bénéficiaires de ces programmes que sont les petits 
agriculteurs et les pauvres, les décideurs politiques recourent principalement au ciblage 
communautaire qui permet aux autorités, représentants locaux et comités villageois de 
développement de sélectionner ces bénéficiaires en se basant sur l’évaluation de leurs 
conditions de vie.  
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Cependant, plusieurs études ont montré que la plupart de ces programmes sont 
charactérisés par un ciblage médiocre des pauvres et une fuite considérable de resources vers 
les ménages les plus riches et les plus politiquement influents. De surcroît, l’evaluation des 
programmes de subvention en intrants agricoles a montré que ces programmes ont creé des 
distortions considérables au niveau des marchés car une bonne partie de ces subventions est 
alloueé par erreur aux agriculteurs riches qui pourraient autrement acquérir les intrants au prix 
du marché, causant ainsi une substitution des intrants commerciaux aux intrants 
subventionnés. En outre, tous les acteurs s’accordent à reconnaître que la plupart des 
interventions en faveur des pauvres sont très mal ciblées dans le pays. Cet état de choses est 
lié à plusieurs raisons dont la méconnaissance des pauvres, la différence dans les perceptions 
locales de la pauvreté, le favoritisme, la corruption, une connaissance inadéquate des critères 
de sélection des bénéficiaires, les interférences politiques, etc. 
Ainsi, cette recherche a exploré les modèles et méthodes pouvant améliorer le ciblage des 
programmes de développement et des services sociaux dans le pays. En se basant sur les données 
de la 2ième enquête intégrée des ménages au Malawi (IHS2-2005) et différents outils 
économétriques, l’étude propose des modèles empiriques conçus à partir d’indicateurs socio-
économiques qui identifient et ciblent plus précisément les pauvres et les petits agriculteurs dans le 
pays. Par ailleurs, nous avons conduit des tests de validation hors échantillon et estimé les limites 
de prédictions à l’aide des méthodes de rééchantillonnage communément appelées bootstrap.  
En outre, nous avons évalué à l’aide de simulations, l’efficience et l’effet d’un 
meilleur ciblage sur la pauvreté. Dans les débats sur le ciblage de la pauvreté, il est souvent 
soutenu que toute considération faite des coûts liés au ciblage, un régime bien ciblé sur les 
pauvres serait inefficient et n’aurait pas plus d’effet qu’un régime universel qui déssert toute 
la population. La présente recherche a constaté si cette thèse est fondée ou non. Par ailleurs, 
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l’étude a comparé l’efficience des modèles établis aux performances des programmes de 
subventions agricoles dans le pays. 
Les résultats de l’étude suggèrent qu’avec les modèles établis, les erreurs de ciblage 
peuvent être considérablement réduites. De plus, l’analyse revèle que les différentes méthodes 
d’estimation utilisées ont atteint les mêmes performances lorsque validées hors échantillon. 
Le modèle rural a produit une précision moyenne d’environ 72% en termes de ciblage des 
pauvres et une erreur de 27% en faveur des non-pauvres lorsqu’il est calibré au seuil national 
de pauvreté de 44,29 Malawi Kwacha (devise du Malawi). Autrement dit, le modèle rural 
identifie correctement 72% des ménages pauvres et confond 27% des ménages non-pauvres 
aux pauvres. Cependant, le modèle urbain a produit une précision de 62% en termes de 
ciblage des pauvres et une erreur d’identification de 39% au sein des ménages non-pauvres 
lorsqu’il est calibré au même seuil de pauvreté. Ces résultats sont confirmés par les courbes 
ROC «Receiver Operating Characteristic» des modèles qui montrent qu’il n’y a pas de 
différence substantielle entre les méthodes d’estimation utilisées. La méthodologie ROC 
permet de comparer le pouvoir prédicteur des méthodes d’estimation et des modèles établis. 
C’est aussi un outil très puissant pouvant permettre aux décideurs et coordonnateurs de 
projets de fixer la part des ménages pauvres à cibler par les politiques anti-pauvreté et de 
mesurer les erreurs de ciblage correspondantes. 
Par ailleurs, un calibrage à l’aide d’un seuil de pauvreté plus élevé que le seuil national 
améliore les performances des modèles, mais un calibrage avec un seuil de pauvreté plus bas 
réduit ces performances. Par exemple, sous le seuil de pauvreté international de 1,25 dollars 
US, le modèle rural couvre environ 82% des ménages pauvres et produit une erreur 
d’inclusion de 16% seulement. Par contre, sous le seuil de pauvreté extrême de 29,81 Malawi 
Kwacha, le modèle rural identifie correctement 51% seulement des ménages pauvres et 
produit une erreur d’inclusion de 39% au sein des ménages non-pauvres. Néanmoins, une 
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déssagréggation des erreurs de ciblage par niveau de pauvreté indique que ces erreurs 
décroissent avec l’augmentation du niveau de consommation. En effet, les résultats d’analyse 
montrent que quel que soit le seuil de pauvreté appliqué, tous les modèles établis ont ciblé 
plus de pauvres dans les déciles inférieurs et moins de pauvres dans les déciles supérieurs. Il 
en découle que ces modèles couvrent mieux les plus pauvres parmi les pauvres. Ces résultats 
ont des implications sociales désirables pour les programmes de développement.  
Les résultats d’analyse montrent par ailleurs qu’un meilleur ciblage des ménages 
pauvres, toute considération faite des coûts, n’est inefficicient ni en termes de coûts ni en 
termes d’effets sur la pauvreté. En effet, l’étude suggère que les modèles établis sont 
considérablement plus précis et plus efficients que le ciblage communautaire actuellement 
utilisé pour identifer les bénéficiaires des subventions agricoles au Malawi. Les différentes 
simulations effectuées démontrent également qu’une couverture universelle des ménages est 
très coûteuse et inefficiente comparée au ciblage à l’aide des modèles établis. Un meilleur 
ciblage réduit non seulement les dépenses publiques, mais aussi les coûts totaux des 
programmes de développement. Bien qu’une amélioration du ciblage de la pauvreté 
s’accompagne d’un accroissement des coûts administratifs, l’analyse indique que le bénéfice 
global dépasse les coûts d’un programme bien ciblé vers les pauvres. Il ressort également de 
l’étude qu’un meilleur ciblage réduit de facon substantielle les coûts liés aux erreurs de 
ciblage et produit un impact bien plus fort sur la pauvreté comparé au régime universel. 
L’étude a également révélé que l’utilisation des modèles établis est plus efficient non 
seulement en termes de ciblage, mais aussi en termes de coûts comparée aux performances 
des programmes de subventions agricoles au Malawi. Alors qu’environ 50% des subventions 
agricoles ont été effectivement transférés aux agriculteurs pauvres, un ciblage basé sur les 
nouveaux modèles permet de transférer jusqu’à 72% des resources aux pauvres. De même, les 
coûts liés aux erreurs de ciblage sont réduits de plus de 50% avec les nouveaux modèles. 
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Ainsi, l’application des modèles établis permettrait de réduire de facon significative les 
erreurs de ciblage des pauvres et d’améliorer l’efficience des programmes et politiques de 
développement au Malawi. Toutefois, un ciblage très affiné ne produit pas toujours les 
meilleures performances en termes de coûts et d’effets. 
Les indicateurs de pauvreté utilisés pour l’établissement des modèles réflètent les 
perceptions locales de la pauvreté. Ces indicateurs sont pour la plupart objectifs et faciles à 
vérifier. Cependant, pour limiter la fraude et la corruption pendant la phase de sélection, le 
ciblage de la pauvreté à l’aide des modèles établis nécéssiterait la mise en place d’un système 
de vérification de l’information livrée par les ménages. De plus, l’accent particulier mis sur 
les modèles de ciblage à base d’indicateurs de pauvreté (proxy means tests) dans cette 
recherche n’implique pas que les autres méthodes de ciblage doivent être ignorées. En effet, 
les modèles conçus ne sont pas parfaits. Ils peuvent donc être combinés avec d’autres 
méthodes de ciblage pour davantage d’efficacité.  
Les modèles établis peuvent être appliqués à la résolution d’un ensemble de problèmes 
de développement, telles que l’identification des ménages et des petits agriculteurs pauvres au 
Malawi, l’amélioration de l’efficience du système de ciblage des subventions agricoles, 
l’évaluation de l’accès des ménages démunis aux services sociaux et au microcrédit, le suivi de 
l’évolution de la pauvrété; ce qui permet de réduire les coûts de collecte fréquente des données 
sur les dépenses de consommation, l’estimation de la couverture sociale des institutions de 
microfinance et de l’impact des politiques de lutte contre la pauvreté. Ces applications font des 
modèles établis des outils privilégiés au service des décideurs au Malawi.  
Cependant, ces modèles uniquement ne sont pas suffisants. En effet, le ciblage des 
actions de développement en faveur des ménages pauvres peut être politiquement sensible; les 
modèles développés dans cette étude ne prennent pas en compte les réalités politiques au 
niveau des décideurs et des coordonnateurs des programmes de développement qui pourraient 
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modifier les critères de sélection des pauvres pour diverses raisons: politiques, administratives, 
budgétaires, etc. Il importe également que le ciblage effectif des pauvres soit couplé avec des 
investissements adéquats dans les secteurs moteurs de la croissance, l’éducation, 
l’infrastructure rurale et une volonté politique forte pour améliorer le bien-être des Malawites.  
La présente recherche a aussi établi un cadre méthodologique pour le développement 
et l’évaluation des modèles de ciblage de la pauvreté. Il est cependant impérieux de souligner 
que les modèles développés ne sont pas explicatifs de la pauvreté mais peuvent seulement 
servir à prédire la pauvreté et le statut des ménages. Enfin, les différentes méthodes 
d’estimation utilisées peuvent être aussi appliquées dans d’autres pays en développement 
ayant des problèmes similaires de ciblage des pauvres et des petits agriculteurs.  
 
 
OPERATIONAL POVERTY TARGETING BY PROXY MEANS TESTS 
MODELS AND POLICY SIMULATIONS FOR MALAWI 
 
 
CHAPTER I 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background to the Research 
Eradicating poverty is one of the major challenges facing the developing world and the 
international community. The plethoric number of National, International, Non-Governmental 
Organizations, and advocacy groups fighting poverty on all its dimensions around the world 
just indicates the extent of the challenge.  
More than one billion of people in the developing world live in absolute poverty (UN, 2009). 
Three out of four people in developing countries live in rural areas and most of them depend 
directly or indirectly on agriculture for their livelihood (World Bank, 2008). While, the Asian 
and Latin American countries have made significant progress in reducing poverty in the past 
decades, the results have been rather mixed in sub-Saharan Africa and the poverty rate remained 
above 50% in 2005 (UN, 2009). Most of the countries in the region also suffer from heavy 
external debt burdens due to a combination of factors, including inappropriate development 
policies, imprudent external debt management policies, lack of perseverance in structural 
adjustment and economic reform, deterioration in their terms of trade, and poor governance. 
They have been classified as Heavily Indebted Poor Countries - HIPCs - (World Bank, 2009a). 
Furthermore, the performance of agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa has been 
unsatisfactory, especially when contrasted with the green revolution in South Asia (World 
Bank, 2008). In the mid-1980s, cereal yields were comparably high. Fifteen years later in South 
Asia, yields had increased by more than 50% and poverty had declined by 30%. In sub-Saharan 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
2
Africa, yields and poverty were unchanged. Likewise, food security remains challenging for 
most countries in Africa, given low agricultural growth, rapid population growth, weak foreign 
exchange earnings, and high transaction costs in linking domestic and international markets. 
The persistence of mass poverty and hunger in this region of the world is rightly seen 
not only as a major ethical and political problem, but also as a serious threat to macro-
economic stability and long-term development. In the wake of this threat, the international 
community devised the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), one of which is to halve 
extreme poverty on all its forms between 1990 and 2015. However, progress has been rather 
slow and even reverse. Previous estimates suggest that little progress was made in reducing 
extreme poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa (UN, 2008). With the recent economic downturn, 
major advances against extreme poverty are likely to have stalled (UN, 2009). Increases in the 
price of food have had a direct and adverse effect on the poor. In 2009, an estimated 
55 million to 90 million more people will be living in extreme poverty than anticipated before 
the crisis. Likewise, the encouraging trend in the eradication of hunger since the early 1990s 
was reversed in 2008, largely due to higher food prices which have pushed 100 million people 
deeper into absolute poverty (UN, 2008). A decrease in international food prices in the second 
half of 2008 has failed to translate into more affordable food for most people around the 
world. The prevalence of hunger in developing regions is now on the rise, from 16% in 2006 
to 17% in 2008. Most of this increase will occur in sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia, 
which are the poorest regions of the world. 
One of the major reasons of this persistent poverty and food insecurity is the low 
targeting efficiency and poverty outreach of most development programs in these countries. 
There is a growing recognition from the development community that many existing 
development and safety net programs are very badly targeted (Coady and Parker, 2009). Over 
the past few decades, development projects failed to either reach the poor or meet their 
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aspirations and needs in developing countries. Therefore, policy makers as well as 
international donors are making conscious efforts to ascertain whether the projects they fund 
actually reach the poor. To this end, they have begun to take concrete steps to direct their 
financial and technical support to those programs that have greater poverty outreach and 
withdraw resources from those programs that fail to reach the poor (Zeller et al., 2006a). 
Better targeting has become an imperative for developing countries in the wake of 
macroeconomic and structural adjustment programs under which governments are pressured 
to cut back enormously on their expenditures (Chinsinga, 2005).  
Moreover, the success of any development policy or project will hinge on a key factor: the 
extent to which they actually target and reach the poor. Excellent health or education projects 
make little dent in poverty alleviation if the poor fail to access them, imaginative poverty-based or 
income transfer policies will not have served their purpose if they are misdirected to the non-poor 
(Zeller et al., 2006a). Ideally, targeting should help direct resources to those who need them the 
most, i.e. the poor. In theory, a better targeting should result in a redistribution of resources to the 
poor by directing resources only to them. Thus, targeting is a means of increasing program 
efficiency by increasing the benefit that the poor can get within a fixed budget. It allows for the 
most effective use of limited government and donor resources and it is likely to result in higher 
marginal impact given that the poor might be more efficient in using scarce resources than the less 
poor. Likewise, historically public spending tends to exclude the lower strata of the population. 
Therefore, without active efforts to target resources at the poor, even the so-called “universalist 
programs” will miss the poor (Grosh, 2009).  
Furthermore, the literature suggests that countries with more egalitarian income 
distribution may perform better in terms of growth and poverty reduction than those with high 
income inequality (Ravallion, 1997, Thorbecke and Charumilind, 2002). Thus, better 
targeting may foster economic growth. Achieving the MDGs also requires targeting areas and 
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population groups that have clearly been left behind – rural communities, the poorest 
households and ethnic minorities (UN, 2009).  
1.2 Problem Statement 
By all estimates, Malawi is a very poor country with 52.4% of its population living 
below the poverty line and 22% living in extreme poverty (National Statistics Office - NSO - , 
2005a). In other words, about 6.4 million Malawians live in poverty and as many as 2.7 million 
Malawians, about one in every five people, live in such dire poverty that they cannot afford to 
meet even their recommended daily food needs (Government of Malawi - GoM - and World 
Bank, 2007). The country is one of the poorest in Sub-Saharan Africa with over 80% of its 
workers in the primary sector, most in agriculture (Benson, 2002).  
The proportion of poor people living in poverty is highest in rural areas of the 
southernmost (64%) and northernmost (56%) parts of the country, which are also the most 
densely populated rural regions, while the center is relatively less poor (47%). Urban areas 
have much lower percentages of people living below the poverty line (25%), and they also 
have the lowest share of ultra-poor (8%). Although poverty incidence rates are relatively high 
in most areas of the country, there is a considerable differentiation in poverty levels within 
districts. Nevertheless, poverty is pervasive in the country. Due to improved macroeconomic 
management, favorable weather conditions, and a supportive donor environment, in the last 3-
4 years, the country has experienced high growth rates averaging 7.5% and the growth rate is 
projected at 6.9% in 2009 (World Bank, 2009c).  
In the past, public services, such as agricultural extension and market infrastructure as 
well as resources, such as credit, fertilizer and improved seeds, etc. distributed through the 
existing public social safety net systems financed by international donors and the national 
government, were not efficiently targeted at the poor, nor to their aspirations and needs as 
shown by various studies (World Bank, 2006, 2007; Smith, 2001). Estimates from the IHS2 
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survey data of 2005 suggest that about 35% of the rural poor did not benefit from the targeted 
Starter Pack Initiative, whereas 62% of the rural non-poor reported benefiting from the 
program. Likewise, researches by Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne (2009) and Dorward et al. (2008) 
suggest that the 2006/2007 Agricultural Input Subsidy Program (AISP) has been targeted to 
wealthier and politically connected farmers who would otherwise have purchased the 
fertilizer, causing substantial displacements on the fertilizer market. Almost all social 
protection programs are poorly targeted in the country (GoM and World Bank, 2007). 
As a result, poverty has not been reduced in the country. From 1998 to 2005, the 
poverty rate declined less than 2% from 54.1% to 52.4%. Moreover, extreme poverty has not 
substantially been reduced during the same period. However, poverty has not been static. The 
frequent and widespread occurrence of shocks in Malawi results in large movements into and 
out of poverty. Such volatility at the household level reflects the pervasive risks and shocks 
which affect the lives of Malawians. Recent trends in human development indicators broadly 
support the conclusion that there has been no or little progress in reducing poverty in the 
country since 1998. Furthermore, given the lack of progress during the past decade, Malawi is 
unlikely to achieve the target reduction in poverty and ultra-poverty by 50% between 1990 
and 2015 (GoM and World Bank, 2007).  
With a per capita income of US$230 (World Bank, 2008) and limited donor resources, 
the surplus available to redistribute is relatively small. Meanwhile, the large proportion of the 
population living under the poverty line means that any program large enough to have a 
substantial impact on the poor would be extremely costly and affordable options will only be 
able to reach some fairly limited portion of the population in need, and will have limited effect 
on household welfare (Smith, 2001). Better targeting can maximize the reduction of poverty 
given a limited budget for poverty alleviation and the trade-off between the number of 
beneficiaries covered by an intervention and the level of transfer - i.e. an opportunity cost - 
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(Coady et al., 2002). Therefore, it is important that assistance is not mistakenly given to the 
non-poor, who may attempt to gain access to benefits by misrepresenting their income status 
(Glewwe, 1992). 
It has appeared that much more remains to be done or corrected to ensure that 
development interventions reach their intended beneficiaries in the country. A major 
challenge for Malawi is to develop a low cost, fairly accurate, and easy system to target the 
poorest (PMS, 2000). Therefore, we conduct research on the theme: Operational Poverty 
Targeting by Proxy Means Tests: Models and Policy Simulations for Malawi.  
The study intends to make innovative methodological and practical contributions to 
the econometric estimation of poverty assessment models. Especially, we would like to 
establish whether indicator-based targeting offers a better prospect compared to the 
currently used mechanisms for targeting the poor and smallholder farmers, largely 
dominated by community-based targeting in Malawi. In addition to the Weighted Least 
Square (WLS), we employ the Weighted Logit and Weighted Quantile regressions with 
refined econometric methods for testing a model’s robustness and out-of-sample validity. 
Furthermore, we estimate the cost-effectiveness and poverty impacts of targeting and assess 
whether using the models developed is more target- and cost-efficient than past agricultural 
subsidy programs, namely the targeted Starter Pack Initiative and the Agricultural Input 
Support Program (AISP). Hence, the development of advanced poverty models is expected 
to improve existing targeting methods used by the Malawian Government and donors in 
agricultural and rural development. Efficiently targeting the poor is likely to improve the 
household food security, agricultural production, and contribute to the country’s overall 
agricultural development in the long run. 
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1.3 Research Objectives and Scope of the Study  
The overall objective of this research resides in developing low cost and fairly 
accurate models for targeting the poor and smallholder farmers and assessing the cost-
effectiveness and poverty impacts of targeting in Malawi. Findings from the study should help 
to improve the targeting of development policies and social safety net funds towards the poor 
and smallholder agricultural households.  
From the theoretical point of view, the research should contribute to the ongoing 
international research on poverty assessment and earlier works by the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), the World Bank, the Food Insecurity and Vulnerability 
Information and Mapping Systems (FIVIMS) of the Food and Agriculture Organization 
(FAO), and the project of the IRIS Center at the University of Maryland in Asia, Latin 
America, and Africa. Particularly, the analysis is expected to improve the above-mentioned 
works through the use of more refined econometric models as well as improved techniques 
for testing model’s robustness and out-of-sample validity.  
The study seeks to answer the following questions: 
1. What are the best sets of indicators (models) – both in terms of accuracy and 
practicality – for correctly predicting whether a household is poor or not? 
2. How well do the models perform out-of-sample, i.e. in an independent sample?  
3. How sensitive are the models to the poverty line? 
4. Is there a difference between estimation methods in terms of predictive power or 
targeting accuracy?  
5. Is targeting by proxy means tests more target- and cost-efficient than universal 
interventions and community-based targeting?  
6. What are the potential benefits and impacts of targeting by proxy means tests?  
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Specifically, this research seeks to achieve the following objectives:  
1. identify the best sets of indicators for predicting the household poverty status;  
2. perform robustness tests to assess the predictive power of the identified sets; 
3. estimate the prediction intervals for the model performances; 
4. evaluate the model sensitivity to different poverty lines; 
5. estimate the cost-effectiveness and benefits of targeting by proxy means tests; 
6. simulate the potential impacts of targeting under a proxy means test on poverty;  
7. compare the model targeting efficiency to the performance of the Starter Pack and 
AISP programs; 
8. discuss the potential contributions of the models and their implications for targeting 
development policies in Malawi and other developing countries.  
1.4 Organization of the Thesis 
This thesis is organized as follows. Section 1.5 describes the data used for the 
research, whereas section 1.6 reviews the literature on targeting, including the definition 
and nature of poverty and past targeted programs in Malawi.  
We address the research questions within the scope of three research articles. In the 
first article titled: Operational Models for Improving the Targeting Efficiency of Development 
Policies: A systematic comparison of different estimation methods using out-of-sample tests 
(Chapter 2), we apply two regression methods – the Weighted Least Square and Weighted 
Logit – along with stepwise selection of variables to develop different proxy means tests 
models for urban and rural Malawi. Both estimation methods are compared based on their 
targeting performances out-of-sample and their Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) 
curves. Furthermore, the model sensitivity to the poverty line is examined and the major 
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conclusions regarding the use of the models and its contributions to improving the targeting 
efficiency of Malawi’s development policies are drawn. 
The second paper is similar to the first one. However, in contrast to the first paper 
which uses continuous as well as dummy variables, the second paper titled: Targeting the 
Poor and Smallholder Farmers: Empirical evidence from Malawi (Chapter 3) uses only 
categorical poverty indicators and applies a stepwise logit to develop simple models for 
identifying the poor and smallholder farmers in the country. Categorical indicators are less 
prone to measurement errors than continuous variables. Indicators are selected based on a 
set of statistical instruments, including the area under a ROC curve which is a good measure 
of how well an indicator predicts poverty. To facilitate the screening of beneficiaries and 
the models use on the field, subsequent transformations are applied after estimation and the 
key findings are highlighted.  
The third paper which is titled: To Target or Not To Target? The costs, benefits, and 
impacts of indicator-based targeting (Chapter 4), estimates the cost-effectiveness, the 
benefits, and poverty impacts of targeting. It is often argued that targeting is cost-ineffective 
and once all targeting costs have been considered, a targeted program may not be any more 
cost-efficient and may not have any more effect on poverty than a universal program. We test 
whether this is the case for Malawi. Using a weighted Quantile regression, the paper develops 
proxy means test models for Malawi and assess whether targeting is more cost- and impact-
effective compared to universal interventions. In addition, the potential benefits of targeting 
are simulated. Furthermore, we assess whether targeting by proxy indicators is more target- 
and cost-efficient than the 2000/2001 Starter Pack and the 2006/2007 Agricultural Input 
Support Program (AISP), both of which were administered through community-based 
targeting systems and emphasize the main findings of the research. 
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The final chapter summarizes the main results of the study, comparing the model 
performances and emphasizing its potential contributions and implications for targeting 
development policies in Malawi. Further research areas and the limitations of the work are 
also specified.  
1.5. Data Source  
The present study draws mainly on the Second Malawi Integrated Household Survey 
(IHS2) of 2005. In 2003, the Government of Malawi decided to conduct the IHS2 in order to 
compare the current situation with the situation in 1997-98, and collect more detailed information 
in specific areas of the rural and urban sectors. The survey was conducted by the National 
Statistics Office (NSO) of Malawi with technical assistance from the International Food Policy 
Research Institute (IFPRI) and the World Bank. The IHS2 was designed to cover a wide array of 
subject matter whose primary objective is to provide a complete and integrated dataset to better 
understand the target population of households affected by poverty (NSO, 2005b).  
Survey planning and pilot testing of the survey instruments took place in 2003. The 
survey was carried out over a period of 13 months from March 2004 through March 2005. 
The sampling design followed a two-stage stratified sampling selection which involved in the 
first stage a selection of 564 Primary Sampling Units (PSU) based on Probability Proportional 
to Size (PPS) sampling and in the second stage a random selection of 20 households per PSU. 
In total, 11280 households were surveyed. This sample is representative both at national and 
district levels, hence the survey provides reliable estimates for those areas. 
Some specific objectives of the survey are as follows: 
• provide timely and reliable information on key welfare and socioeconomic indicators and 
meet special data needs for the review of the Malawi Poverty Reduction Strategy which has 
been implemented in Malawi for the last five years since year 2002;  
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• provide data to come up with an update of the poverty profile for Malawi (poverty 
incidence, poverty gap, severity of poverty);  
• derive indicators for monitoring of Malawi’s progress towards achievement of the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) and the Malawi Poverty Reduction targets (MPRs);  
• provide an understanding of the living conditions of Malawi’s people who live mostly in 
rural areas; 
• provide an understanding of the linkage between poverty, agriculture, and food security and; 
• provide information for the formulation of a rural development strategy. 
During the IHS2 survey, information was collected at household as well as community 
levels on a wide range of socioeconomic characteristics, including household demography, 
education, health, time use and labor, security and safety, housing, consumption of food and 
non-food items, durable goods, agriculture, economic activities, credits, social safety nets, child 
anthropometry, access to basic services in the community, etc1. Household expenditures data 
were collected following the United Nations statistical system of Classification of Individual 
Consumption According to Purpose (COICOP). Broadly speaking, the consumption 
expenditures collected fall into four categories: i) food, ii) non-food and non-consumer 
durables, iii) consumer durable goods and, iv) actual or self-estimated rental cost of housing. 
The food expenditures also included the consumption from the household own production.  
Since the data were collected over a period of 13 months and across different districts, 
there are price differences which need to be considered. In order to compare the monetary 
values across households, the nominal values were converted into real values using a price 
index that accounts for spatial and temporal price differences in the country. In addition, a 
national poverty line was established by the NSO. This poverty line has two components: the 
food poverty line and the non-food poverty line. The food poverty line or ultra poverty line 
                                                 
1 See the IHS2 basic information document (NSO, 2005b) for further details on the IHS2 survey. 
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was derived by estimating the amount of expenditures below which an individual is unable to 
purchase enough food to meet its recommended daily caloric requirements of 2,400 
kilocalories (kcal). The food poverty line was estimated at 27.5 Malawi Kwacha (MK) per 
capita per day based on a set of basket of food items. 
With regard to the non-food poverty line, it was established based on those households 
whose consumption is close to the food poverty line, as there is no concept like calories which 
can be applied in that case. Households whose food expenditures per capita are five percent 
below or above the food poverty line were considered to calculate the kernel weighted 
average non-food expenditures. Based on this estimation, the non-food poverty line was set at 
MK16.8 per capita per day. The national total poverty line was therefore estimated at MK44.3 
per capita per day (NSO, 2005c). 
1.6 Targeting in the Literature  
The literature on poverty targeting is well established. By definition, targeting is the 
process by which benefits are channeled to the members of the high priority group that a 
program aims to serve (Grosh and Baker, 1995). It is a means of identifying which members 
of society should receive a particular benefit, such as a social transfer (Rook and Freeland, 
2006). It involves two elements: first defining which categories of people should be eligible to 
receive benefits (i.e. setting the eligibility criteria), and second establishing mechanisms for 
identifying those people within the population (finding out who meets the eligibility criteria). 
As the main target group is the poor in this research, first we define poverty, including the 
profile of Malawi’s poor. Then, we review the poverty targeting mechanisms often used in 
development practice and emphasize the use of Proxy Means Tests (PMT). 
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1.6.1 The concept of poverty: Theoretical considerations 
1.6.1.1 Defining poverty  
The concept of poverty has evolved considerably since the eighteenth century. 
Nonetheless, poverty is defined today as a state of long-term deprivation of well-being 
considered adequate for a decent life (Aho et al., 2003). Poverty is also seen as a long-term 
phenomenon which doesn’t apply to individuals in temporary need. In other words, poverty is 
considered as a level of consumption and expenditures by individuals in a household which 
has been calculated to be insufficient to meet their basic needs; the benchmark being the 
poverty line which is the minimum level of food and non-food consumption expenditures 
deemed sufficient to live a decent life. This definition of poverty is absolute and essentially 
monetary. It favors a certain number of basic needs (e.g. food, housing, clothing, education) 
that must be fulfilled before an individual can be considered non-poor.  
The concept of absolute poverty is standard, but nonetheless narrow view of poverty 
(Benson, 2002). It defines poverty independently from individual perceptions of well-being, 
focuses on living standards, and relies on what decision makers judge adequate from a social 
point of view. Likewise, it differs from Sen’s conceptualization of poverty and excludes 
several important components of personal and household well-being, including physical 
security, level of participation in networks of support and affection, access to important public 
social infrastructure, such as health and educational services, and whether or not one can 
exercise ones human rights (Benson, 2002).  
According to Sen (1987), poverty is a deprivation in capabilities and functionings2. 
A functioning is an achievement (e.g. being well-nourished, educated, etc.), whereas a 
capability is the ability to achieve (freedom to choose, longevity, fertility, etc.). Sen (1987) 
emphasizes that the basic needs should be formulated in line with functionings and 
                                                 
2 See Sen (1987) and Johannsen (2009) for further details on Sen’s capability approach. 
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capabilities between which exists a simultaneous and two-way relationship. “Functionings are 
more related to living conditions since they are different aspects of life. Capabilities, in 
contrast are notions of freedom, in the positive sense: what real, but also good opportunities 
you have regarding the life you may lead.” (Sen, 1987). Even though Sen’s conceptualization 
of poverty has received wider attention, its empirical application is challenging. Nevertheless, 
some attempts have been made in the literature to incorporate Sen’s views in the form of 
poverty indices, such as the Human Development Index (HDI) and the Human Poverty Index 
HPI (UNDP, 1990) which are multidimensional measures of poverty and development. In 
sum, there is more to assessing the quality of life and the welfare of individuals than 
consumption and expenditures. Nonetheless, the concept of monetary poverty is widely used 
in economics.  
Why do individuals go poor? The causes of poverty are myriad, but Aho et al. (2003) 
identify three major ones. The first refers to the unequal distribution of production factors. 
Countries like individuals do not have the same physical, financial, and human capital, nor do 
they enjoy the same access to the technological knowledge necessary for the optimal 
utilization of that capital. The second source of poverty stems from the choice that individuals 
make in allocating their time between work and leisure, spending and saving, production and 
consumption. According to this cause, people are responsible for their poverty because they 
freely choose to allocate their individual resources in certain ways and thereby assume the 
consequences, either positive or negative.  
The third cause of poverty results from the unequal access to ways out of poverty. 
Therefore, improving the poor access to essential services, such as healthcare, basic education 
and clean water as well as access to economic opportunities, such as micro-credit and 
employment might help reduce poverty. Nevertheless, a country’s specific context also 
matters in the definition of and fight against poverty.  
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1.6.1.2 The nature of poverty in Malawi  
Malawi is a Southern African country (Figure 1) with a population of about 13.1 million 
people (NSO, 2008) and one of the poorest countries in the world with a per capita income of 
US$230 (World Bank, 2008). More than 85% of the population live in rural areas. The country 
is mostly agricultural with about 90% of its households working in the sector. Almost half of 
the households are subsistence farmers. The agricultural sector contributed about 34% to the 
GDP in 2007 (World Bank, 2009b) and accounted for more than 80% of export earnings 
(World Bank, 2009c). Malawi is a large exporter of tobacco which is the most important cash 
crop in the country. In 2006, tobacco production amounted to about 74% of export earnings in 
terms of main commodities – tobacco, tea, and sugar – (NSO, 2007). 
 
Figure 1: Map of Malawi. 
Source: Adopted from the National Statistics Office (2005a). 
Deeply entrenched poverty is a major obstacle to Malawi’s development and growth. 
As mentioned earlier, in 2005 the poverty rate was estimated at 52.4% and the ultra poverty or 
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food poverty rate was set at 22.4% (NSO, 2005a). By international standard, this rate amounts 
to 61.4%3. Poverty is higher in rural than in urban areas (Figure 2) with the highest 
concentration of poor living in the Southern and Northern regions.  
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 Figure 2: Welfare distribution in the Malawian population. 
 Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. 
The curves in Figure 2 show the proportion of the population at any given daily 
consumption level ranked from the poorest to the richest. For example, the portions of the 
curves under the poverty line represent different levels of consumption of the poor. The 
distance between the poverty line and any point on these portions of the curves shows the 
consumption shortfall of the individuals. By visual inspection, these curves suggest that 
Malawi’s poverty is deep, especially among the rural population because many of the poor are 
farther below the poverty line.  
Likewise, Malawi has a fairly high inequality with a Gini coefficient estimated at 0.39, 
reflecting profound inequities in access to assets, services, and opportunities across the 
population (GoM and World Bank, 2007). The top third of the population has a much higher 
living standard than the bottom two thirds. However, inequality is substantially higher in 
urban than in rural areas (0.47 versus 0.34) as indicated by the Lorenz curves in Figure 3. On 
the other hand, the gap and severity of poverty are much lower in urban than in rural areas. 
                                                 
3 This rate is estimated based on an international poverty line of US$1.25 equivalent to MK59.175 in Purchasing   
   Power Parity. 
56.19 
Rural population Urban population 
25.13 Poverty line 
Poverty line 
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Malawi rural population (Gini = 0.34)
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                Figure 3: Lorenz curves of urban and rural Malawi. 
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. 
Poverty has remained fairly stable over the last decade in the country. A recent report 
by the GoM and the World Bank (2007) suggests that there has been no or little progress in 
reducing poverty in the country since 1998. To put this in perspective, we present in Table 1 
the progress in poverty between 1998 and 2005.  
Table 1. Poverty in Malawi (1998 and 2005) 
1998 2005 
 
Headcount Gap Severity Headcount Gap Severity 
Poor 54.1 18.6 8.5 52.4 17.8 8.0 
Ultra-poor 23.6 5.7 2.0 22.4 5.3 1.8 
By region By region 
 
Poor Poor 
Urban 18.5 4.8 1.8 25.4 7.1 2.8 
Rural Overall 58.1 20.2 9.2 55.9 19.2 8.6 
North 56.3 19.5 8.9 56.3 19.6 8.8 
Central 47.6 14.4 6.0 46.7 14.1 5.9 
South 68.4 25.7 12.3 64.4 23.8 11.2 
 Ultra-poor Ultra-poor 
Urban 4.9 1.1 0.5 7.5 1.6 0.5 
Rural Overall 25.7 6.2 2.2 24.2 5.8 2.0 
North 24.9 6.0 2.1 25.9 5.9 1.9 
Central 16.3 3.5 3.2 16.1 3.5 1.1 
South 34.6 8.9 1.2 31.5 7.9 2.8 
Source: Adopted from the IHS2 report (GoM and World Bank, 2007). 
As shown in Table 1, the poverty rate was estimated at 54.1% in 1998 against 52.4% 
in 2005, implying a reduction of less than 2%. Likewise, poverty continues to be much higher 
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in rural than in urban areas, and the South is still the poorest regions of the country. Poverty 
has not been static, however. There have been some movements in relative levels of poverty. 
While the overall levels of poverty remain stagnant, the rankings of districts have changed. About 
two-third of households have moved into or out of poverty during the past decade. Such large 
movements reflect the fact that a quarter of Malawians have income levels within 20% of the 
poverty line and could therefore be forced into poverty by even slight misfortune. Urban poverty 
has been increasing rapidly, from 18% in 1998 to 25% in 2005. This increase has been offset by a 
decrease in rural poverty in the South from 68% to 64%. Similar patterns can be observed when 
comparing ultra-poverty as well as changes in poverty gap, severity, and inequality. These 
findings are also supported by recent trends in human development indicators. While there have 
been some improvements in education and literacy, several health indicators have worsen during 
the past decade (GoM and World Bank, 2007). 
Who are the Malawian poor and how do they differ from the non-poor? Are some types 
of households more likely to be poor? Living conditions, such as housing, water, sanitation, 
cooking, and lighting fuel are very basic for the majority of the population, especially in rural 
areas, making it difficult to distinguish poor households based on these characteristics (GoM 
and World Bank, 2007). However, access rates are generally better in urban than in rural areas. 
Figure 4 provides a poverty, risk, and vulnerability profile for Malawi.  
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                      Ultra-poverty rate: 22 percent                                 Poverty rate: 52 percent 
 
Poorer                                                                                                                                                            Richer 
Ultra-poor Poor Transient poor/at risk 
 Few assets, little or no land 
 Income less than food needs 
 Chronic illness, female-headed, 
elderly-headed, high dependency 
ratio 
 Low vulnerability because of low 
risk and low return livelihood 
strategy 
 Pathway out of poverty: long term 
investment in human capital, 
utilizing existing labor and other 
assets  
 Some land or labor and other assets, but 
vulnerable to further impoverishment 
 Income less than food and non-food 
needs 
 Heavily dependent on a single activity 
– usually agriculture 
 Vulnerable to climate/weather shocks/ 
crop failure, chronic illness 
 Net consumers of food 
 Little resilience to shocks 
 Pathway out of poverty: increase 
capacity to deal with shocks 
 Land and labor assets 
 Some resilience, but 
face a broad range of 
shocks 
 
High dependence on single                                                        
livelihood activity        
 
Figure 4: Profile of poverty, risk and vulnerability in Malawi. 
Source: Adopted from World Bank (2007). 
Table 2 explores the correlation between poverty and some basic household 
characteristics in Malawi. 
Table 2. Characterization of the Malawian poor  
Dimensions Indicators Poor Non-poor T-value  
Welfare Per capita expenditures (MK) 28.79 82.27 124.33*** 
Household size 5.43 3.81 -39.11*** 
Dependency ratio 0.54 0.38 -33.99*** Demography 
Age of household head 44.33 40.93 -11.02*** 
Education Members with no schooling or incomplete primary education 1.76 0.75 -31.86*** 
Total agricultural land (ha) 0.51 0.48 -0.39 
Total land cultivated (ha) 0.35 0.30 -0.93 
Number of pangas owned2 0.75 0.89 8.78*** 
Number of hoes owned 3.02 2.87 -4.41*** 
Number of sickles owned 0.78 0.72 8.45*** 
Agriculture1 
Number of axes owned 0.80 0.95 3.97*** 
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. ***denotes significant at 0.01 level of error 
1Estimations based on agricultural households only. 2Panga is a large heavy knife used for cutting 
the vegetation. 
Apart from total agricultural and total cultivated land, the characteristics presented in 
Table 2 are highly correlated with poverty. Considering the household consumption, the poor 
consume about MK29 per capita per day against MK82 for the non-poor. Disaggregated by 
Increasing diversification of livelihoods 
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deciles (Figure 5), the households in the 9th and 10th deciles (richest) have an average 
consumption which is respectively 20 (MK196.54) and 10 (MK103.37) times higher than the 
consumption of the poorest households - 1st decile - (MK18.15). 
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                                             Figure 5: Household expenditures by poverty deciles. 
                                             Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. 
Furthermore, Table 2 indicates that households with higher size and higher 
dependency ratio, and households held by older heads are more likely to be poor. For 
example, households in the poorest decile are more than twice as large as households in the 
richest decile (panel to the left of Figure 6). Likewise, household heads in the poorest decile 
are more than seven years older than those in the richest decile (panel to the right of Figure 6).  
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Deciles of consumption expenditures
H
ou
se
ho
ld
 d
em
og
ra
ph
y
Household size
Dependency ratio
34
36
38
40
42
44
46
48
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Deciles of consumption expenditures
A
ge
 o
f h
ou
se
ho
ld
 h
ea
d 
(y
ea
rs
)
 
Figure 6: Household characteristics by poverty deciles.  
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data.  
With regard to education, Table 2 suggests that on average the illiteracy rate is higher 
among the poor compared to the non-poor; 1.76 versus 0.75. Likewise, the household head 
level of education is strongly correlated with poverty as shown in Figure 7.  
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 Figure 7: Household education. 
 Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. Educational qualification: 1=None, 2= Primary School 
 Leaving Certificate (PSLC), 3= Junior Certificate of Education (JCE), 4= Malawi School Certificate of 
 Education (MSCE), 5=Non-university diploma, 6=University degree, 7=Post graduate degree. 
The panel to the left of Figure 7 indicates that the poverty rate decreases whereas the 
share of non-poor increases with increasing level of education of the household head. Higher 
levels of education are almost exclusively reserved to the non-poor. Likewise, the illiteracy 
rate decreases with increasing consumption level as shown in the panel to the right of Figure 7. 
Nevertheless, the absence of formal education of the head is not synonymous with poverty: 
some non-poor household heads do have low level of education.  
With respect to the gender of the household head, the GoM and World Bank (2007) 
state that poverty and ultra-poverty are more common in female-headed households. About 
51% of the people living in male-headed households are poor, while 59% of people living in 
female-headed households are poor. In addition, gender-based differences in access to resources 
and bargaining power reveal significant disparities in welfare between women and men (GoM 
and World Bank, 2007).  
As concerns access to agricultural assets, such as land and equipments, the picture in 
Table 2 is mixed. The average land holding per capita is fairly small (0.43 ha). Holdings are 
higher among the poor (0.51 ha) compared to non-poor agricultural households (0.48 ha). 
There is, however no significant difference between poor and non-poor on average land per 
capita. Moreover, a visual inspection of the land distribution per decile (Figure 8) reveals no 
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perceptible relation between holdings and poverty. Therefore, smaller landholdings are not 
synonymous with poverty in Malawi.  
Likewise, Table 2 indicates that non-poor agricultural households own on average a 
higher number of pangas (0.89) and axes (0.95), whereas the poor possess a higher number of 
hoes (3.02) and sickles (0.78). The panel to the right of Figure 8 reveals that access to small 
agricultural equipments is slightly high in the richest deciles, except the number of hoes 
which is higher in the poorest deciles of the agricultural population. 
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 Figure 8: Household agricultural assets by poverty deciles.  
 Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data.  
According to the GoM and World Bank (2007), poor households are unable to 
diversify out of agriculture. Most households earn their income only from farm or fishing 
activity. Off-farm income sources tend to be limited to Ganyu (casual labor) for the poor. This 
situation reflects the lack of opportunities as a result of low levels of education, low capital 
base, and limited availability to credits and markets. 
As mentioned earlier, housing conditions are very basic for the majority of the 
population. Figure 9 shows the relation between poverty and selected housing characteristics. 
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 Figure 9: Household housing conditions. 
 Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. Type of construction material: 1=traditional, 2=semi- 
 permanent, 3=permanent. Type of lighting fuel: 1=grass, 2=collected firewood, 3=purchased firewood, 
 4=paraffin, 5=gas, 6=candles, 7=battery/dry cell, 8=electricity. 
The panel to the left of Figure 9 indicates a likely correlation between poverty and housing; 
the majority of households living in houses built with traditional materials are poor, whereas those 
living in houses with semi-permanent and permanent structures are overwhelmingly non-poor. For 
instance, more than 50% of the households living in traditional structures are poor, whereas more 
than 80% of the households living in permanent structures are non-poor.  
Concerning the type of lighting fuel, the panel to the right of Figure 9 shows that the 
poverty rate decreases with increasing lighting quality. For example, more than 60% of the 
households using grass as lighting fuel are poor. On the other hand, over 80% of the 
households using candles, battery, or electricity as lighting fuel are non-poor and less than 
20% of them are poor. The same trend applies to the house floor and wall material in 
appendix 8. Therefore, it seems fair to say that the poor tend to live in very poor housing 
conditions compared to non-poor in Malawi. 
The GoM and World Bank (2007) report that limited access to markets, financial 
services, key transport infrastructure, and remoteness are the main obstacles to getting out of 
poverty. The latter also emphasize that the existence of widespread risk and the frequent 
occurrence of shocks, such as illness, death, crop failure, livestock disease, and falls in crop 
prices, is a major cause of poverty in the country.  
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The description of Malawi’s poor can guide the development of effective poverty 
reduction policies and programs. However, reducing poverty requires first identifying the 
poor. How to identify and target those who are unable to meet their basic needs? We discuss 
the issue in the following section. 
1.6.2 Targeting the poor: Empirical methods 
Targeting methods have all the same goal – to correctly identify which households or 
individuals should receive benefits based on predefined criteria (e.g. individuals living below 
the poverty line, vulnerable households, etc.) and which should not. Targeting can be based 
on different units, such as households or individuals. And the targeted beneficiary is not 
necessarily the same as the recipient (Rook and Freeland, 2006); for example a child support 
grant targeted at under-14s would not be given directly to the child, but to the head of the 
child’s household.  
In practice, a number of methods are used to target development interventions at the poor. 
The main targeting methods include means tests, proxy means tests, geographical targeting, 
categorical targeting, community-based targeting, and self-targeting. In the absence of targeting, 
program benefits are provided “universally” – In other words to everyone in the population. Table 3 
gives an overview of existing targeting methods, including their advantages and weaknesses. 
Table 3 is self-explanatory. A few remarks can be drawn from the Table. None of the 
targeting methods is perfect; all of them have advantages but also some limitations. Likewise, 
they are not mutually exclusive and may work better in combination if feasible. The 
appropriateness of targeting is determined by its costs. Divergent views on the efficacy of targeted 
interventions are based on differing assessments of three questions (Coady et al., 2004). “Are the 
methods used for reaching the poor likely to achieve better targeting outcomes? Are they cost-
effective? Do they raise the living standards of the poor?” Targeting is not costless. There is a 
whole range of costs associated with narrow targeting: administrative costs, incentive effects, 
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private costs borne by beneficiaries, stigmatization and social discrimination, and political costs. 
On the other hand, universal regimes are prohibitive because of excessive leakage to the non-poor 
and budget constraint. Because of the special relevance of Proxy Means Tests (PMTs) for this 
research, we provide in the following section further details on the tests. 
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Table 3. Overview of poverty targeting methods 
Characteristics 
Targeting methods Definitions Advantages Disadvantages Applications 
Verified means tests 
 
Aimed at the poor, based on 
the measurement of the 
beneficiary income, assets 
and/or nutrition status 
Best way of determining eligibility, 
focus on the poor, reduces inclusion 
errors 
Very costly and difficult to administer, require regular 
and frequent monitoring, administrative compliance 
results in inclusion errors, possible stigma, performance 
rise with country-income level, appropriate for countries 
with higher administrative capacity and well 
documented economic transactions, and programs that 
provide large benefits 
Child support grant 
(South Africa), GAPVU 
(Mozambique) 
Simple means tests 
Rely on self-reported income 
or welfare status  or 
qualitative assessment of a 
social worker with no 
independent verification 
Simple, quick, and easy Inaccurate, introduce perverse incentives to lie, 
especially when no triangulating information is collected 
1980 Food Stamp 
Program (Jamaica) 
 
Proxy means tests 
 
Aimed at the poor, based 
more easily observable 
“proxy” measures of poverty 
(e.g. location, housing, 
assets) or vulnerability (e.g. 
household characteristics)  
Focus on the poor and vulnerable, 
reduces inclusion and exclusion errors, 
can be easily replicated, fairly accurate, 
can guaranty horizontal equity, fairly 
simple training required, can be used to 
evaluate program outreach and impacts, 
system can be shared between different 
programs 
Difficult to construct valid and accurate proxy 
indicators, may introduce perverse incentives to meet 
proxy criteria, effective verification process may be 
needed, may be costly and difficult to administer, 
especially at scale, rigid, static, possible stigma 
BEAM (Zimbabwe), 
PAM (Zambia), INAS 
(Mozambique), FICHAS 
(Chile), PROGRESA 
(Mexico) 
Community-based 
targeting 
 
Aimed at the poor, based on 
community perception of 
poverty and vulnerability 
Reflects and values local knowledge and 
understanding of poverty and 
vulnerability, simple, low administrative 
costs, can work in a well defined 
community with good social consensus 
Significant inclusion and exclusion errors, may 
perpetuate local patronage structures and gender bias, 
can be divisive, difficult to evaluate, not replicable, 
accuracy cannot be verified, communities often tend to 
modify criteria to suit their interests, diverging interests 
of community members, notion of community is 
problematic  
Kalomo cash transfer 
(Zambia), Mchindji cash 
transfer (Malawi), Dowa 
emergency cash transfer, 
Starter Pack, AISP 
(Malawi) 
Source: Own conception and compilations from Rook and Freeland (2006), Coady et al. (2002), and Hoddinot (1999). 
GAPVU: Gabinete de Apoio à População Vulnerável. BEAM: Basic Education Assistance Module. PAM: Program Against Malnutrition. AISP: Agricultural Input Support 
Program. INAS: National Institute for Social Welfare. PROGRESA: Programa de Educacion, Salud y Alimentacion. 
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Table 3. Overview of poverty targeting methods (continued) 
Characteristics 
Targeting methods Definitions Advantages Disadvantages Applications 
 
Categorical/demographic 
targeting 
 
Aimed at specific 
identifiable categories of the 
population associated with 
poverty (e.g. elders, children, 
female-headed households, 
disabled, orphans) 
Easy to administer, objective/ transparent 
measure, high level of public support, 
suitable when correlation between poverty 
and group characteristics is strong, lower 
administrative costs compared to other 
methods 
Inclusion and exclusion errors, does not necessarily 
target the poor and most people in need, 
documentation and administrative constraints may 
increase transaction costs for the beneficiaries  
Old age pension 
(Lesotho), Child support 
grant (South Africa), 
Disability pension 
(Namibia)  
Geographical targeting 
Aimed at specific 
geographic areas with 
disproportionate number of 
poor, rarely used alone to 
target the poor 
Easy to administer, useful as a first level 
targeting approach, may be more cost- 
efficient to concentrate resources in areas 
with disproportionate number of poor, can 
be used by all countries, useful for crisis 
situation and immediate needs 
Inclusion and exclusion errors, can encourage 
migration, does not say how much resources to give 
to which areas, may be politically unfeasible, violate 
the principles of horizontal equity, leave out poor 
living in richer regions  
Chipata cash transfer 
(Zambia), Social 
Investment Fund 
(Bolivia), Food subsidy 
(Egypt), Food-for- 
Education (Bangladesh) 
 
Self-targeting4 
 
Open to all, but offering 
benefits to which only the 
poor will be attracted (e.g. 
low wage rate), focuses on 
the quality of the good 
provided 
Low administrative costs, can be linked to 
skill development and income generation, 
can generate improved infrastructure (e.g. 
public works), appropriate for transitory 
poverty, where poor and non-poor have 
different consumption and wage patterns  
High exclusion errors, potential bias against women, 
those who cannot do hard physical work, can ensure 
good targeting but may limit the level of benefit, 
opportunity costs of participation, stigma, may be 
difficult to find a commodity that is consumed only 
by the poor, or not used in the livestock industry, or 
a wage rate that attracts only the poor, can be 
complex to design and administer. 
MASAF public works 
(Malawi), Zibambele 
program (South Africa), 
EGS Maharashtra (India) 
 
Market-delivered 
 
Provided to all through 
market mechanisms 
(subsidies, price support) 
Easy to administer 
Costly and inefficient, highly regressive, excludes 
those who are outside the market (e.g. the poor, etc.), 
may distort market 
Fertilizer subsidy 
(Malawi), price subsidies  
 
Universal targeting 
 
Provided unconditionally to 
all 
Reduces costs of targeting, no exclusion 
errors, high level of pubic support, 
respects rights 
High inclusion errors, too costly, cannot be 
sustained, especially in poor countries, low level of 
impacts 
Basic income grant 
(South Africa, Namibia) 
Source: Own conception plus compilations from Rook and Freeland (2006), Coady et al. (2002), and Hoddinot (1999). 
MASAF: Malawi Social Action Fund. EGS: Employment Guarantee Scheme. 
                                                 
4 Strictly speaking, all targeting methods are to some extent self-targeted because targeting always implies some actions and therefore costs for the beneficiaries in order to 
  qualify for the program (Coady et al., 2002).  
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1.6.3. Proxy means tests in the literature 
Because of the difficulties and the costs associated with collecting and verifying 
detailed information on household income or consumption, especially in developing 
countries, governments and development institutions rely on alternative targeting methods. 
On such method is proxy means test.  
Proxy means tests use household socioeconomic indicators to proxy its income or 
welfare level. As in any targeting method, the aim is to find a few indicators that are less 
costly to identify, but are sufficiently correlated with household income or expenditures to be 
used for poverty alleviation (Besley and Kanbur, 1993). These indicators are used to calculate 
a score that indicates how well off the household is. This score is then used to determine 
household eligibility to development or safety net programs (consumption and production 
subsidies, free food, education, health, etc.), and possibly the level of benefits. The system can 
also potentially be used for assessing the welfare impacts of agricultural development projects 
as argued by Van Bastelaer and Zeller (2006).  
The first step in designing a proxy means test is to select a few variables that are well 
correlated with poverty and have three characteristics (Coady et al., 2002): i) the variables 
should be few enough that it is feasible to apply the proxy means tests to a significant share of 
the population that may apply for the program, maybe as much as a third; ii) the variables 
selected must be easy to measure or observe (see for example Johannsen, 2009; Houssou et 
al., 2007; Zeller et al., 2006b; Zeller et al., 2005a, b; Zeller and Alcaraz V., 2005a, b); and iii) 
they should be relatively difficult for the households to manipulate just to get into the 
program. These variables are usually available in national household surveys and Living 
Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS). They often include different dimensions of poverty, 
such as housing, location, assets, demography, occupation, etc. 
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Once the variables have been chosen, statistical methods are used to associate a weight 
with each variable. One common approach is regression analyses, such as Ordinary Least 
Square (OLS), Linear Probability Model (LPM), Logit or Probit, and Quantile regressions 
which are used to regress household welfare measured by income or consumption on the 
selected variables. This procedure is often iterative in that the variables initially selected are 
chosen on the basis of a more comprehensive statistical analysis that evaluates their predictive 
power, i.e. how closely they are correlated with household welfare. Additionally, out-of-
sample validations (across time and or space) are conducted when feasible, to gauge how well 
the system is likely to perform on the field. These tests involve the use of non-overlapping 
samples derived from the initial dataset or the use of datasets from different time periods to 
assess the predictive ability of the system (see for example Johannsen, 2009; Houssou et al., 
2007; Benson et al., 2006; Narayam and Yoshida, 2005). Sometimes, the weights are rounded 
to simplify the system and facilitate calculation of scores on the field.  
A key feature of proxy means test is the formulaic nature of its calculation of need. 
The test has the merit of making replicable judgments using consistent and visible criteria 
(Coady et al., 2002). Proxy means tests are highly accurate and less prone to criticism of 
politicization or randomness. They are also less costly than verified means tests. Likewise, 
they are appropriate for large and long term programs, but less so for crisis situation (e.g. 
emergency food relief as a result of severe drought). Furthermore, the estimation methods 
used to develop proxy means test systems may require a high level of technological skills and 
may not always be well understood, especially by non-specialists. Depending on the nature of 
the indicators used, proxy means tests can capture only chronic or transient poverty or both.  
Additional methods used to develop proxy means test models include principal 
component and discriminant analyses which measure relative poverty. However, a relative 
welfare measure only identifies the poor, but doesn’t account for how much poor there are; 
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focusing on who get program benefits, but not how much they get. Such index-based 
measures of poverty are useful when income or expenditures data are not available. 
The efficacy of proxy means testing is demonstrated in various studies, such as 
Coady and Parker (2009), Johannsen (2009), Houssou et al. (2007), Schreiner (2006), Benson 
et al. (2006), Zeller et al. (2006), Narayam and Yoshida (2005), Zeller et al. (2005a, b), Zeller 
and Alcaraz V. (2005a, b), Coady et al. (2004), Ahmed and Bouis (2002), Baulch (2002), 
Braithwaite et al. (1999), Grosh and Baker (1995), Grosh (1994), and Glewwe and Kanaan 
(1989). While there is bound to be some leakage, no indicator being perfectly correlated with 
welfare, it is hoped that any leakage of benefits to those who are not poor is much less 
expensive than administering a means test or providing benefits universally to the population.  
Targeting can work, but not always. In a comprehensive survey of 122 targeted 
antipoverty interventions, Coady et al. (2004) found that differences in country characteristics 
and implementation mechanisms are important determinants of program effectiveness than the 
choice of targeting method per se. For example, administrative arrangements associated with 
collecting and verifying information are vital to ensuring low errors of exclusion of the poor and 
low leakage to the non-poor. No matter how well or badly the statistical formula works, if the 
poor don’t register for the program, it will have high exclusion errors (Coady et al., 2002).  
There is a long tradition of targeting by proxy means tests in Latin America. Social safety 
nets have long relied on proxy means tests to provide benefits to the poor (e.g. Chile’s Ficha CAS, 
Columbia’s SISBEN, and Mexico’s PROGRESA). Likewise, in 2000 the U.S. Congress passed 
the Microenterprise for Self-Reliance and International Anti-Corruption Act which emphasized 
that half of all United States Agency for International Development (USAID) microenterprise 
funds benefit the very-poor. To meet this target, a subsequent legislation required USAID to 
develop and certify low cost proxy means tests tools for assessing the poverty status of 
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microenterprise clients. Within this framework, proxy means tests are now being developed and 
field-tested in many developing countries. 
In general, to evaluate the performances of a proxy means targeting system, a two-by-
two cross-table of the actual versus predicted poverty status is used. The actual poverty status 
is determined by comparing the household actual expenditures to the poverty line. 
Households with expenditures below the poverty line are classified as poor, otherwise they 
are deemed non-poor. Likewise, the predicted household poverty status is determined by 
comparing the predictions (e.g. predicted expenditures or probability of being poor) to a 
benchmark (e.g. poverty line or predefined cut-off) after estimation. Table 4 illustrates the 
cross-classifications. 
Table 4. Actual vs. predicted household poverty status 
Predicted poverty status 
Actual poverty status 
Non-poor Poor Total 
Non-Poor 444 104 548 
Poor 105 146 251 
Total 549 250 799 
Source: Adapted from Zeller et al. (2006b). 
Table 4 crosses the predicted versus the actual household poverty status. The results 
indicate that out of 548 actually non-poor households, 444 are correctly predicted as non-
poor, whereas 104 are wrongly predicted as poor. Likewise, 146 of 251 truly poor households 
are correctly predicted as poor, whereas 105 are wrongly predicted as non-poor. Based on the 
above results, different performances measures are used to assess the accuracy of the system 
as presented in Table 5. 
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Table 5. Indicators of targeting performances 
Accuracy ratios Definitions 
Total Accuracy Percentage of the total sample households whose poverty status is correctly predicted by the estimation method. 
Poverty Accuracy Number of households correctly predicted as poor, expressed as a percentage of the total number of poor. 
Non-Poverty Accuracy Number of households correctly predicted as non-poor, expressed as percentage of the total number of non-poor. 
Undercoverage Number of poor households predicted as non-poor, expressed as a percentage of the total number of poor. 
Leakage Number of non-poor households predicted as poor, expressed as a percentage of the total number of poor. 
Poverty Incidence Error (PIE) Difference between predicted and actual poverty incidence, measured in percentage points. 
Balanced Poverty Accuracy 
Criterion (BPAC) 
Poverty accuracy minus the absolute difference between undercoverage 
and leakage, measured in percentage points. 
Source: IRIS (2005). 
The first three measures in Table 5 are self-explanatory. Undercoverage and 
leakage are exclusion and inclusion errors, respectively. They are extensively used to 
assess the targeting efficiency of development policies (Valdivia, 2005; Ahmed et al., 
2004; Weiss, 2004). In statistical terminology, undercoverage is also known as type II 
error or false negative and leakage is termed as type I error or false positive.  
The performance measure PIE indicates the precision of a model in correctly 
predicting the observed poverty rate. Positive PIE values indicate an overestimation of 
the poverty incidence, whereas negative values show the opposite. The Balanced 
Poverty Acurracy Criterion (BPAC) considers three accuracy measures that are 
especially relevant for poverty targeting: poverty accuracy, leakage, and undercoverage. 
These three measures exhibit trade-offs. For example, minimizing leakage leads to higher 
undercoverage and lower poverty accuracy. Higher positive values for BPAC indicate higher 
poverty accuracy, adjusted by the absolute difference between leakage and undercoverage.  
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Using the results in Table 4 and the indicators in Table 5, the performances of the 
system can be calculated as follows: 
 Total Accuracy = ((444 + 146) / 799)* 100 = 73.84%; 
 Poverty Accuracy = (146 / 251)* 100 = 58.18%; 
 Non-Poverty Accuracy = (444 / 548)* 100 = 81.02%; 
 Undercoverage = (105 / 251)* 100 = 41.83%; 
 Leakage = (104 / 251)* 100 = 41.43%; 
 PIE = 31.29-31.41= -0.13 percentage points; 
 BPAC = 58.18-abs(41.83-41.43) = 57.77 percentage points. 
In general, actions to reduce undercoverage (e.g. raising the cut-off point) may 
increase the leakage rate and vice versa. Table 6 reviews the performances of selected studies 
(as measured by their undercoverage and leakage rates) on proxy means tests in different countries.  
Table 6. Selected studies on proxy means tests 
Performances                             Results
 
Studies 
Poverty 
rate (%) 
Estimation 
methods 
Number of 
indicators  
Out-of-
sample tests Under- 
coverage Leakage 
Iris (2008)1 
Malawi 61.4 
Iterative 
quantile 15 Yes 16.55 17.09 
Johannsen (2007) 
Peru 54 
Weighted 
OLS 10 Yes 20 25.6 
Houssou et al. (2009)2 
Uganda 32.36 Probit 10 Yes 47.06 43.53 
Schreiner (2006) 
India 46.37 Logit 15 No 38.5 16.1 
54.8 OLS 17 Yes 27 34 
Benson et al. (2006) 
                Rural Malawi 
Urban Malawi 51.6 OLS 09 Yes 18.5 25.4 
Zeller et al. (2006b) 
Bangladesh 31.41 
Principal 
component  13 No 41.83 41.43 
Zeller et al. (2005a) 
Bangladesh 31.41 
Iterative 
quantile 15 No 30.28 30.28 
Zeller & Alcaraz V. (2005a) 
Uganda 31.4 
Iterative 
quantile 15 No 38.04 37.65 
Zeller & Alcaraz V. 
(2005b) Kazakstan 4.52 
Iterative 
quantile 15 No 54.05 62.16 
Zeller et al. (2005b) 
Peru 26.88 
Iterative 
quantile 15 No 27.44 27.91 
Source: Compiled from the literature. 1Preliminary results. 2 Results based on 0.5 cut-off probability. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
34
Table 6. Selected studies on proxy means tests (continued) 
Performances                             Results
 
Studies 
Poverty 
rate (%) 
Estimation 
methods 
Number of 
indicators  
Out-of-
sample tests Under- 
coverage Leakage 
Narayan &Yoshida (2005) 
Sri Lanka 40 OLS 34 Yes 28 31 
Ahmed & Bouis (2002) 
Egypt 36.5 OLS 09 No 28.2 16.3 
Baulch (2002)2 
                 Rural Vietnam    45.5 
Stepwise 
probit 09 No 26.9 21.7 
                 Urban Vietnam 9.2 Stepwise probit 06 No 53.3 1.9 
Grosh & Baker (1995) 
Jamaica 30 OLS 25 No 41 34.2 
Source: Compiled from the literature. 1Preliminary results. 2 Results based on 0.5 cut-off probability. 
As shown in Table 6, a number of studies have applied proxy means tests for targeting 
the poor in the past. Using an iterative Quantile regression with 15 indicator set in Bangladesh, 
Zeller et al. (2005a) achieve an undercoverage and leakage of about 30%. Likewise, using the 
OLS and a set of nine indicators for targeting food subsidies in Egypt, Ahmed and Bouis (2002) 
obtain an undercoverage of 28% and a leakage of 16%. However, none of the above authors 
validates the targeting performances out-of-sample to assess the robustness of their results; they 
used the same sample to fit the models and estimate the predictions.  
Conversely, Narayan and Yoshida (2005) conduct out-of-sample tests based on 34 
indicator set in Sri Lanka. Their results yield an undercoverage of 28% and a leakage of 31%. 
Similarly, Benson et al. (2006) achieve an undercoverage of 27% and a leakage of 34% in 
Rural Malawi. Differences in the number and type of variables (categorical or continuous), 
their practicality, the poverty rate (or poverty line applied), the estimation methods, and 
whether the models are validated out-of-sample or not, make difficult a systematic 
comparison of targeting performances across studies. Nonetheless, the general trend is that 
none of the studies identifies perfectly the poor. They all exhibit some targeting errors.  
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1.6.4 Malawi’s targeted programs: Costs and targeting efficiency  
Historically, there has been no coherent strategy for targeting the poor and vulnerable 
in Malawi (Smith, 2001). There exist a large number of targeted programs in the country, 
most of which are uncoordinated short-term relief or emergency responses. In the period 
2003-2006, including emergency aid and disaster response, the combined safety nets/social 
protection system amounted to an average of more than US$134 million per year; that is 
about 6.5% of the country’s GDP (World Bank, 2007). The main programs implemented in 
the past included the Public Work Program (PWP), the Food-for-Work Program (FWP), the 
subsidized/free food distribution, such as food transfers and school feeding and the subsidized 
agricultural inputs, such as fertilizer and seeds (input subsidies and transfers). Table 7 
describes the programs implemented in Malawi between 2003 and 2006. 
Table 7. Malawi’s targeted programs from 2003 to 2006 
Programs Number of projects 
Costs 
(US$ million) 
Number of 
beneficiaries 
Average cost/ 
beneficiary (MK) 
Cash-for-work 8 212.5 863,328 34213.53 
Food transfers 2 128.0 199,550 89160.61 
Input subsidies 1 60.0 2,000,000 4170.00 
Input transfers 2 49.5 3,701,350 1858.92 
Input-for-work 3 27.4 238,857 15945.11 
School feeding 3 31.0 610,000 7063.93 
Supplementary 
feeding 2 11.1 64,208 24029.72 
Food-for-work 3 10.1 92,293 15211.34 
Relief transfers 1 0.9 1,225 102122.45 
Food and cash 1 0.6 5,050 16514.85 
Cash transfers 2 0.5 7,065 9837.23 
Source: Adapted from the World Bank (2007). Average cost based on an exchange rate of US$1=MK139. 
The cash-for-work was one of the largest programs under the PWP. It was self-targeted 
and provided transfers to the poor on the basis of a low wage rate and was operated by the 
Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF). The program was launched in 2005 as an emergency 
response to a national food shortage that occurred in the country following the 2004/2005 
drought. The underlying principle of the program is that it should self-select the poor, by paying 
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less than the prevailing market wage. This ensures that the non-poor will not be attracted. It also 
increases the probability of employing women as informal wage rates for women are generally 
below those for men. However, the program has been plagued by design challenges, one of 
which was getting the wage rate right (Smith, 2001).  
The main Food-for-work paid participants a given amount of maize, using food aid 
provided by the World Food Program. Like the PWP, it is self-targeted on the basis of a work 
requirement and a relatively low wage rate. Its major advantage is that food payments are 
selective of women than are cash. The drawback is that logistics of moving food around the 
country, and of paying in food is cumbersome and expensive. As a result, coverage has 
generally been lower than was intended.  
Input transfers and subsidies are the most extensive programs. They aim at raising 
household food self-sufficiency and maintaining total national level of food production. 
Fertilizer subsidy has been a key element of the Malawian Government present policy (World 
Bank, 2007). The provision of agricultural inputs, especially fertilizer enjoys a special place in 
the popular hierarchy of anti-poverty measures in the country (Smith, 2001). For example, the 
Starter Pack Initiative (SPI) of 1998/1999 provided 10 kilograms (kg) of fertilizer along with 
seed to all farmers at a cost of US$27 million. One of the major drawbacks of the program is 
that it was universal. Universality of course eases the administrative burden and ensures wide 
popular and political support, but confronted with the fiscal burden, the Government 
subsequently scaled down the program to a targeted version. Funding has, therefore been 
substantially reduced to about US$11 million in 2000/01. In 2005/2006 growing season, a new 
fertilizer subsidy program was devised in the country as a result of an extremely poor harvest 
in 2004/2005. The program was extended and scaled up in the following year. Both programs 
cost in total US$124 million (Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne, 2009).  
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In addition to the above-mentioned programs, there have been large scale food 
distribution programs in the past. These programs included the School Feeding and 
Supplementary Feeding Programs. The main problem with the school feeding is that the 
program is expensive and it is not selective of the poor as it is untargeted within schools. 
Furthermore, there is no reason to believe that the poor are more likely to be represented in 
schools than among the population as a whole (Smith, 2001).  
With regard to the targeting mechanisms, most of previous programs were administered 
through different methods, including universal provision, geographical targeting, self-targeting, 
and mainly community-based targeting. But, they display a poor targeting efficiency and some of 
them are too costly to sustain (e.g. programs based on universal provision of benefits). Likewise, 
the targeting mechanisms applied are not replicable and their cost-effectiveness and poverty 
impacts are rarely investigated. Almost all these interventions have targeting problems (GoM and 
World Bank, 2007). To put this in perspective, we plot in Figure 10 the percentage of households 
that reported benefiting from various programs by poverty deciles. 
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                                   Figure 10: Targeting efficiency of Malawi’s development programs. 
                    Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. 
Figure 10 shows that in general, the coverage of program beneficiaries decreases with 
increasing consumption. This indicates that past programs were somehow progressive. 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
38
Likewise, the graph illustrates the tradeoff between undercoverage and leakage: the higher the 
coverage of the poorest deciles, the higher the program leakage, i.e. the coverage of the richest 
deciles. Apart from the Starter Pack (rainy season) which covered about 60% to 70% of the first 
five deciles, very few households in the poorest deciles benefited from most interventions. For 
example, about 30% of households in the poorest decile reported benefiting from the Free food 
distribution program. At the same time, all of the programs wrongly covered the richest deciles. 
Further results confirm the same pattern (appendix 9).  
1.7 Summary 
This introductory chapter has stated the problematic of poverty and the challenge of 
targeting Malawi’s poor and smallholder farmers. It has appeared that much more remains to 
be done or corrected as the Government of Malawi reflects on improving the targeting of 
future interventions. The literature review suggests that none of the available methods is 
perfect at targeting poverty. Similarly, the description of Malawi’s poverty profile has shed 
some light on the definition of the poor and their distinctive characteristics relative to the non-
poor in the country. 
Furthermore, the assessment of past interventions suggests that previous programs 
have been badly targeted at the poor in the country. However, targeting errors can be reduced 
if more accurate targeting methods are used and programs are rationalized and properly 
implemented. The extent to which the poor and smallholder farmers are accurately targeted 
will determine the success of future actions for reducing the country’s pervasive poverty. 
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Abstract 
Accurate targeting is key for the success of any development policy. While a number 
of factors might explain low targeting efficiency, such as governance failure, political 
interference, or lack of political will, this paper focuses on improving indicator-based models 
that identify poor households and smallholder farmers more accurately. 
  Using stepwise regressions along with out-of-sample validation tests and receiver 
operating characteristic curves, this paper develops proxy means test models for rural and 
urban Malawi. The models developed have proven their validity in an independent sample 
and therefore, can be used to target a wide range of development policies at the poor. This 
makes the models potentially interesting policy tools for the country. 
Keywords: Malawi, poverty targeting, predictions, proxy means tests, out-of-sample tests,  
ROC curve, bootstrap. 
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1. Introduction 
 Malawi is a very poor and mostly agricultural country. According to the Second 
Integrated Household Survey (IHS2), 52.4% of Malawians are poor and about 90% of the 
population live in rural areas (National Statistics Office - NSO -, 2005a). Likewise, most of 
the rural population depends on agriculture for their livelihoods.  
In response to widespread poverty and endemic food insecurity in the country, the 
Government of Malawi enacted different programs, such as credit, fertilizer, improved seed, 
and conditional cash transfer through community-based and self-targeting mechanisms. 
However, most of these programs were not efficiently targeted at the poor and smallholder 
farmers. Existing statistics indicate that the problem of food insecurity remains rampant 
(Chinsinga, 2005). Almost all social protection programs are poorly targeted in the country.  
As a result, poverty and food insecurity have not been reduced in the country. Recent 
estimates suggest that the poverty rate has declined less than 2% over a decade (Government 
of Malawi and World Bank, 2007). It has therefore appeared that much more needs to be done 
to develop a low cost, fairly accurate, and easy system to target the poorest (PMS, 2000). 
Such an operational system is also useful for assessing whether a project, policy or 
development institution reaches the poor and smallholder farmers.  
This paper addresses these challenges. We develop proxy means test models for 
targeting Malawi’s poor and smallholder farmers. Proxy means tests use household 
socioeconomic indicators to proxy household poverty or welfare level. These tests have the 
merit of making replicable judgments using consistent and visible criteria (Coady et al., 
2002). They are also simple to implement and less costly than sophisticated means tests5.  
 In addition to the Weighted Least Square (WLS) estimation method, we apply the 
Weighted Logit (WL) regression with stepwise selection to identify the best set of indicators 
                                                 
5 See Coady et al. (2002) and Grosh and Baker (1995) for further details on means tests.  
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for correctly predicting the household poverty status. Furthermore, we compare the predictive 
power and the robustness of both estimation methods using out-of-sample tests and Receiver 
Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves. Finally, we estimate the prediction intervals of model 
performance measures using the bootstrap algorithm. The set of indicators used in our models 
include objective and easily verifiable variables. These variables are usually available in 
Living Standard Measurement Surveys (LSMS) data and most household surveys in 
developing countries.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets out the methodology, whereas 
section 3 presents the results with applications to household data from Malawi. Section 4 ends 
the work with some concluding remarks. 
2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Data 
This research used the Second Malawi Integrated Household Survey (IHS2) data. The 
National Statistics Office of Malawi conducted the IHS2 with the assistance of the 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the World Bank (NSO, 2005b)6. The 
IHS2 was carried out from March 2004 through March 2005 and covered a nationally 
representative sample of 11,280 households that were selected based on a two-stage stratified 
sampling design. This design involved in the first stage the selection of the Primary Sampling 
Units (PSU) based on Probability Proportional to Size (PPS) sampling and in the second 
stage, a random selection of 20 households per PSU. 
Compared to previous experiences, this survey is particularly appropriate for the 
research for three main reasons. First, it used an improved methodology for collecting and 
computing household consumption expenditures. Second, the survey covered a wide range of 
                                                 
6 We gratefully acknowledge the National Statistics Office of Malawi for providing us with the data. 
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poverty indicators that are potentially suitable to developing proxy means test models. Third, 
the sample is representative at national as well as district levels. 
Poverty in this research is defined as a level of consumption and expenditures by 
individuals in a household which has been calculated to be insufficient to meet their basic 
needs. It is generally agreed among analysts that expenditures (as an income proxy) are a 
more robust measure of poverty than income itself (Deaton, 1997). This definition is a 
standard, but nonetheless narrow view of poverty (Benson, 2002). Its excludes several 
important components of personal and household well-being, including physical security, level of 
participation in networks of support and affection, access to important public social infrastructure, 
such as health and educational services, and whether or not one can exercise ones human rights. 
In sum, there is more to assessing the quality of life and the welfare of individuals than 
consumption and expenditure. In view of the widespread use of monetary poverty lines with 
expenditure-based measures of poverty however, the research pursues a policy-relevant 
objective by identifying indicator-based tools that can simplify the identification of rural poor 
and measure welfare changes over time in poor populations. 
2.2 Model estimation methods 
2.2.1 Poverty predictors and sample selection  
The set of poverty predictors includes 148 practical indicators selected from a pool of 
800 potential variables to ensure an operational use of the tools7. The practicality refers to two 
criteria: difficulty and verifiability of indicators. Initially, variables that are difficult to measure, 
verify (for example, subjective variables), and compute were excluded from the set of available 
variables. Before estimating the regressions, the list of selected variables was further screened 
                                                 
7 The list of indicators was reduced to 112 for the urban model; some of the variables were not relevant in 
    urban areas. 
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for multicollinearity within dimension8. This screening of potential poverty predictors is the 
first step toward the selection of indicators that are significantly associated with poverty. 
 Separate models were estimated for rural and urban households because of substantial 
differences between both areas. In order to perform the validation tests, each sample was first 
split into two sub-samples following the ratio 67:33. The larger sample or calibration sample 
was employed to estimate the model i.e. identify the best set of variables and their weights, 
whereas the smaller sample or validation sample was used to test out-of-sample the predictive 
accuracy of the model. In the out-of-sample tests, we therefore applied the set of identified 
indicators and their derived weights to predict the household poverty status. In order to mimic 
the initial sample selection, we followed in the sample split followed a two-stage stratified 
sampling design. This design ensures that all strata are adequately represented in the 
calibration samples. A simple random sampling split would not guaranty such representativity. 
With the 67:33 split and the stratified sampling design, we put more emphasis on the 
model calibration than validation. Furthermore, the continued representativity of the 
calibration samples was assessed by testing the differences in estimates between the samples 
and the full datasets. The results of the tests show that there is no statistically significant 
difference between both sets. Therefore, the calibration samples are as representative as the 
full datasets. 
After performing the sample split, the household weight was readjusted to reflect the new 
inflation rates in the calibration samples. The weight adjustment however, was not necessary in 
the validation sub-samples because the weight is not needed to predict the out-of-sample accuracy 
of the models. Obviously, the same level of accuracy cannot be guaranteed in such smaller 
samples. Table 1 describes the number of indicators and the sample size by model types. 
 
                                                 
8 All variables with a bivariate correlation coefficient of more than 0.65 or a variance inflation factor of more   
   than 10 were removed from the sets. 
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Table 1. Sample size by model types 
Sub-samples Rural model Urban model Total 
Total sample size 9,840 1,440 11,280 
               - calibration (2/3) 6,560 960 7,540 
               - validation (1/3) 3,280 480 3,760 
Number of indicators 148 112 - 
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. 
2.2.2 Estimation methods 
Two estimation methods were applied. They included the Weighted Least Square 
(WLS) and Weighted Logit (WL) regressions. As stated earlier, both regressions were 
weighted in order to account for how much each household influences the final parameter 
estimates. A weighted regression is also appropriate in the presence of heteroscedasticity9. 
Both regression methods are widely used in the literature. However, there is a debate on the 
merits of welfare regressions versus binary poverty models. The Weighted Least Square10 
uses the full information available by estimating the model over the entire welfare spectrum, 
whereas the Weighted Logit collapses the entire expenditure distribution into two values. In 
their poverty regressions, Braithwaite et al. (2000) justify the use of binary probit by the 
possibility of systematic measurement errors in the dependent variable. These authors also 
add that it is a judgment call whether the loss of information embodied in the binary 
regression outweighs the risk of bias due to measurement error. In this paper, we 
systematically compare the targeting performances of both methods to derive the best for 
targeting poor households and improving the efficiency of development policies.  
                                                 
9 One of the critical assumptions of ordinary least square regression is homoscedasticity. When this assumption   
    is violated, WLS compensates for violation of the homoscedasticity assumption by weighting cases    
    differentially. Cases with greater weight contribute more to the fit of the regression. The result is that the  
    estimated coefficients under the WLS have smaller standard errors.  
10 For example, Grosh and Baker (1995) argue that strictly speaking, ordinary least square is not appropriate for  
    predicting poverty. Glewwe (1992) and Ravallion and Chao (1989) try to solve the problem of targeting using  
    more complex poverty minimization algorithms. These methods are however difficult to implement and have   
    limited applications compared to the methods used in this paper. 
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Both methods sought to identify the best set of ten indicators for predicting the 
household poverty status. Previous researches show that in general, the higher the number of 
indicators, the higher the achieved accuracy (Zeller and Alcaraz V., 2005; Zeller et al., 2005). 
Higher accuracy is often achieved at a cost of practicality and entails higher costs of data 
collection. Therefore, we limited the number of indicators to the best ten in order to balance 
the cost of data collection, practicality, or operational use of the models. Furthermore, most 
analysts favor the use of ten regressors in an operational poverty targeting model. 
A model with a high explanatory power is a prerequisite for good predictions of the 
dependent variable per capita daily expenditures (and thereby poverty status). Therefore, 
under the WLS, the best ten regressors were selected based on the Stepwise-MAXR routine of 
SAS (SAS Institute, 2003) that maximizes a model’s explained variance (R-square). Under 
the WL, the best ten regressors were selected using the stepwise score routine of SAS. 
Similarly to the MAXR routine, SAS offers a stepwise score routine for best subset selection of 
variables with logistic regressions. The stepwise-score uses the branch and bound algorithm of 
Furnival and Wilson (1974) to find a specified number of models with the highest likelihood 
score (chi-square) statistic (SAS Institute, 2003). In other words, the stepwise-score seeks the 
best set of variables that maximizes the likelihood score (chi-square) statistic.  
The WLS used the continuous dependent variable logarithm of daily per capita 
expenditures11, whereas the WL had as dependent variable a dummy variable that is coded one if 
the household is poor (expenditures below the national poverty line) and zero otherwise. In other 
words, the WL model estimates the probability of a household being below the poverty line.  
In the rural model, we controlled for agricultural development districts in order to 
capture agro-ecological and socioeconomic differences between regions. The inclusion of 
such variables also captures the effects of omitted variables as well as the effects of other 
                                                 
11 The logarithm of expenditures was used instead of simple expenditures because the log function better  
   approximates a normal distribution. 
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unobservable factors in the model. Likewise, in the urban model we controlled for the four 
major cities: Mzuzu, Zomba, Lilongwe, and Blantyre. Using the calibration samples, we 
estimated both models following Greene (2003) and Wooldridge (2006): 
  Weighted Least Square 
1 1 2 2 ...i o i i k ik iy x x xβ β β β ε= + + + + +                            (1) 
where iy  is the logarithm of daily per-capita expenditures, , 1.... 1....ikx k K and i n= =  is the 
set of poverty predictors, including the control variables, oβ  is the intercept term,  
, 1...k k Kβ =  are the parameter estimates, iε  is the random disturbance, n is the total number 
of observations in the sample. ˆiy , the predicted value of iy  is estimated by:  
1 1 2 2
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ...i o i i k iky x x xβ β β β= + + + +                                     (2) 
A weighted sum of residual squares is minimized to obtain the parameters as follows:  
2
1
ˆmin ( )
n
i i i
i
y yω
=
−∑                                                             (3) 
, 1...i i nω =  is the weight of observation i  in the population. 
  Weighted Logit 
1( 1 )
1 ii i i
z x
e η
ρ −= = +                                                                (1) 
iρ  is the probability of being poor, e  is an exponential function, iz  is the poverty status 
variable, iz { 1 ( )0 ( ),ipoor if cut offnon poor otherwiseρ ≥ −−=                                                                            (2) 
iη  is the linear predictor, 1 1 2 2 ...i o i i k ik ix x xη α α α α ε= + + + + +                   (3) 
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, 1.... 1....ikx k K and i n= =  is the set of poverty predictors, including the control variables, 
oα  is the intercept term, 1 , 1...k k Kα =  are the parameter estimates, iε  is the random 
disturbance. The estimated logit or natural log ( ln ) of the odds is given by:  
1 1 2 2
ˆ ( 1 )
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆln ...
ˆ1 ( 1 )
i i i
o i i k ik
i i i
z x
x x x
z x
ρ α α α αρ
⎛ ⎞= = + + + +⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟− =⎝ ⎠                                 (4) 
A weighted Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) is maximized to obtain the parameters as 
follows: 
( )ˆ ˆ
1
1 1max ln 1 ln 1
1 1i i
n
i i i
i
MLE z z
e eη η
ω − −
=
⎡ ⎤⎧ ⎫ ⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= + − −⎨ ⎬ ⎨ ⎬⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭ ⎩ ⎭⎣ ⎦∑          (5) 
, 1...i i nω =  is the weight of observation i  in the population. 
The distinction between exogenous and endogenous variables in the holistic causal 
chain of poverty is difficult to make in practice: feedback loops and endogeneity issues can be 
conceptualized virtually everywhere in this chain (Grootaert and Braithwaite, 1998). But since 
the purpose of a poverty assessment is to measure poverty (i.e., to identify and use highly 
significant but easily measurable correlates of poverty) and not to analyze causal 
relationships, it is analytically permissible to measure primary causes (lack of entitlements, 
rights, and endowments) together with intermediate and final outcome variables in the 
consumption, production, and investment spheres of individuals and their households as 
possible indicators of poverty. Therefore, the above models do not seek to identify the 
determinants of poverty, but select variables that can best predict the current poverty status of 
a household. A causal relationship should not be inferred from the results.  
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2.2.3 Predicting the household poverty status 
Having estimated the model, the question arises as to what cut-off to use to predict the 
household poverty status. We therefore explored three classifications based on three different 
cut-offs: national, percentile-corrected, and maximum-BPAC cut-offs.  
In the first classification, the predicted per capita expenditures from the WLS were 
compared to the national poverty line to derive the predicted household poverty status. 
Households with per capita expenditures less than MK44.29 daily were classified as poor and 
those with higher daily per capita expenditures were deemed non-poor. The national poverty 
line matches the actual poverty rate in the total population. Similarly, the probability of being 
poor estimated with the WL regression was compared to the cut-off point (predicted probability) 
that matches the actual poverty rate in the population. Households with higher probability than 
this cut-off point were predicted as poor, otherwise they were deemed non-poor.  
However, the above classification ignores the unknown error in the estimation of 
household expenditures. As a result, it would give biased estimates of poverty rates (Hentschel 
et al., 2000) and thereby accuracy performances. Therefore, a second classification based on the 
percentile-corrected poverty line (PC) was used12. Figure 1 illustrates the national and 
percentile-corrected poverty lines from the WLS method. As shown in the graph, the PC 
poverty line is the line that matches the actual poverty rate in the distribution of predicted 
expenditures after the rural model’s estimation. Both poverty lines on the graph differ, but the 
difference between them is minor since the vertical lines are very close to each other. 
                                                 
12 See Johannsen (2009) for further details on the percentile-corrected approach.  
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                  Figure 1. Cumulative distribution of poverty rate. 
                  Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. 
The third classification approach used to predict the household poverty status applied 
the cut-off that maximizes the Balanced Poverty Accuracy Criterion (BPAC)13 which is an 
estimation method overall performance measure. Table 2 summarizes the decision rule for 
predicting the household poverty status.  
Table 2. Decision rule for predicting the household poverty status 
             Method 
Classification 
type 
Weighted Least Square Weighted Logit 
Cut-off 1 Poverty line Probability that matches the poverty line 
Cut-off 2 Percentile-corrected line (PC) Probability that matches the PC line 
Cut-off 3 Poverty line that maximizes the BPAC* Probability that maximizes the BPAC 
Source: Own presentation. *See section 2.3 for details on BPAC. 
The three poverty classifications in Table 2 were then crossed with the actual household 
poverty status. The latter was determined by comparing the actual daily per capita expenditures 
to the national poverty line as in the first classification above. The two-by-two cross-table of the 
actual and predicted household poverty statuses was subsequently used to describe the 
outcomes of the predictions as exemplified in Table 3. 
                                                 
13 See section 2.3 for further details on BPAC. 
    National poverty line 
       Percentile-corrected line    
       Poverty rate       
       Cumulative poverty rate 
Rural Model  
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Table 3. Net benefit matrix of poverty classification (hypothetical figures) 
Predicted poverty status Actual poverty status 
Non-poor Poor Total 
Non-poor 20 15 35 
Poor 10 5 15 
Total 30 20 50 
Source: Own presentation.  
Table 3 suggests that 5 out of 15 actually poor households were correctly predicted as 
poor, whereas the remaining 10 households were wrongly predicted as non-poor. Likewise, 20 
of 35 actually non-poor households were correctly predicted as non-poor, while the remaining 
15 households were wrongly predicted as poor. The above example suggests that the net benefit 
matrix yields correct as well as incorrect predictions of the household poverty status. Based on 
the results, different performance measures can then be calculated as described in section 2.3. 
2.3 Accuracy measures and robustness tests 
2.3.1. Accuracy measures 
Different measures have been proposed in the literature on poverty targeting to assess 
the accuracy of a poverty assessment model. This paper focuses on selected ratios which are 
especially relevant for targeting the poor (Table 4). 
Table 4. Selected accuracy ratios 
Targeting ratios Definitions 
Poverty Accuracy Number of households correctly predicted as poor, expressed as a percentage of the total number of poor 
Undercoverage 
Number of poor households predicted as non-poor, expressed as a 
percentage of the total number of poor 
Leakage 
Number of non-poor households predicted as poor, expressed as a  
percentage of the total number of poor 
Poverty Incidence  
Error (PIE) 
Difference between predicted and actual poverty incidence, 
measured in percentage points 
Balanced Poverty 
Accuracy Criterion (BPAC) 
Poverty accuracy minus the absolute difference between 
undercoverage and leakage, measured in percentage points 
Source: Adapted from IRIS (2005). 
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 The poverty accuracy is self-explanatory. Undercoverage and leakage are extensively 
used in the literature to assess the targeting efficiency of development policies (Valdivia, 
2005; Ahmed et al., 2004; Weiss, 2004). The Poverty Incidence Error (PIE) indicates the 
precision of the model in correctly predicting the poverty incidence. Ideally, the value of PIE 
should be zero, implying that the predicted poverty rate equals the observed poverty rate. 
Positive values of PIE indicate an overestimation of the poverty incidence, whereas negative 
values imply the opposite. The PIE is particularly useful in measuring the poverty outreach of 
an institution that provides microfinance or business development services.  
The Balanced Poverty Accuracy Criterion (BPAC) considers the first three accuracy 
measures above because of their relevance for poverty targeting. These three measures exhibit 
trade-offs. For example, minimizing leakage leads to higher undercoverage and lower poverty 
accuracy. Higher positive values for BPAC indicate higher poverty accuracy, adjusted by the 
absolute difference between undercoverage and leakage. In this paper, the BPAC is used as the 
overall criterion to judge a method’s accuracy performance. In the formulation of the BPAC, it 
is assumed that leakage and undercoverage are equally valued. For example, Ravallion (2007) 
found it more credible to value both measures in a characterization of a policy problem. 
However, a policy maker may give higher or lower weight to undercoverage compared to 
leakage. This is in principle possible by altering the weight for leakage in the BPAC formula.  
2.3.2 Assessing the predictive power and robustness of the models  
Out-of-sample validation tests were performed to ascertain the predictive power and 
the robustness of the models. The main purpose of the validation is to observe how well the 
models perform in an independent sample derived from the same population. A model with 
high predictive power in a validation sample is relevant for reaching most of the poor. 
Therefore, the models developed were validated by applying the set of selected indicators, 
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their weights, and cut-offs to the validation sub-samples in order to predict the household 
poverty status.  
Furthermore, the model robustness was assessed by estimating the prediction intervals 
of the targeting ratios out-of-sample using bootstrapped simulation methods. Approximate 
confidence interval based on bootstrap computations were introduced by Efron in 1979 (Efron, 
1987; Horowitz, 2000). Bootstrap is the statistical procedure which models sampling from a 
population by the process of resampling from the sample (Hall, 1994). Using the bootstrap 
approach, repeated random samples of the same size as the validation sub-samples were drawn 
with replacement. The set of identified indicators and their derived weights were applied to each 
resample to predict the household poverty status and estimate the accuracy ratios. These 
bootstrap estimates were then used to build up an empirical distribution for each ratio. Unlike 
standard confidence interval estimation, bootstrap does not make any distributional assumption 
about the population and hence does not require the assumption of normality.  
A thousand (1,000) new samples were used for the estimations. Campbell and 
Torgerson (1999) state that the number of bootstrap samples required depends on the 
application, but typically it should be at least 1,000 when the distribution is to be used to 
construct confidence intervals. Figure 2 illustrates the distribution of the poverty accuracy for 
1,000 samples for the best ten indicator set. This graph is superimposed with a normal curve.  
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                               Figure 2: Bootstrapped distribution of the poverty accuracy (WLS). 
                               Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. 
After generating the bootstrap distribution, the 2.5th and 97.5th percentiles were used as 
limits for the interval at a 95% confidence level. This amounts to cutting the tails of the above 
distribution on both sides.  
3. Results and Discussions 
This section discusses the out-of-sample results of the models14. First, we briefly 
describe the poverty lines applied. Then, the targeting performances of the models are presented 
by regression methods and poverty classifications. The classification that yields the highest 
performances is selected and flagged with the prediction intervals. We then compare the 
aggregate accuracy of both estimation methods out-of-sample. Finally, we analyze the 
sensitivity of the models to the poverty line and the distribution of targeting errors.  
3.1 Modelling the household poverty status: Empirical results  
Table 5 gives an overview of the poverty lines and rates in Malawi. The full regression 
results, including the indicator lists are presented in Annex 1 thru 4. All of the coefficient 
                                                 
14 For brevity reasons, only out-of-sample results are presented throughout the paper. The results from  
    the model calibrations are available upon request.  
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estimates on the best indicator sets are statistically significant and their signs are consistent 
with expectations and economic theory. 
Table 5. Malawi’s poverty rates by regions and poverty lines (as of 2005)15 
Poverty rate 
(in percent of people) 
Poverty rate 
(in percent of households) Type of poverty line 
Poverty lines 
(MK*) national rural urban national rural urban 
Extreme 29.81 26.21 28.66 8.72 19.94 22.08 5.95 
National 44.29 52.40 56.19 25.23 43.58 47.13 19.67 
International 59.18 (US$1.25 PPP) 69.52 73.59 40.26 61.04 65.20 33.08 
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data, Chen and Ravallion (2008), and the World Bank (2008). 
MK denotes Malawi Kwacha, national currency. PPP stands for Purchasing Power Parity. 
As shown in Table 5, the poverty rate in Malawi is estimated at 52.4% under the 
national poverty line of MK44.29. This rate suggests that more than half the population is 
unable to meet their basic needs. However, the poverty rate varies considerably between 
urban and rural areas. Following Chen and Ravallion (2008), the international poverty line of 
US$1.25 was used. Converted to Malawi Kwacha (MK) using the 2005 Purchasing Power 
Parity (World Bank, 2008), the international poverty line is equivalent to MK59.18 per day. 
Under this line, the national poverty headcount is estimated at 69.52%. This line hides 
sizeable differences between urban and rural areas. The extreme poverty line is defined as the 
line under which the poorest 50% of the population below the national poverty line are living. 
This line was set at MK29.31. Under the extreme poverty line, 26% of Malawians are very 
poor. These poverty rates are lower when expressed in percent of households. Table 6 
presents the results of the rural model by classification types. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15 These rates differ slightly from the official statistics because of errors in the weights of the IHS2 report. 
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Table 6. Rural model’s predictive accuracy by classification types  
Targeting ratios 
Method   Cut-off 
Log cut-
off value 
(MK) 
Poverty 
accuracy 
(%) 
Under-
coverage 
(%) 
Leakage 
(%) 
PIE 
 (% points) 
BPAC 
(% points) 
National 3.79 64.07 35.94 20.45 -7.32 48.58 
Percentile 3.80 65.43 34.58 21.74 -6.07 52.58 
W
LS
 
MaxBPAC 3.85 72.00 28.00 26.32 -0.79 70.32 
National 0.59 58.77 41.23 16.58 -11.65 34.13 
Percentile 0.66 48.85 51.16 11.42 -18.78 9.10 
W
L 
MaxBPAC 0.48 71.61 28.39 27.10 -0.61 70.32 
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. 
Table 6 suggests that under the WLS method, the cut-off that maximizes the BPAC in-
sample (MaxBPAC) yields the highest out-of-sample performances, followed by the 
percentile-corrected poverty line, and then the national poverty line. The highest BPAC is 
however, associated with the highest leakage. The same trend applies to the WL method; 
except that the percentile-corrected poverty line yields the lowest performances in that case. 
The results show that the classification by the MaxBpac cut-off consistently yields the highest 
BPAC out-of-sample.  
These results also illustrate the trade-off between undercoverage and leakage ratios as 
increasing the cut-off16 reduces the undercoverage (improves poverty accuracy), but results in 
higher leakage to the non-poor. The performances of the urban model (see annex 5) follow the 
same pattern as the rural model. Therefore, the cut-off that maximizes the BPAC in the 
calibration sample was selected as the optimal cut-off for out-of-sample validations. Table 7 
describes the results of the rural and urban models at these optimal cut-offs, including their 
prediction intervals. 
 
 
 
                                                 
16 This trade-off also applies to the WL method, but when reducing the cut-off because the method  
     estimates the probability of being poor.  
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Table 7. Model predictive accuracy at optimal cut-offs  
Targeting ratios 
 
Model      Method 
Cut-off 
values 
(MK) 
Poverty 
accuracy 
(%) 
Under-
coverage 
(%) 
Leakage 
(%) 
PIE 
 (% points) 
BPAC 
(% points) 
WLS 3.85 72.00 (69.7; 74.2) 
28.00 
(25.8; 30.3) 
26.32 
(23.4; 29.1) 
-0.79 
(-2.4; 1.0) 
70.32 
(64.9; 73.5) 
Rural 
WL 0.48 71.61 (69.6; 74.0) 
28.39 
(26.0; 30.4) 
27.10 
(24.2; 30.0) 
-0.61 
(-2.3; 1.1) 
70.32 
(65.2; 73.2) 
WLS 3.92 62.16 (53.3; 71.0) 
37.84 
(29.0; 46.7) 
38.74 
(26.3; 52.8) 
0.21 
(-3.5; 3.8) 
61.26 
(40.9; 66.5) Urban 
WL 0.39 61.26 (51.7; 70.5) 
38.74 
(29.5; 48.3) 
39.64 
(27.3; 53.5) 
0.21 
(-3.2; 4.0) 
60.36 
(40.9; 66.0) 
Source: Own computations based on Malawi IHS2 data. Bootstrapped prediction intervals in brackets. Cut-off 
values are expressed in Ln MK under the WLS and probability for the WL. 
Table 7 shows that the WLS method yields a poverty accuracy of 72% and a BPAC of 
70.32% points for the rural model. This result indicates that the model would cover about 
72% of the poor - that is about seven out of every ten poor households - if applied to target 
Malawi’s poor. The undercoverage is estimated at 28%, while the leakage is set at 26.32% for 
the same model and estimation method. The PIE nears 0% points, which implies that the 
method perfectly predicts the poverty rate out-of-sample. Likewise, the WL method yields a 
poverty accuracy of about 72% and a BPAC of 70.32% points for the rural model. In addition, 
the estimated PIE is close to 0% points, whereas undercoverage and leakage are estimated at 
28.39% and 27.10%, respectively. These results show that the WLS and the WL yield the 
same BPAC and PIE, but the former slightly outperforms the latter in terms of poverty 
accuracy and leakage. Using the BPAC to assess an estimation method’s overall accuracy, the 
results of the rural model show that both methods perform equally. Even when considering 
single accuracy measures, such as poverty accuracy or leakage, both methods do not differ 
much in terms of targeting performances. 
With regard to the urban model, Table 7 indicates that the WLS and WL methods 
yield the same PIE of 0.21% points which indicate that they both predict the poverty rate 
remarkably well. However, the former yields a slightly higher BPAC (61.26% points) and 
poverty accuracy (62.16%) compared to the latter. Besides, its leakage is lower (38.74%). 
Chapter 2: Operational models for improving the targeting efficiency of development policies 
 
63
Though the WLS method slightly outperforms the WL method, the results of the urban model 
show that the differences in performances between both methods are minor. Nonetheless, the 
leakage and undercoverage are deceptively high in the urban model.  
The relatively low performance of the urban model as compared to the rural model is 
partly driven by the low level of actual poverty rate in urban areas: 25% versus 56%. 
Therefore, the lower the poverty rate, the weaker the model performance. This result may also 
be due to the greater variability in the welfare indicator for urban households and between 
different urban centers in Malawi. The variance estimates of the household consumption 
expenditures point to this argument. Nevertheless, even though undercoverage and leakage 
are high in urban areas, these errors amount to relatively small numbers of households; less 
than 15% of Malawians live in urban areas. 
 As concerns the prediction intervals, Table 7 shows that the interval lengths are very 
short under the rural model with a maximum width of 8% points, indicating a very robust 
model. Conversely, the results of the urban model suggest a less robust tool with higher 
interval lengths. These results are explained by the lower size of the sample used to validate 
the urban model as shown in Table 1. 
As a whole, the above findings suggest that both estimation methods perform 
equally, with the WLS slightly outperforming the WL17. Likewise, the rural model 
performs better than the urban model which is less robust. Section 2.3 compares the 
estimation method aggregate performances. 
3.2 Estimation method aggregate performances  
To compare the aggregate predictive power of the WLS and WL regressions, the 
Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves were plotted based on the predictions of the 
                                                 
17 To allow for a stricter comparison of both estimation methods, we used in separate simulations the same     
    indicator set to fit both regressions. The results however, do not differ from the performances presented. 
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validation samples. Unlike the results in section 3.1 which were based on a single cut-off – 
the cut-off that maximizes the BPAC in-sample –, the ROC curve shows the trade-off 
between the coverage of the poor or poverty accuracy and the inclusion of non-poor or 
inclusion error18 at different cut-offs across the predicted welfare (WLS) or probability (WL) 
spectrum. Earlier applications of ROC curves for poverty assessment include Wodon (1997), 
Baulch (2002), and Schreiner (2006) who applied the curve in combination with probit or 
logit regression in a calibration sample only. However, apart from Johannsen (2009), no 
research has to our knowledge applied the ROC curve out-of-sample to assess the accuracy 
performances of different estimation methods.  
Figure 3 displays the ROC curves of the rural model. In addition, Figure 4 illustrates 
the BPAC distributions across the cut-off spectrum. 
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            Figure 3: ROC curves of the rural model.                 Figure 4: BPAC curves of the rural model.  
 Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data.    Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. 
Figure 3 shows that the higher the coverage of the poor, the higher the inclusion of 
non-poor. For example, 80% coverage of the poor would lead to an inclusion of about 30% of 
non-poor households. Increasing the coverage of the poor to 90% would lead to more than 
40% of non-poor households being wrongly targeted. The curves follow a similar pattern with 
                                                 
18 The coverage of the poor or poverty accuracy is also known as sensitivity, whereas the inclusion of non-poor or   
    inclusion error is also termed as 1-specificity. It is defined as the error of predicting non-poor as poor, expressed   
    in percent of non-poor. It differs from the leakage (Table 2) which is expressed in percent of poor.                 
    See Wodon (1997) and Baulch (2002) for further details on ROC curves. 
 
Rural model 
Rural model
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minor exceptions. While both curves are monotonically increasing, their shape depends on the 
performances underlying each model used to predict the poverty status of the households. The 
curves overlay in the lower (below 40% sensitivity level), middle (between 50% and 65% and 
between 85% and 90% sensitivity level), and extreme upper (above 95% sensitivity level) 
sections of the graph. This pattern illustrates that both curves achieve the same coverage of 
the poor in these sections of the graph. Between 40% and 50% sensitivity level, the WL yields 
slightly higher accuracy, whereas the WLS performs better the latter between 65% and 70% 
sensitivity level. These results suggest that none of the estimation methods consistently yields 
the highest coverage of the poor across the ROC curves. In the relevant band of sensitivity 
(from 70% to 90%) however, both methods perform equally.  
Furthermore, by visual inspection the areas under the curves are not much different. 
To confirm this statement, we tested the difference between the distributions of poverty 
accuracy for both curves. The results of the tests show that there is no statistically significant 
difference between both distributions. Therefore, both estimation methods yield 
approximately the same level of aggregate predictive accuracy. This result is consistent with 
the findings in Table 7 which suggest that both methods do not differ much in terms of 
achieved targeting performances. More to this point, the accompanying BPAC curves (Figure 
4) show that the maxima obtained out-of-sample (about 73% points) are not much different 
from the performances presented in Table 7. The reason behind is that the cut-offs applied to 
the validation sample are closer to the out-of-sample optima. This indicates that the cut-offs 
that maximize the BPAC in the calibration sample converge towards the out-of-sample 
optima19. The same trend applies to the urban model (Figures 5 and 6).  
                                                 
19 A similar trend emerges when the models were calibrated to the international and extreme poverty lines. 
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            Figure 5: ROC curves of the urban model.                 Figure 6: BPAC curves of the urban model.  
 Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data.      Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. 
Figure 5 indicates that in the relevant band of sensitivity (from 70% to 90%), the WL 
outperforms the WLS within the lower section of the band, whereas the WLS outperforms the 
WL in the upper section of the band. Likewise, the difference between the distributions of both 
curves is found to be statistically not significant. Therefore, both methods do not differ in terms 
of aggregate predictive accuracy. This result is consistent with the findings in Table 7. 
As stated earlier, the cut-off that maximizes the BPAC in the calibration sample is 
used to judge a method’s overall targeting performance out-of-sample. However, a policy 
maker may set a different cut-off using the ROC curve to decide on the number of poor a 
program or project should reach and ponder on the number of non-poor that would be 
incorrectly targeted. The best indicators selected are objective and fairly easy to verify (see 
regression results in the annex). Information on these indicators can be quickly collected at 
low cost by a survey agent to determine the household poverty status. 
3.3 How do the model results change with the poverty line?  
In this section, we examine the sensitivity of the models to the choice of the poverty 
line. These simulations involved the calibration of the models to the international and extreme 
poverty lines described in Table 5. Under the WLS method, the list of the best indicators 
selected is the same across poverty lines. However, since the dependent variable in the WL 
method - the household poverty status - is affected by the poverty line chosen, the logit 
Urban model 
Urban model 
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regression, including the selection of indicators was re-estimated for both lines and models. 
Table 8 shows the results of the simulations.  
           Table 8. Model sensitivity to poverty line  
          Targeting ratios 
Method   Poverty line* 
Cut-off 
values 
(MK) 
Poverty  
accuracy 
(%) 
Under- 
coverage 
(%) 
Leakage 
 (%)  
PIE 
(% points) 
BPAC 
(% points) 
Rural Model 
International 4.03 82.33 (80.9; 83.9) 
17.67 
(16.1; 19.1) 
16.60 
(14.7; 18.4) 
-0.70 
(-2.3; 1.0) 
81.27 
(77.7; 83.3) 
WLS 
Extreme 3.56 49.93 (46.4; 53.4) 
50.07 
(46.6; 53.6) 
39.21 
(34.2; 44.4) 
-2.44 
(-3.9; -1.0) 
39.08 
(30.9; 48.1) 
International 0.56 82.61 (81.1; 84.2) 
17.39 
(15.8; 18.9) 
16.18 
(14.4; 18.1) 
-0.79 
(-2.2; 0.9) 
81.40 
(77.9; 83.6) 
WL 
Extreme 0.36 53.05 (49.6; 56.7) 
46.95 
(43.3; 50.4) 
38.54 
(33.5; 44.1) 
-1.89 
(-3.4; -0.4) 
44.64 
(35.9; 53.7) 
Urban Model 
International 4.18 74.57 (68.3; 81.2) 
25.43 
(18.8; 37.1) 
24.86 
(17.4; 34.2) 
-0.21 
(-3.8; 3.7) 
73.99 
(59.5; 77.6) 
WLS 
Extreme 3.52 50 (31.8; 67.7) 
50 
(32.3; 68.2) 
73.53 
(43.7; 123.0) 
1.67 
(-0.8; 4.2) 
26.47 
(-23.4; 50.5) 
International 0.43 73.99 (67.7; 79.9) 
26.01 
(20.1; 32.3) 
26.59 
(18.6; 36.2) 
0.21 
(-3.6; 4.0) 
73.41 
(59.5; 76.6) 
WL 
Extreme 0.30 47.06 (31.0; 64.7) 
52.94 
(35.3; 69.0) 
61.77 
(32.1; 104.4) 
0.63 
(-1.9; 3.1) 
38.23 
(-5.61; 51.7) 
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. WLS= Weighted Least Square, WL= Weighted Logit. 
Prediction intervals in brackets. Cut-off values are expressed in Ln MK under the WLS and probability for the 
WL. *See Table 5 for description of poverty lines. 
Table 8 shows that raising the poverty line to US$1.25 (MK59.18 PPP) increases the 
BPAC and the coverage of the poor by about 10% to 14% points and reduces the leakage by 
the same margin depending on the model and estimation method applied. These results 
suggest a sizable improvement of model targeting performances with about 82% and 74% of 
the poor correctly targeted by the rural and urban models, respectively. Nearly, all poor 
households are identified and covered in these scenarios.  
On the other hand, reducing the poverty line to MK29.31 disappointingly reduces the 
targeting performances of the rural model by 10% to 30% points depending on the ratio and 
estimation method. Under the urban model, the reduction in targeting performances ranges 
from 12% to 35% points. Likewise, both models estimate the observed poverty rate 
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remarkably well when calibrated to the international poverty line as compared to the extreme 
poverty line; in which case the deviation from the observed poverty rate is much higher as 
shown by the PIE.  
Furthermore, the results show that given the model, both estimation methods do not 
differ much in terms of performances when calibrated to the international poverty line. On the 
contrary, the difference between both methods is more perceptible when calibrated to the 
extreme poverty line. The comparison of the ROC curves point towards the same conclusion 
(see annex 6 thru 9). These results confirm the findings in Table 7 and the conclusions 
regarding the ROC curves in Figures 3 and 5. The following section analyzes the distribution 
of model targeting errors across poverty deciles. 
3.4 Targeting error distribution  
As we have seen in the previous sections, irrespective of the poverty line and estimation 
method applied, the models yield some targeting errors, though these errors decrease with 
increasing poverty line. This is due to inherent model estimation errors. While it is 
unsatisfactory to miss the poor or wrongly target the non-poor, the error would be less severe 
if indeed those who are excluded are the least poor or those who are incorrectly targeted are 
the least rich households (Grosh and Baker, 1995). To confirm this, we looked at the out-of-
sample distribution of model undercoverage and leakage by deciles of actual consumption 
expenditures for the three poverty lines applied (Figures 7 and 8).  
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Figure 7: Targeting errors by poverty lines (WLS).  Figure 8: Targeting errors by poverty lines (WL). 
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data.    Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. 
Figure 7 shows that when the rural model is calibrated to the national poverty line, 
poor households whom the model fails to cover are heavily concentrated among those just 
under the line in the 5th decile rather than at the very bottom of the welfare distribution, while 
those who are incorrectly targeted are heavily concentrated among those just above the 
national poverty line rather than at the top of the distribution. The same trend applies to the 
international and extreme poverty lines, and the WL estimation method (Figure 8). 
These results suggest that the models perform quite well in terms of poor households 
who are incorrectly excluded and non-poor who are wrongly targeted; covering most of the 
poorest deciles and excluding most of the richest ones. The same trend applies to the urban 
model ((see annexes 10 and 11). These results have obvious desirable welfare implications. 
They are also consistent with Coady and Parker (2009) who found that administrative 
selection based on proxy-means testing is particularly effective at reducing overall program 
coverage while maintaining high coverage of the lowest welfare households.  
4. Concluding Remarks 
 This paper proposes empirical models for improving the poverty outreach of 
agricultural and development policies in Malawi. Furthermore, the research analyzes the out-
of-sample performances of two estimation methods in targeting the poor. The developed 
Rural model Rural model 
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models were calibrated to three different poverty lines as a set of policies might explicitly 
target different poverty groups in the population.  
Findings suggest that both estimation methods achieve the same level of targeting 
performances out-of-sample. This is confirmed by the ROC curves which show that there is 
no sizable difference in aggregate predictive accuracy between both methods. Likewise, 
calibrating the models to a higher poverty line improves their targeting performances, while 
calibrating the models to a lower line does the opposite. With regard to targeting errors, the 
models perform well in terms of those who are mistargeted; covering most of the poorest 
deciles and excluding most of the richest ones.  
The set of selected indicators are easily observable and fairly easy to verify. This 
implies a simple and low-cost system to identify the poor. The models developed can be used 
to improve the existing targeting mechanisms of agricultural input programs in the country. 
Furthermore, they can be applied to target a wide range of development policies at the poor 
and estimate poverty rates over time. Similarly, they can be used to assess the poverty impacts 
of such policies. However, the observed patterns could be refined with additional validations 
across time as suitable data become available. Likewise, the estimations of the potential 
impacts of the models on poverty, its benefits, and costs are left out for further research. 
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Annexes 
Annex 1. Weighted Least Square regression results (rural model)  
                                             Model significance F= 329.25*** 
Adj. R2 = 0.4597                                                                          Number of observations= 6560 
Indicator set Parameter Estimates 
Standard 
Errors T-values 
          Intercept 4.337***      0.037      115.86      
Agricultural development district is Mzuzu 0.078**      0.038           2.07       
Agricultural development district is Kasungu  0.257***     0.037           6.96       
Agricultural development district is Salima  0.164***     0.039           4.21       
Agricultural development district is Lilongwe  0.220***     0.035           6.38       
Agricultural development district is Machinga  -0.079** 0.034          -2.31       
Agricultural development district is Blantyre     -0.036 0.034    -1.04 C
on
tro
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Agricultural development district is Ngabu      0.009 0.040     0.24 
1. Household size -0.169***     0.003        -60.94       
2. Number of members who can read in English 0.082***     0.006          14.36       
3. Household grew tobacco in the past five  
    cropping seasons 0.119***     0.016          7.63       
4. Floor of main dwelling is predominantly made  
    of smooth cement 0.192***     0.019           10.19       
5. Number of separate rooms occupied by  
   household, excluding toilet, storeroom, or garage 0.047***     0.005            9.41       
6. Cooking fuel is collected firewood -0.152***     0.017          -9.06       
7. Bed ownership 0.161***     0.016           10.35       
8. Tape, CD player, or HiFi ownership 0.179***     0.018           9.67       
9. Electric, gas stove, or hot plate ownership 0.610***     0.067           9.16       
Be
st
 1
0 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 
10. Bicycle ownership 0.154***     0.013           12.31       
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. *** denotes significant at the 99% level.  
               ** denotes significant at the 95% level. 
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Annex 2. Weighted Logit regression results (rural model)  
Likelihood ratio = 877042.545***                                                     Wald=520598.859*** 
Score= 721528.131***                                                                      Number of observations= 6560 
Indicator set Parameter Estimates 
Standard 
Errors 
Wald Chi-
Square 
          Intercept -1.496*** 0.010 22891.540 
Agricultural development district is Mzuzu -0.478*** 0.011 1972.800 
Agricultural development district is Kasungu  -1.258*** 0.011 13756.947 
Agricultural development district is Salima  -0.326*** 0.011 887.511 
Agricultural development district is Lilongwe  -0.973*** 0.010 9748.009 
Agricultural development district is Machinga  0.293*** 0.010 914.526 
Agricultural development district is Blantyre 0.031*** 0.010 9.969 C
on
tro
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Agricultural development district is Ngabu -0.068*** 0.011 35.864 
1. Household size 0.703*** 0.001 421164.019 
2. Number of male adults in the household -0.276*** 0.003 11877.869 
3. Number of members who can read in English -0.302*** 0.002 29751.164 
4. Household has grew tobacco in the past five  
    cropping seasons -0.482*** 0.004 11686.453 
5. Floor of main dwelling is predominantly made  
    of smooth cement -0.971*** 0.006 29707.046 
6. Any household members sleep under a bed net? -0.451*** 0.004 14831.047 
7. Bed ownership -0.558*** 0.004 15565.326 
8. Tape, CD player, or HiFi ownership -0.708*** 0.006 15968.654 
9. Bicycle ownership -0.481*** 0.004 17194.069 
Be
st
 1
0 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 
10. Paraffin lantern ownership -0.485*** 0.004 15156.778 
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. *** denotes significant at the 99% level.  
               ** denotes significant at the 95% level. 
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Annex 3. Weighted Least Square regression results (urban model)  
                                             Model significance F= 176.05*** 
Adj. R2 = 0.7035                                             Number of observations= 960 
Indicator set Parameter Estimates 
Standard 
Errors T-values 
              Intercept 4.903*** 0.074 66.14 
Lilongwe city 0.061 0.063 0.97 
Zomba city -0.351*** 0.084 -4.19 
Co
nt
ro
l 
va
ri
ab
le
s 
Blantyre city -0.200*** 0.063 -3.15 
1. Household size -0.240*** 0.009 -28.20 
2. Number of members who can read in English 0.073*** 0.013 5.84 
3. Maximum class level ever attended in the  
    household is superior/post secondary 0.413*** 0.070 5.91 
4. Number of separate rooms occupied by   
   household, excluding toilet, storeroom, or garage 0.083*** 0.016 5.07 
5. Cooking fuel is collected firewood -0.419*** 0.052 8.08 
6. Household owns a landline telephone in   
    working condition? 0.351*** 0.079 4.45 
7. Household has electricity working in the     
    dwelling 0.316*** 0.043 7.29 
8. Bed ownership 0.263*** 0.038 6.87 
9. Television & VCR ownership 0.333*** 0.061 5.51 
Be
st
 1
0 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 
10. Electric, gas stove, or hot plate ownership 0.263*** 0.060 4.38 
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. *** denotes significant at the 99% level.  
               ** denotes significant at the 95% level. 
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Annex 4. Weighted Logit regression results (urban model)  
Likelihood ratio= 140465.169***                                                     Wald= 63111.546*** 
Score= 123575.755***                                                                      Number of observations= 960 
Indicator set Parameter Estimates 
Standard 
Errors 
Wald Chi-
Square 
              Intercept -3.913*** 0.036 12181.583 
Lilongwe city     0.035 0.023 2.390 
Zomba city 1.012*** 0.030 1168.705 
Co
nt
ro
l 
va
ri
ab
le
s 
Blantyre city 0.987*** 0.024 1704.266 
1. Household size   0.721*** 0.004 40401.758 
2. Number of members who can read in English -0.124*** 0.005  636.188 
3. Household can read in Chichewa language -0.672*** 0.015 2114.769 
4. Highest class level ever attended by females   
    in the household is secondary/post primary -1.466*** 0.020 5294.979 
5. Dwelling construction material is traditional 0.862*** 0.015 3499.259 
6. Cooking fuel is collected firewood 0.926*** 0.017 2905.106 
7. Household has electricity working   -1.751*** 0.025 5094.946 
8. Household head sleeps on Mat (grass) on floor 1.021*** 0.0133 5903.420 
9. Television & VCR ownership -2.108*** 0.0473 1984.649 
Be
st
 1
0 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 
10. Is there a place to purchase common  
     medicines such as panadol in this community? -0.831*** 0.0202 1697.948 
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. *** denotes significant at the 99% level.  
               ** denotes significant at the 95% level. 
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Annex 5. Urban model’s predictive accuracy by type of classifications  
Targeting ratios Cut-off probability  
Poverty 
accuracy 
(%) 
Under-
coverage 
(%) 
Leakage 
(%) 
PIE 
 (% points) 
BPAC 
(% points) 
National 3.79 49.55 50.45 23.42 -6.25 22.52 
Percentile 3.85 55.86 44.14 31.53 -2.92 43.24 
W
LS
 
Max BPAC 3.92 62.16 37.84 38.74 0.21 61.26 
National 0.32 67.57 32.43 46.85 3.33 53.15 
Percentile 0.01 99.1 0.90 200.15 49.58 -100.15 
W
L 
Max BPAC 0.39 61.26 38.74 39.64 0.21 60.36 
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data.  
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                                Annex 6: ROC curves of the rural model (international line)              Annex 7: ROC curves of the rural model (extreme line) 
                                   Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data.                               Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. 
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                               Annex 8: ROC curves of the urban model (international line)                 Annex 9: ROC curves of the urban model (extreme line) 
                                  Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data.                                    Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. 
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                              Annex 10: Targeting error distribution by poverty lines (WLS)               Annex 11: Targeting error distribution by poverty lines (WL) 
                              Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data.                                    Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. 
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TARGETING THE POOR AND SMALLHOLDER FARMERS 
Empirical evidence from Malawi 
Nazaire Houssou and Manfred Zeller 
Published as Discussion paper (No. 01/2009) in Development Economics and Policy Series. 
Forthcoming in the Quarterly Journal of International Agriculture 
 
Abstract 
This paper develops low cost, reasonably accurate, and simple models for improving 
the targeting efficiency of development policies in Malawi. Using a stepwise logistic 
regression along with other techniques applied in credit scoring, the research identifies a set 
of easily observable and verifiable indicators for correctly predicting whether a household is 
poor or not, based on the 2004-05 Malawi Integrated Household Survey data. The predictive 
power of the models is assessed using out-of-sample validation tests and receiver operating 
characteristic curves, whereas the model robustness is evaluated by bootstrap simulation 
methods. Finally, sensitivity analyses are performed using the international and extreme 
poverty lines.  
 The models developed have proven their validity in an independent sample derived 
from the same population. Findings suggest that the rural model when calibrated to the 
national poverty line correctly predicts the status of about 69% of poor households when 
applied to an independent subset of surveyed households, whereas the urban model correctly 
identifies 64% of poor. Increasing the poverty line improves model targeting performances, 
while reducing the poverty line does the opposite. In terms of robustness, the rural model 
yields a more robust result with a prediction margin of ±10% points compared to the urban 
model. While the best indicator sets can potentially yield a sizable impact on poverty if used 
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in combination with a direct transfer program, some non-poor would also be targeted as the 
result of model leakage. One major feature of the models is that household score can be easily 
and quickly computed on the field. Overall, the models developed can be potential policy 
tools for Malawi.  
Keywords: Malawi, poverty targeting, proxy means tests, out-of-sample tests, bootstrap. 
 
 CHAPTER IV 
TO TARGET OR NOT TO TARGET? 
The costs, benefits, and impacts of indicator-based targeting 
Nazaire Houssou and Manfred Zeller 
A shorter version of this paper has been submitted to Food Policy Journal 
 
 
Abstract 
This paper assesses the cost-effectiveness of indicator-based targeting. Using 
household survey data from Malawi, we examine whether an indicator-based targeting of the 
poor is more cost-efficient in alleviating poverty than universal systems that broadly target the 
population. Furthermore, we assess whether a proxy indicator system is more target- and cost-
efficient than past agricultural subsidy programs which used community-based targeting to 
deliver benefits to the poor and smallholder farmers in the country.  
There is compelling evidence in favor of targeting Malawi’s poor and smallholder 
farmers by proxy means tests because targeting benefits outweigh its costs. Targeting not only 
reduces the Malawian Government’s direct costs, but also reduces overall program costs. 
Even though administrative costs increase under finer targeting, simulation results suggest 
that it does not make a targeted program cost-ineffective. Furthermore, finer targeting is found 
to have a stronger impact on poverty than universal coverage of the population. More 
importantly, the newly designed proxy system appears to be more target- and cost-efficient than 
the 2000/2001 Starter Pack and the 2006/2007 Agricultural Input Support Program (AISP). 
While the Starter Pack and the AISP transferred about 50% of total transfer, under the new 
system about 73% of transfer are delivered to the poor and smallholder farmers. Likewise, 
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under the new proxy system the costs of leakage are cut down by more than 50% compared to 
previous agricultural subsidy programs. 
This work is prospectively relevant for Malawi as its policy makers reflect on 
improving the efficiency of the country’s pro-poor development programs. Given the 
constraint in fiscal and donor resources, the sheer number of poor, and the competing 
development needs in the country, the savings from targeting can be used to expand program 
outreach or promote other pro-poor development policies. Finally, the research could be 
applied in other developing countries with similar targeting problems.  
Keywords: Malawi, poverty targeting, out-of-sample tests, redistribution, cost-effectiveness, 
cash transfers, agricultural subsidy, safety nets. 
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1. Introduction 
Malawi is one of the poorest countries in the world with a poverty rate of 52.4% 
(National Statistics Office - NSO -, 2005a). In response to endemic poverty, poor harvest, 
severe food insecurity, and unfavorable weather conditions, successive development 
programs, including fertilizer subsidy schemes were devised and targeted at the poor and 
smallholder farmers in the country. One such program is the Starter Pack Initiative (SPI) of 
2000/2001 which provided free fertilizer and seeds to poor farmers at a total cost of about 
US$11 million (Smith, 2001). Similarly, the Agricultural Input Support Programs (AISPs) of 
2005/2006 and 2006/2007 disbursed about 310,803 tons of subsidized fertilizer and seeds to 
poor farmers at a total cost of MK17.5 billion (Dorward et al., 2008). Preliminary assessments 
suggest that the AISPs have improved the household food security and led to an increase of 
the country’s national maize output with some of parts of the production being exported to 
neighboring countries (Dorward et al., 2008; Minde et al., 2008). 
Input subsidy and other development programs in Malawi mostly rely on community-
based targeting mechanisms in which local authorities and community representatives identify 
program beneficiaries based on their assessment of the household living standards. However, 
most of these programs display a poor targeting efficiency due to a number of factors, including 
various local perceptions, favoritism, abuse, lack of understanding of targeting criteria, political 
interests, etc. According to the IHS2 survey data, about 35% of rural poor did not benefit from 
the SPI, while 62% of non-poor did benefit the program. Likewise, an evaluation of the 
2006/2007 AISP program by Dorward et al. (2008) suggests that 46% of the poor did not 
receive fertilizer vouchers, whereas 54% of non-poor wrongly received vouchers. Furthermore, 
a research by Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne (2009), suggests that the 2006/2007 AISP program has 
been targeted to wealthier and politically connected farmers who would otherwise have 
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purchased the fertilizer, causing substantial displacement of commercial fertilizer estimated at 
about 30% to 40% on the market (Dorward et al., 2008).  
Better targeting has become an imperative for developing countries in the wake of 
macroeconomic and structural adjustment programs under which governments are pressured to 
cut back enormously on their expenditures (Chinsinga, 2005). Likewise, with a per capita income 
of US$230 (World Bank, 2008) and limited donor funds, the surplus available to redistribute is 
relatively small. Under these conditions, the first challenge for Malawi is to develop a low cost, 
fairly accurate, and easy system to target the poor and smallholder farmers. The second challenge 
is to assess whether targeting using such a system is more cost- and impact-effective compared to 
universal interventions and the currently used targeting mechanisms in the country.  
This research seeks to address these challenges. We propose an alternative system that 
might improve the targeting efficiency of development programs and foster pro-poor 
economic growth, food security, and poverty reduction in Malawi. Furthermore, we estimate 
the costs, benefits, and poverty impacts of an indicator-based targeting and assess whether the 
newly developed system is more cost-efficient compared to the 2000/2001 SPI and the 
2006/2007 AISP which used community-based targeting mechanism to deliver benefits to the 
poor and smallholder farmers. 
There is compelling evidence in favor of targeting since considering all costs does not 
make a targeted program cost- and impact-ineffective. Likewise, the newly designed system 
appears to be more target- and cost-efficient than the 2000/2001 SPI and the 2006/2007 AISP. 
This piece of work is prospectively relevant for Malawi as its policy makers reflect on improving 
the efficiency of the country’s pro-poor development programs. Likewise, the research could be 
applied in other developing countries with similar targeting problems. The paper is organized as 
follows. Section 2 discusses the targeting of development policies within the context of Malawi. 
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Section 3 reviews the principles of targeting. Section 4 sets out the methodology, whereas 
section 5 presents the results. Section 6 offers our concluding remarks. 
2. Targeting Development Programs: The Malawian context 
Deeply entrenched poverty is a major obstacle to Malawi’s economic growth and 
development. The country is mostly agricultural with more than 85% of its population living 
in rural areas (NSO, 2005a) and about 90% of its households working in the agricultural 
sector. Almost half of the households are subsistence farmers. The agricultural sector 
contributed about 34% to the Gross Domestic Product in 2007 (World Bank, 2009a) and 
accounted for more than 80% of export earnings (World Bank, 2009b). With improved 
macroeconomic management, favorable weather conditions, and a supportive donor 
environment, in the last 3-4 years, the country has experienced high growth rates averaging 
7.5% and the growth rate is projected at 6.9% in 2009 (World Bank, 2009b). 
Historically, there has been no coherent strategy for targeting the poor and vulnerable in 
Malawi (Smith, 2001). There exist a large number of targeted programs in the country, most of 
which are uncoordinated short-term relief or emergency responses. In the period 2003-2006, 
including emergency aid and disaster response, the combined safety nets/social protection 
system amounted to an average of more than US$134 million per year; that is about 6.5% of the 
country’s Gross Domestic Product (World Bank, 2007).  
Fertilizer subsidy has been a key element of the Malawian Government’s present policy 
(World Bank, 2007). The provision of agricultural inputs, especially fertilizer, enjoys a special 
place in the popular hierarchy of anti-poverty measures in Malawi (Smith, 2001). For instance, 
the SPI of 1998/1999 provided 10 kilograms (kg) of fertilizer, along with seeds to all 
smallholder households at a cost of US$27 million. But, confronted with the fiscal burden, the 
Government subsequently scaled down the program to a targeted version and funding has been 
therefore substantially reduced. In 2005/2006 growing season, a new fertilizer subsidy 
Chapter 4: To target or not to target? 
 
89
program was devised in the country following an extremely poor harvest in 2004/2005. The 
program which cost about US$33 million (Ricker-Gilbert and Jayne, 2009), was scaled up in 
the following year. According to NSO’s estimates, the 2006/2007 AISP program provided 
fertilizer and seeds to just under 2.5 million rural households (Dorward et al., 2008) and cost 
about US$91 million. The program distributes about 3.482 million of fertilizer coupons with 
which each qualified farming household is entitled to purchase 1 bag of 50 kg of Urea and 1 
bag of 50 kg of NPK at a subsidized rate of MK950 or approximately 28% of market price. 
Though the AISP planned to provide farmers with two coupons (one coupon for basal 
dressing and one for top dressing of the soil), some farmers were given only one coupon and 
were imposed either of the fertilizer type. Likewise, 28% of the coupons were unaccounted 
for. As in most previous programs, the AISP was implemented through a community-based 
targeting mechanism in which local authorities and other community representatives select 
program beneficiaries based on their assessment of household living conditions. However, 
almost all development interventions have targeting problems in the country (Government of 
Malawi and World Bank, 2007): they cover a limited number of poor and leak program benefits 
to a significant number of non-poor. To put this in perspective, we estimate in Table 1, the 
targeting efficiency of selected programs as measured by their undercoverage and leakage rates.  
Table 1. Targeting efficiency of Malawi’s development programs  
Program type Undercoverage (%) Leakage (%) 
Free food distribution 70.99 31.23 
Input-for-work 98.61 0 
Starter Pack (rainy season)1 34.98 61.81 
Starter Pack (dry season)1 94.96 8.03 
Food/cash-for-work 93.06 6.19 
ILTPWP2 72.9 2.6 
AISP3 46 54 
Average performance 73.07 23.41 
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. 1Results based on rural areas only. 2Excerpts 
from World Bank (2006) and 3Dorward et al. (2008). AISP denotes Agricultural Input 
Support Program. The Improved Livelihood Through Public Works Programs (ILTPWP) 
was implemented in six districts of the central region of Malawi. 
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Table 1 suggests that Malawi’s development programs are badly targeted, with 
average undercoverage and leakage estimated at about 73% and 23%, respectively. The 
results are consistent with World Bank (2007) which reports that the level of funding for 
different programs in the country is not necessarily inadequate, but many programs do suffer 
from limited beneficiary coverage, mis-targeting, and significant leakages to the non-poor. 
Likewise, most of them are too small in scale to have a meaningful impact. Clearly, under the 
community-based targeting system, development programs are not reaching their intended 
beneficiaries and therefore, they are unlikely to yield their intended effects on poverty and 
economic development in the country. To reverse this trend, we propose targeting by proxy 
means tests which if well implemented could considerably improve the efficiency of the 
country’s development programs. 
3. The Principles of Targeting: A theoretical perspective20 
The principles of targeting are well established in the literature. However, less is 
known about the costs of targeting. By definition, targeting is the process by which benefits are 
channelled to the members of the high priority group that a program aims to serve (Grosh and 
Baker, 1995). It is a means identifying which members of society should receive a particular 
benefit (Rook and Freeland, 2006). It involves two elements: first defining who should receive 
benefits and second establishing mechanisms for identifying those people21.  
From a welfare point of view, targeting should address institutional failures (market 
failures) and distributional issues regarding access to assets, services, inputs for production or 
human capital formation and maintenance. The case for narrow targeting rests on the existence 
of a budget constraint (Coady et al., 2004). Since the public budget is scarce, ideally targeting 
should help direct transfers or services or improve access as much as possible to/for those who 
need them most. Targeting should not be only seen as an effort to improve the immediate 
                                                 
20 A substantial part of this section is inspired from Besley and Kanbur (1993). 
21 See below for a brief survey of these mechanisms.  
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consumption of the poor, but also as an investment in the future by ensuring the productivity of 
the next generation and long term economic growth. It is a pro-poor development strategy since 
it reduces the leakage of scarce public resources to people who do not need assistance.  
However, targeting is not costless. It imposes administrative costs that reduce the amount 
of benefits available for the actual intervention (Hoddinott, 1999). Likewise, no feasible targeting 
mechanism is perfect; all available options involve two types of errors: undercoverage and 
leakage. Undercoverage represents a failure of the program to cover all poor. Leakage is an error 
of including non-poor as program beneficiaries. While effective targeting may reduce the 
government’s direct costs for providing benefits, it does not necessarily reduce the total costs of a 
targeted program (Rook and Freeland, 2006; Dutrey, 2007).  
Targeting entails a number of costs. These include the costs of transfer to the poor, the 
costs of leakage to the non-poor, administrative costs, and the hidden costs of targeting which 
comprise: private, indirect, social, and political costs22. The transfer to the poor is the amount of 
benefits that reach effectively the poor who are the intended program beneficiaries. The leakage 
is the amount of benefits that is wrongly given to the non-poor. The transfer to the poor is a 
good use of resources, whereas leakage to the non-poor is a waste of resources although it may 
increase political support for targeting23. Administrative costs include the costs of data 
collection for developing a targeting algorithm (e.g. developing a proxy means test model), the 
cost of regular screening of program beneficiaries, the costs of processing and delivering 
program benefits, and program staff costs.  
Private costs consist of costs, such as income lost (e.g. opportunity cost of 
participating in a targeted intervention), the time, and fees necessary for the poor to prove 
their eligibility for targeted benefits. Indirect costs or incentives costs arise when for example 
                                                 
22 See Rook and Freeland (2006); Coady al, (2002), and van de Walle (1998) for a fuller description of targeting  
    costs and benefits. 
23 See for example Gelbach and Prichett (2000) for a discussion on the political economy of targeting. 
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beneficiaries report faulty information in order to qualify for a transfer scheme. This is likely 
the case when targeting criteria are not explicit and verifiable or in the absence of an effective 
verification process. Social costs arise from the stigma associated with declaring oneself as 
poor, the deterioration of community cohesion due to selective targeting, and the erosion of 
informal support networks.  
Political costs arise from the fact that politicians can manipulate or abuse targeting rules 
in order to favor their constituencies and garner political support. In addition, targeting can 
erode the political support from the wealthier, especially if it is financed through the taxation of 
non-poor. On the other hand, targeting may increase political support from those who support it 
based on its indirect benefits to them – e.g. feeling of social justice or being hassled by fewer 
beggars, and security – (Coady et al., 2002). To our knowledge, there is no comprehensive 
study on the hidden costs of targeting in the literature. 
The total cost of targeting depends on a number of factors, including population 
coverage, targeting method, implementation mechanisms, socio-political environment, etc. 
Though less is known about the costs of targeting, it is generally agreed that the finer the 
targeting, the higher the administrative and hidden costs. The following diagram shows 
administrative and hidden costs of targeting as a function of population coverage.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Costs of targeting. 
Source: Adapted from Smith (2001). 
Figure 1 suggests that narrow targeting (of the poor) increases administrative, indirect, 
private, social, and political costs and reduces fiscal costs. As the coverage of the population 
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increases toward universal coverage, administrative, indirect, private, social, and political 
costs fall, whereas political support improves, but fiscal costs increase due to excessive 
leakage to non-poor.  
Related to narrow targeting is the so-called “ideal solution” for targeting a transfer 
scheme (Besley and Kanbur, 1993). The ideal solution implies a perfect targeting and complete 
elimination of poverty. It supposes that income or expenditures can be observed accurately and 
costlessly, and no incentive effects prevent the state from plugging the gap between poverty line 
and income. The ideal solution is depicted in the panel to the left of Figure 2, which plots the 
final (i.e. post transfer) against the original income.   
 
 
                           
                                                                    
                                                                             
                                                                             
                                                                                                  
 
                                                                                           
 
 
                    Figure 2: Ideal solution (left) and universal coverage (right) for targeting a transfer scheme.  
                    Source: Besley and Kanbur (1993).  
Along the dotted 45° line, there is no difference between original and final income. A 
point above this line indicates a subsidy or transfer, while a point below indicates a 
withdrawal or tax. The ideal solution is given by the solid line. For anybody with original 
income y less than z, the government transfers exactly the amount z-y so as to bring final 
income up to z. This completely eliminates poverty. The financial cost of this strategy is 
given by the sum of these transfers z-y. If the distribution of income is uniform, then this cost 
would simply be depicted by the triangular areas between the horizontal solid line and the 45° 
line. The structure of the scheme for those with income above z depends on the nature of the 
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budget constraint. If the transfer scheme is to be self-financing, then those with incomes 
above z have to be taxed. This is shown by the solid line beyond z, but below the 45° line. 
The larger the tax revenue to be raised, the shallower this line will have to be in order to 
balance the budget. If the state is perfectly informed, the ideal solution is clearly the least cost 
method of alleviating poverty. It relies on being able to transfer the right amount to each 
individual below the poverty line without affecting their incentives to earn.  
Opposite to the ideal solution for targeting is universal coverage. A universal scheme 
gives everybody a transfer of z independently from its income level. This is depicted by the 
panel to the right of Figure 2. This scheme also eliminates poverty, but at a far greater 
budgetary cost. Everyone, even someone with original income exceeding z, receives a transfer 
of z from the government. The budgetary cost is just z times the population size. If the scheme 
is to be financed through taxation, then the marginal tax rates on non-poor will need to be 
higher than in the ideal solution. 
The main question is: are both extreme feasible (Besley and Kanbur, 1993)? The ideal 
solution is not feasible for three main factors: the costs of administration, individual responses 
and incentive effects, and considerations of political economy. The administrative costs 
involved in the ideal solution are high; its quantification is not an easy task. Besides, the ideal 
solution implies a means testing based on a regular measurement of individual or household 
income. It is very difficult to assess and verify income, even in developed countries.  
Furthermore, the ideal solution imposes a higher marginal tax rate on the poor than on 
non-poor. If the original income of the poor is zero, then the marginal tax rate on the rich will 
have to be higher than that indicated by the ideal solution24. In both cases, the marginal tax rates 
might affect incentives to work and hence income. This will be reflected in the political and 
indirect costs of the program. On the other hand, a universal scheme will have a medium level 
                                                 
24 From the theoretical point of view, higher marginal tax rate on the rich is justified by the law of declining 
marginal utility. 
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marginal tax rate on everybody. However, empirical evidence is limited as to which level of tax 
rate to impose upon the society (Besley and Kanbur, 1993). Likewise, individual costs (e.g. social 
and private costs) of participating in a finely targeted program meant specifically for the poor 
might deter them from joining the program. The alternative is to have a universal scheme which 
gives everyone the same amount of transfer, but universal scheme is costly and does not do much 
for the poorest. Indeed, many countries began to switch from universal to targeted programs 
(Smith and Subbarao, 2003). 
In addition, the ideal solution might not enjoy enough political support to predominate since 
is it targeted only to the poor who often lack sufficient political power. A finely targeted program 
may be divisive, exacerbates social tensions, and further isolates the poor. Likewise, politicians can 
manipulate targeting rules for their own interest. Conversely, universal coverage has the advantage 
of covering non-poor as well, thus increases political support for a transfer scheme. 
In theory, none of the above solutions is feasible. The alternative is to consider an 
intermediate solution which lie somewhere in the middle of the curves (Figure 1). This 
solution is based on various targeting mechanisms, including indicator-based targeting 
methods (proxy means targeting, categorical targeting), community-based targeting, 
geographical targeting, self-targeting, and subjective self-assessment25. All of these methods 
have the same goal: to correctly identify which households are poor and which are not. 
However, none of them is perfect at targeting. Most often, they exhibit a trade-off between 
accuracy and practicality/costs of implementation as shown in Figure 3.  
                                       
 
 
                               
                             
 
 
 
                                                 
25 See Coady et al., (2002); Conning and Kevane (2002), and Grosh and Baker (1995) for a fuller description of  
    targeting methods. 
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                                                           Figure 3: Trade-off between practicality and accuracy.  
                                                           Source: Own conception. 
Figure 3 shows that the higher the method accuracy, the lower the practicality (or the 
higher the costs of implementation) and vice versa. Means tests are the best way of determining 
eligibility26. They are highly accurate (assuming the information provided by the household is 
free from error) since they rely directly on income or consumption. However, they are 
unpractical and very expensive to implement, especially in developing countries. Geographical 
and single indicator targeting are more practical, but they are less accurate than means tests. On 
the other hand, subjective self-assessment is the most practical method, but it is poorly accurate. 
Conversely, proxy means tests are more accurate than geographical targeting, single indicator 
targeting and subjective self-assessment. Besides, they are more practical than means tests.  
Compared to most targeting methods, proxy means tests have the merit of making 
replicable judgments using consistent and visible criteria (Coady et al., 2002). They are also 
simple to implement and less costly than sophisticated means tests. For example, in a recent 
review of 122 targeted anti-poverty interventions, Coady et al. (2004) found that proxy means 
tests show good results on average, even though there is a wide variation in targeting 
performances between programs. Likewise, Coady and Parker (2009) found that administrative 
                                                 
26 Means tests directly measure household income to determine its welfare level. Because of the difficulties    
   associated with such tests, they are largely reserved for industrialized countries. See Coady et al. (2002) and  
   Grosh and Baker (1995) for further details on means tests.  
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selection based on proxy means testing is particularly effective at reducing overall program 
coverage while maintaining high coverage of the lowest welfare households. Therefore, we 
propose targeting by proxy means tests as a mechanism to target the poor and smallholder 
farmers in Malawi. Proxy means tests use household socioeconomic indicators to proxy 
household income or welfare level. In general, the aim is to find one or a few indicators which 
are less costly to verify, but are sufficiently correlated with income or expenditures to be useful 
for poverty alleviation (Besley and Kanbur, 1993). The advantage of using few indicators is that 
administrative costs are kept low, while leakage is less than what it would be under 
universalistic scheme, so that more poverty reduction could be achieved with the same budget.  
The total budget required for targeting a transfer scheme can be formulated as follows 
(Besley and Kanbur, 1993): 
T= P + NP + A + H 
Where:  
T is the total budget of the program; 
P is the value of transfers given to the poor; 
NP is the value of transfers wrongly given to non-poor; 
A is the administrative costs; 
H is the hidden costs (private, indirect, social, and political costs). 
A measure of the targeting efficiency is given by: 
F = P*100/(P + NP) 
Alternative measures of targeting efficiency include:  
F1= (NP + A + H)/P 
F2= P*100/(P + NP + A + H) 
F is defined as the transfer to the poor as a percentage of total transfer;  
F1 is the cost of transferring one unit of resources to the poor; 
F2 is defined as the transfer to the poor as a percentage of total program cost.  
Administrative costs as a function of the total program cost are given by: 
C= A/(P + NP + A + H).  
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Following Besley and Kanbur (1993), we hypothesize that C rises with F at an 
increasing rate. Figure 4 shows administrative costs as a function of program efficiency. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           Figure 4: Administrative cost function.  
                                           Source: Besley and Kanbur (1993).  
Figure 4 shows that there is a minimum level of costs (Cmin) for any development 
policy or program whether randomly or universally targeted. Associated with that is a 
minimum transfer efficiency (Fmin) which is always achievable under any program. 
Furthermore, the higher the targeting efficiency, the higher the administrative costs. 
Compared to the ideal solution, universal coverage has lower administrative costs, but higher 
overall program costs. Since less is known about the exact shape of the curve, the 
quantification of administrative costs is often approximated. In the literature, these costs range 
from 0.1% to 30% of total program cost (see Grosh and Baker, 1995; Smith, 2001; Coady, 
2003; Smith and Subbarao, 2003).  
4. Data and Methodology 
4.1 Data 
 This research used the Malawi Second Integrated Household Survey (IHS2) data of 
2005. The NSO (2005b) conducted the IHS2 with the assistance of the International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) and the World Bank27. The IHS2 which was carried out 
from March 2004 through March 2005 covered a nationally representative sample of 11,280 
                                                 
27 We gratefully acknowledge the NSO for providing us with the data. 
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households that were selected based on a two-stage stratified sampling design. This design 
involved in the first stage the selection of primary sampling units based on Probability 
Proportional to Size (PPS) sampling and in the second stage a random selection of surveyed 
households. Likewise, the survey covered a wide range of socioeconomic indicators, 
including household consumption expenditures. 
We define poverty in this research as a level of consumption and expenditures which 
has been calculated to be insufficient to meet individual basic needs in a household. This 
definition is a standard but narrow view of poverty (Benson, 2002). It does not consider the 
capability of individuals to achieve a desired life as conceptualized by Sen (1987). However, 
in view of the widespread use of monetary poverty lines with expenditure-based measures of 
poverty, this research pursues a policy-relevant objective by identifying indicator-based tools 
that can simplify the identification of rural poor and measure welfare changes over time in 
poor populations.  
4.2 Estimating the models  
4.2.1 Estimation method 
Separate models were estimated for rural and urban households due to substantial 
differences between rural and urban areas. These models were estimated using the quantile 
regression. Previous applications of quantile regression for poverty targeting include 
Braithwaite et al. (2000), Zeller and Alcaraz V. (2005), Zeller et al. (2005), and Muller and 
Bibi, (2008). Quantile regression was first introduced by Koenker and Bassett (Koenker and 
Hallock, 2001). Defined in the simplest way, quantile regression is a statistical procedure 
intended to estimate conditional quantile functions in which quantiles of the conditional 
distribution of the response variable are expressed as functions of observed covariates. In analogy 
with classical linear regression methods (e. g. ordinary least squares), based on minimizing 
sums of squared residuals and meant to estimate models for conditionals mean functions, 
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quantile regression methods are based on minimizing asymmetrically weighted absolute 
residuals and intended to estimate conditional median functions.  
The quantile regression was deemed appropriate for estimating the models because we 
are interested in a particular segment (i.e. the poor) of the analyzed conditional distribution 
(here the welfare distribution) as a function of several covariates of interest. Furthermore, 
quantile regression does not impose any sort of strict parametric assumptions on the analyzed 
distribution. The general form of the model takes the following form: 
i j ij iy xβ ε= +  
 where iy  is the dependent variable, i.e. the logarithm of daily per capita expenditures; 
ijx  is a set of poverty predictors; 
jβ  is a vector of parameter estimates; 
iε  is the random error term. 
The minimization problem is formulated as follows: 
( )( )min ,i ij jy xτρ ξ β−∑  
 where τρ is a tilted absolute value function with the thτ sample quantile as solution.  ( ),ij jxξ β  is a parametric function that can be formulated as linear. 
 The simplex algorithm was used for solving the minimization problem (SAS Institute, 
2006). A model with a high explanatory power is a prerequisite for good predictions of the 
dependent variable per capita daily expenditures (and thereby poverty status). Initially the set 
of predictors included 148 practical indicators that where selected to ensure an operational use 
of the models28. These indicators were selected based on Zeller et al. (2006) and included 
practicability considerations regarding the ease and accuracy with which information on the 
indicators could be quickly elicited in an interview as well as considerations regarding the 
                                                 
28 The list of indicators was reduced to 112 for the urban model; some of the variables were not relevant in  
     urban areas. 
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objectiveness and verifiability of an indicator29. The list of selected indicators was then 
submitted to stepwise regressions out of which the best ten indicators with highly significant 
coefficients (at an error level of 1% or less) were retained30. To reflect the importance of each 
household, the regression was weighted by the household weight in the population. In 
addition, we controlled for agricultural development districts in the rural model and the four 
major cities: Mzuzu, Zomba, Lilongwe, and Blantyre in the urban model. 
Since we are particularly interested in identifying accurately the poor, we estimated 
the quantile regression at the point of estimation that corresponds to the poverty rate in the 
population. In that way, the estimation can be said to focus on the poor. The models 
developed do not seek to identify the determinants of poverty, but select variables that can 
best predict the current poverty status of a household31. A causal relationship should not be 
inferred from the results.  
4.2.2 Out-of-sample tests  
Out-of-sample validation tests were conducted to assess the predictive power of the 
models. The main purpose of the validations is to observe how well the models perform in an 
independent sample derived from the same population. In order to perform the tests, the initial 
samples were first split into two sub-samples following the ratio 67:33. The larger samples or 
calibration samples were employed to estimate the models i.e. identify the best set of 
variables, their weights, and the optimal cut-offs, whereas the smaller samples or validation 
samples were used to test out-of-sample the predictive accuracy of the models. In the out-of-
sample tests, we therefore applied the set of identified indicators, their weights and the 
                                                 
29 In addition, before estimating the regressions, the list of selected variables was further screened for      
    multicollinearity. 
30 Previous researches (Zeller and Alcaraz V., 2005 and Zeller et al., 2005) show that in general, the higher the   
    number of indicators, the higher the prediction accuracy and the lower the model practicality (higher cost of  
    data collection). In this paper, we used the best ten indicators in order to balance the model accuracy and  
    practicality or operational use.      
31 See for example Sen (1984) for a conceptual framework on poverty and Mukherjee and Benson (2006) for a   
    study on the determinants of poverty in Malawi.  
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optimal cut-offs to predict the household poverty status. Furthermore, the model robustness 
was assessed by estimating the prediction intervals of the targeting ratios using 1, 000 
bootstrapped resamples32.  
In the selection of the calibration samples, we followed a two-stage stratified sampling 
selection process and PPS protocol in order to mimic the initial sample selection. This design 
ensures that all strata are adequately represented in the model estimation. In order, to confirm 
the representativity of the calibration samples, we tested the differences in estimates between 
the samples and the full datasets. The results of the tests show no statistically significant 
difference between both sets. Therefore, the calibration samples are as representative as the 
full datasets. Table 2 describes the sample size and the number of indicators by model types.  
Table 2. Sample size by model types 
Sub-samples Rural model Urban model Total 
Total sample size 9,840 1,440 11,280 
     - calibration (2/3) 6,560 960 7,540 
     - validation (1/3) 3,280 480 3,760 
Number of indicators 148 112 - 
Source: Own calculations based on Malawi IHS2 data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
32 See Efron (1987) for further details on bootstrapped simulation methods. 
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4.2.3 Measuring targeting performances  
 Different performance measures can be used to assess the targeting performances of a 
poverty assessment model (Table 3). 
Table 3. Selected accuracy ratios 
Targeting ratios Definitions 
Poverty Accuracy 
Number of households correctly predicted as poor, expressed as a 
percentage of the total number of poor 
Undercoverage Number of poor households predicted as non-poor, expressed as a percentage of the total number of poor 
Leakage Number of non-poor households predicted as poor, expressed as a percentage of the total number of poor 
Poverty Incidence  
Error (PIE) 
Difference between predicted and actual poverty incidence, 
measured in percentage points 
Balanced Poverty 
Accuracy Criterion (BPAC) 
Poverty accuracy minus the absolute difference between 
undercoverage and leakage, measured in percentage points 
Source: Adapted from IRIS (2005) and Houssou and Zeller (2009) 
 Having estimated the models, the question arises as to what cut-off to use to predict 
the household poverty status. Therefore, the cut-offs that maximized the BPAC after 
calibrations were used. Households with predicted expenditures higher than these cut-offs 
were predicted as poor, otherwise they were deemed non-poor. This classification was then 
crossed with the actual household poverty status. The latter is defined as follows: households 
with expenditures less than the national poverty line (MK44.29 a day) were classified as poor, 
otherwise they were deemed non-poor. Finally, we calibrated the models to the international 
and extreme poverty lines as different development institutions might be interested in 
targeting different poverty groups in the population. 
4.3 Methodology for the simulations 
It is often argued that targeting is cost-ineffective and once all targeting costs have 
been considered, a finely targeted program may not be any more cost-efficient and may not 
have any more effect on poverty than a universal program. Therefore, an evaluation of the 
costs and benefits of targeting was performed under the new system and a program which 
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provides cash transfer to the poor. Likewise, we assess whether the new system is more 
target- and cost-efficient than community-based targeting of agricultural subsidy programs. 
In order to fit with the existing institutional capacity for handling a targeted program, 
we assumed a realistic transfer scheme to cover 20% of the population; that is approximately 
equivalent to the proportion of direct beneficiaries of under the initial version of the SPI33. 
Likewise, we set the total annual budget available for targeting the rural population at US$30 
million. This amount is approximately equivalent to the total cost of the initial version of SPI 
and corresponds to about one-third of the costs of the AISP in 2006/2007. It represents just 
about 9% of the Government’s annual expenditures on public work programs in 2000 and 1% 
of Malawi’s GDP in 200534. Under the urban model, the total budget available for targeting 
was set at 10% of the budget allocated for targeting the rural poor (i.e. US$3 million). This 
rate is roughly proportional to the number of urban poor. Both budgets were exogenously 
determined; we did not consider financing the redistribution through the taxation of non-poor. 
We simulated three transfer schemes and evaluated their costs, benefits, and poverty 
impacts based on the model targeting performances35. The first scheme provides a fixed amount 
of transfer to all poor irrespective of their poverty level, whereas the second scheme grants 
transfer to the poor progressively according to their level of consumption. In other words, the 
second scheme provides the poorest with the exact transfer needed to bring them up to the 
poverty line. This redistribution scheme was implemented progressively starting from the 
poorest poor till the available budget (net of costs) is exhausted. The scheme aims at reducing 
extreme poverty and represents a finer targeting compared to the first scheme. We define the 
latter as uniform targeting and the former as progressive targeting. Uniform targeting is the 
scheme applied for providing fertilizer subsidies to program beneficiaries in Malawi.  
                                                 
33 20% coverage of the population is a policy variable that can be set at any government wishes. 
34 Malawi’s GDP is estimated at US$2.9 billion in 2005 (World Bank, 2008). 
35 We based our simulations on the performances of the models calibrated to the national poverty line, but we   
    conducted further simulations based on the international and extreme poverty lines. 
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However, both schemes do not respect the initial welfare ranking of the population. 
With the uniform scheme, the poor who are just below the poverty line would get richer than 
the non-poor who lie just over the line after transfer. Likewise, under a progressive targeting 
scheme individuals in the poorest deciles would get richer than the less poor. Therefore, a third 
scheme was implemented. The third scheme which is termed as fair targeting, not only covers 
all poor, but also respects the initial welfare ranking of the total population. Under this scheme, 
a poorer individual would not get richer than its less poor neighbor. Likewise, the less poor 
receive less transfer and the poorer receive more transfer. It is the finest redistribution scheme. 
We compared the benefits and costs of targeting with the reference point of universal coverage. 
Under the universal scheme, the available budget is distributed equally among the population 
covered by the program. The universal scheme assumes that there is no targeting.  
With respect to administrative and hidden costs of targeting, they were set following 
Smith and Subbarao (2003), Smith (2001), and Besley and Kanbur (1993) who hypothesize 
that the finer the targeting, the higher the costs of administration36. Therefore, under the 
uniform scheme, administrative costs of targeting were estimated at 30% of the budget 
available for poverty reduction. In addition, we set the hidden costs of targeting at 5% of 
program administrative costs. Since progressive targeting is finer than uniform targeting, we 
further increased administrative costs to 35% of the program budget and the hidden costs to 
10% of administrative costs in the second scheme. Under a fair targeting scheme, the costs are 
assumed to be identical to the costs under the second scheme, because both schemes provide 
transfers to the poor in similar fashion.  
Under a universal coverage, we set administrative costs at 50% of the costs under 
uniform targeting. In other words, under a universal coverage administrative costs were set at 
15% of total program cost. Likewise, we assumed that under a universal redistribution, the 
hidden costs of targeting are negligible because everyone is qualified for transfer in that case; 
                                                 
36 Confer section 2. 
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no eligibility screening is required. Similarly, under the SPI and AISP programs, 
administrative costs were set at 15% of total program costs37 and the hidden costs of targeting 
were estimated at 5% of administrative costs. 
We estimated the impacts of targeting on poverty using the Foster-Greer-Thorbecke 
(FGT)38 poverty index, which is defined as follows:  
1
1 q i
i
z yP
N z
α
α
=
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠∑  
where Pα is the poverty measure, N is the total population, z is the cut-off applied or generally the poverty 
line, q is the total number of poor, and yi is the predicted household per capita consumption expenditures.  
When α = 0, the poverty measure P0 is the incidence of poverty or the headcount ratio, 
that is the proportion of individuals whose expenditures is below the poverty line. With α = 1, 
the relative importance given to all individuals below the poverty line is proportional to their 
expenditures and the poverty measure P1 is the poverty gap measure. If α = 2, then the 
poverty measure P2 takes into account the degree of inequality among poor individuals, the 
depth of poverty as well as the number of poor. This poverty measure, also called the squared 
poverty gap is a measure of the severity of poverty.  
Following Ravallion and Chao (1989), we estimated the benefits of targeting as the 
amount by which an untargeted budget would have to be increased in order to achieve the 
targeted poverty level. This amount is the budget difference between a universal coverage and 
a targeted program with the same poverty impacts. This assessment is, however static and 
underestimates the benefits of targeting. Targeting generates a number of benefits, the most 
obvious being the savings from excessive leakage to non-poor. Likewise, targeting benefits 
may percolate through and strengthen over time through the positive external effects of 
                                                 
37 This rate is roughly equivalent to estimates by Dorward et al. (2008). 
38 See Foster, Greer, and Thorbecke (1984) for a detail description of the FGT index. 
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development on the poor (van de Walle, 1998). Measuring the full effects of targeting 
requires data that are beyond the scope of this research. Therefore, we limited the evaluation 
to the direct benefits of targeting. 
5. Empirical Results 
5.1 How well do the models predict the household poverty status?  
Table 4 presents the model results calibrated to three poverty lines, including the 
prediction intervals. The poverty lines applied and the parameter estimates are presented in 
annex 1 thru 3. The parameter estimates are highly significant. Their signs are consistent with 
expectations and economic theory.  
Table 4. Model targeting performances by poverty lines  
Targeting ratios 
Poverty lines* 
Log cut-
off value 
Poverty  
accuracy 
(%) 
Under- 
coverage 
(%) 
Leakage 
(%)  
PIE 
(% points) 
BPAC 
(% points) 
R u r a l  M o d e l  
National 3.90 71.48 (69.3; 73.6) 
28.52 
(26.4; 30.7) 
26.65 
(23.7; 29.6) 
-0.88 
(-0.0; 0.8) 
69.61 
(64.5; 72.9) 
International 4.30 80.38 (78.8; 82.1) 
19.62 
(17.9; 21.2) 
16.92 
(15.0; 18.8) 
-1.77 
(-3.3; -0.1) 
77.69 
(74.2; 81.4) 
Extreme 3.30 48.71 (45.2; 52.4) 
51.29 
(47.6; 54.8) 
40.57 
(35.4; 46.1) 
-2.41 
(-4.0; -0.9) 
37.99 
(29.6; 47.2) 
U r b a n  M o d e l  
National 3.63 60.36 (51.5; 69.2) 
39.64 
(30.8; 48.5) 
48.65 
(34.3; 67.3) 
2.08 
(-1.9; 6.2) 
51.35 
(32.7; 62.9) 
International 4.06 78.04 (71.8; 84.0) 
21.97 
(16.0; 28.2) 
34.10 
(24.2; 44.5) 
4.38 
(-0.2; 8.1) 
65.90 
(55.5 ; 74.9) 
Extreme 2.93 47.06 (29.1; 65) 
52.94 
(35; 70.9) 
73.53 
(40.5; 123.8) 
1.46 
(-1.3; 4.2) 
26.47 
(-22.8; 50.0) 
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. Prediction intervals in brackets. *See annex 1for description of 
poverty lines. Cut-offs values are expressed in Logarithm of Malawi Kwacha (MK). 
Table 4 shows that the rural model yields a poverty accuracy of 71.48% and a BPAC 
of 69.61% points when calibrated to the national poverty line. This result indicates that the 
model would cover about 71% of the poor if used for targeting poverty. The model’s 
undercoverage is estimated at about 28.52%, while its leakage is set at 26.65% which means 
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that the model would leak program benefits to 27% of non-poor. The PIE nears 0% points, 
which implies that the model perfectly predicts the observed poverty rate out-of-sample.  
Table 4 further indicates that raising the poverty line increases the BPAC and the coverage 
of the poor by about 10% and 7% points, respectively and reduces the leakage by about 10% points 
under the rural model. These results suggest a sizable improvement in the model’s targeting 
performances with about 80% of the poor correctly targeted. On the other hand, reducing the 
poverty line disappointingly reduces the model’s targeting performances. For instance, the model’s 
poverty accuracy is reduced by 20% points, whereas its leakage increases by about 15% points.  
With regard to the urban model, the same trend applies. However, the BPAC is lower 
(51.35% points) as compared to the rural model and only 60% of the poor are covered when 
the model is calibrated to the national poverty line. Besides, the leakage is high (48.65%).  
As a whole, the above findings suggest that the models yield fairly accurate 
predictions of absolute poverty out-of-sample. Likewise, the rural model performs better than 
the urban model. Furthermore, the results indicate that calibrating the models to a higher 
poverty line (international line) improves their performances, while calibrating the models to 
a lower line (extreme line) does the opposite. Section 5.2 analyzes the cost-effectiveness and 
impacts of targeting. 
5.2 Evaluating the cost-effectiveness and impacts of targeting the poor: Policy simulations 
5.2.1 Population welfare under targeted policies  
This section illustrates the pre- and post-transfer distributions of consumption 
expenditures for the redistribution schemes applied: universal coverage, uniform targeting, 
progressive targeting, and fair targeting of the poor. Figures 5 and 6 describe the distributions. 
Annex 4 shows a clearer view of the redistributions. 
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 Figure 5: Pre- and post-transfer consumption expenditures under different transfer schemes (rural model). 
 Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. 
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 Figure 6: Pre- and post-transfer consumption expenditures under different transfer schemes (urban model). 
 Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. 
The panel to the upper left corner of Figure 5 shows that under a universal coverage, the 
available budget (net of costs) is distributed equally among individuals in the population, 
independently from their poverty status. Therefore, the entire curve of the pre-transfer 
expenditures shifts upward by a fixed amount (equal to the transfer amount), yielding the post-
transfer curve. As a consequence, both pre- and post-transfer curves are parallel. The universal 
regime has the advantage of covering all of the poor. But, it creates two kinds of wastes: the first 
one is the excessive leakage to the non-poor who do not need transfers and the second one is the 
amount received by least poor (those just below the poverty line) in excess of their needs. Both 
kinds of wastes are indicated by the area delimited by the pre- and post-transfer curves above the 
poverty line. Under limited resources, reducing such wastes is of a paramount importance. 
Universal coverage 
Progressive targeting 
Uniform targeting 
Fair targeting 
Chapter 4: To target or not to target? 
 
111
Under uniform targeting (upper right panel of Figure 5), only the poor receive cash 
transfers in a fixed amount. Therefore, only the portion of the curve below the poverty line 
moves upward by a fixed amount in the post-transfer distribution, whereas the section above 
the line remains unchanged after redistribution: the non-poor receive no transfers. This 
targeting scheme concentrates benefits on the poor and reduces excessive leakage to the non-
poor; the average transfer per poor is higher compared to universal coverage. This is indicated 
by the margin between pre- and post-transfer curves. However, alike the universal regime, the 
uniform scheme provides transfers to some less poor in excess of their needs, and therefore 
changes the initial welfare ranking of the population.  
With regard to progressive targeting scheme (lower left panel of Figure 5), transfers are 
distributed from bottom up: the poorest poor receives the amount just enough to bring him up to 
the poverty line, then the next poorest is served, and so on till the available budget (net of costs) 
is exhausted. Therefore, the lower section of the post-transfer curve matches exactly the poverty 
line, whereas the upper part remains identical to the pre-transfer distribution. The transition 
between both parts marks the exhaustion of the available budget. It is illustrated by the fall of 
the post-transfer expenditures down to the pre-transfer level. This targeting regime aims at 
reducing extreme poverty first. However, it is more costly than uniform targeting since it seeks 
the poorest out of the poor and grants them the exact transfer necessary to lift them out of 
poverty. Likewise, the poorest poor get richer than the less poor after transfer. As a result, the 
initial welfare ranking of the population changes. Therefore, a fair targeting scheme is applied. 
The fair redistribution scheme respects the initial welfare ranking of the population as 
shown in the lower right panel of Figure 5. This scheme provides transfer amounts which 
ensure that: i) a poorer individual doesn’t get richer than its less poor neighbor and ii) all of 
the poor lifted out of poverty after redistribution lie just at the poverty line, but not above. 
Therefore, only the portion of the pre-transfer curve below the poverty line shifts upward at a 
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decreasing rate in the post-transfer curve and its upper part matches exactly the poverty line. 
This scheme aims at preserving the social hierarchy in the population. As concerns the urban 
model, the same trend applies (Figure 6). 
All of the redistribution schemes have advantages, but also some limitations. 
Likewise, they are not exhaustive and the range of transfer options is broader, but they do 
provide some insights on the comparison of welfare gains from different policy choices.  
5.2.2 Costs, benefits, and impacts of targeting  
This section analyzes the cost-effectiveness and impacts of targeting. The magnitude 
of targeting costs, benefits, and impacts depends on program budget, model accuracy, the 
number of poor, and the poverty gap in the population. Table 5 presents the cost estimates of 
the redistribution schemes. 
Table 5. Costs of targeting by model type and transfer scheme 
                           Costs 
Models 
Total 
transfer  
to the poor*  
Costs of 
leakage to the 
non-poor 
Administra- 
tive costs 
Hidden 
costs 
Total 
costs 
Rural model 
Universal coverage 
(Zero targeting) 
1645.02 
(1395.58) 1374.69 532.89 0 3552.6 
Uniform targeting 
(scheme 1) 
1946.80 
(2180.50) 486.74 1065.78 53.29 3552.6 
Progressive targeting 
(scheme 2) 
1912.52 
(2142.12) 272.32 1243.41 124.34 3552.6 
Fair targeting 
(scheme 3) 
1696.74 
 (1900.43) 488.11 1243.41 124.34 3552.6 
Urban model 
Universal coverage 
(Zero targeting) 
88.22 
(1035.62) 213.75 53.28 0 355.26 
Uniform targeting 
(scheme 1) 
80.14 
(1660.96) 163.22 106.59 5.33 355.26 
Progressive targeting 
(scheme 2) 
162.86 
(3375.47) 55.63 124.34 12.43 355.26 
Fair targeting 
(scheme 3) 
130.30 
(2700.62) 88.19 124.34 12.43 355.26 
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. The cost estimates are given in million Malawi  
Kwacha (MK) using 2005 prices, US$1= MK118.42. The budget available for poverty reduction is set 
at US$30 million for the rural model and US$3 million for the urban model. *The average transfer per  
poor (in brackets) is given in MK. 
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Table 5 shows that the total transfer to the poor increases under the targeted program 
compared to universal coverage, with one exception. The urban poor receive in total a lower 
transfer under uniform targeting. This result is driven by the fact that the sum of leakage, 
administration, and hidden costs under uniform targeting is higher compared to universal 
coverage. As a consequence with a limited budget, the amount of funds to be redistributed to 
the poor, i.e. the total transfer to urban poor is lower under uniform targeting. The results may 
also be explained by the higher leakage of the urban model as shown in Table 4. Nonetheless, 
the average transfer per poor is higher under uniform targeting (MK1661) compared to 
universal coverage (MK1036) of urban poor. This indicates that even though all of the poor are 
covered and the total transfer is higher, the benefits of the program spread thin under universal 
redistribution. In addition, this scheme does not do much for the poorest. In fact, irrespective of 
the model, average transfer to the poor increases under the targeted programs. For example, the 
rural poor receive MK1396 on average under universal coverage against MK2181, MK2142, 
and MK1900 under uniform, progressive, and fair targeting, respectively. These results show 
that targeting does concentrate resources on the poor.  
Furthermore, Table 5 indicates that the costs of leakage decrease substantially for both 
models, indicating sizable savings under the targeted programs. For instance, under the rural 
model, leakage costs decrease from about MK1.37 billion under universal coverage to 
MK486.7 million, MK272 million, MK488 million under uniform, progressive, and fair 
targeting, respectively. Conversely, administrative and hidden costs increase considerably 
under targeted schemes. For example, under the urban model administrative costs are 
estimated at MK53.28 million under universal coverage against MK106.59 million under 
uniform targeting, but this effect is weaker than the reduction in leakage costs. 
Within targeted programs, none of the schemes consistently allocates the highest 
transfer to the poor. In rural areas, uniform targeting provides the highest transfer, whereas 
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fair targeting grants the lowest transfer to the poor. Conversely, progressive targeting 
allocates the highest transfer, while uniform redistribution provides the lowest transfer to the 
poor in urban areas.  
The above results broadly suggest that even though narrow targeting increases 
administrative and hidden costs, it concentrates resources on the poor and considerably 
reduces the costs of leakage to non-poor. Based the aforementioned results, we estimate in 
Table 6, the transfer efficiency and poverty impacts of targeting.  
Table 6. Transfer efficiency and poverty impacts of targeting by model types 
Transfer efficiency Post-transfer poverty (poverty impacts)  
                     Indicators 
 
Models F F1 F2 Po P1 P2 
Rural model 
Universal coverage 54.48 1.16 46.30 46.96 (-7.52) 
0.11 
(-0.04) 
5.73 
(-3.08) 
scheme 1 80.0 0.83 54.80 41.58 (-12.90) 
0.08 
(-0.07) 
4.45 
(-4.36) 
scheme 2 87.54 0.86 53.83 44.05 (-10.42) 
0.09 
(-0.06) 
3.79 
(-5.02) 
Ta
rg
et
ed
 
pr
og
ra
m
 
scheme 3 77.66 1.09 47.76 41.49 (-12.99) 
0.09 
(-0.06) 
4.34 
(-4.48) 
Urban model 
Universal coverage 29.22 3.03 24.83 25.88 (-3.34) 
0.06 
(-0.02) 
3.11 
(-1.59) 
scheme 1 32.93 3.43 22.56 21.42 (-7.80) 
0.05 
(-0.04) 
2.41 
(-2.29) 
scheme 2 74.54 1.18 45.84 16.68 (-12.53) 
0.02 
(-0.06) 
0.59 
(-4.11) 
Ta
rg
et
ed
 
pr
og
ra
m
 
scheme 3 59.64 1.73 36.68 20.97 (-8.27) 
0.05 
(-0.04) 
2.35 
(-2.36) 
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. Baseline poverty measures are estimated at  
Po= 54.48%; P1= 0.15; P2= 8.81 under the rural model and Po= 29.22%; P1= 0.08; P2= 4.70 for the  
urban model. Poverty impacts (in brackets) are measured as post minus pre-transfer poverty. 
Considering the rural model, Table 6 suggests that transfer efficiency and post-transfer 
poverty improve under the targeted schemes compared to universal coverage. The transfer to 
the poor as a percentage of total transfer (F) and the transfer to the poor as a percentage of 
total program cost (F2) increase, whereas the cost per unit of resources transferred (F1) 
decrease under a targeted program. For instance under universal coverage, the program 
spends MK1.16 for every MK transferred to the poor, against MK0.83, MK0.86, and MK1.09 
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under a uniform, progressive, and fair targeting, respectively. Likewise, the transfer to the 
poor as a percentage of total program cost increases from 46.30% under universal coverage to 
54.8%, 53.83%, and 47.76% under uniform, progressive, and fair targeting, respectively. 
Table 6 also indicates that under the rural model, the transfer efficiency differs considerably 
between targeted and untargeted regimes with exceptions. Under fair targeting, F1 and F2 do 
not improve much compared to universal coverage because of leakage costs.  
Though progressive targeting provides the highest transfer (F) to the poor in rural areas, it 
yields the lowest poverty impact on Po (i.e. the highest post-transfer poverty). Conversely, fair 
targeting with the lowest efficiency (F) achieves the highest poverty impact in terms of Po. For 
instance, under fair targeting, the poverty incidence (Po) is reduced by 13% against 10% under 
progressive targeting. However, under progressive targeting, the severity of poverty (P2) is 
reduced by 5.02 versus 4.48 under fair targeting. These results are driven by differences between 
both schemes. Under progressive targeting, a higher total transfer lifts fewer poorer people out of 
poverty, whereas a lower total transfer lifts many less poor out of poverty under fair targeting. As 
concerns the poverty gap (P1), there is no sizeable difference between the redistribution schemes 
applied in rural areas. These results suggest that none of the targeted schemes consistently yields 
the best transfer efficiency and post-transfer poverty in rural areas. 
With regard to the urban model, F improves under a targeted program. Similarly, F1 and 
F2 improve considerably under progressive and fair targeting, but these estimates regress under 
uniform targeting compared to universal coverage. This result suggests that uniform targeting of 
urban poor does not improve transfer and cost-efficiency measures F1 and F2 compared to 
universal coverage, whereas progressive and fair targeting do. The result may be explained by 
the fact that uniform targeting transfers fewer resources to the poor in total due to higher costs 
compared to universal coverage. Nevertheless, the reduction in efficiency under uniform 
targeting is balanced by the far higher poverty impact and the higher average transfer that go to 
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the poor (see Table 5). Unlike the rural model, progressive targeting consistently yields the best 
transfer efficiency and post-transfer poverty, followed by fair targeting.  
As a whole, the above results suggest that the targeted schemes outperform a universal 
coverage of the population in Malawi. However, the finest redistribution doesn’t consistently 
yield the best transfer efficiency, nor does it consistently improve post-transfer poverty. These 
results imply that the performances of a targeted program may depend on the welfare distribution 
of the population covered. Nonetheless, it is shown that better targeting improves resource 
efficiency and post-transfer poverty compared to universal coverage. What are the benefits from 
targeting? We answer this question by estimating the gains from targeting in Table 7. 
Table 7. Benefits from targeting  
Total costs                    Costs and benefits 
 
Post-transfer poverty Targeted program Universal coverage 
Direct 
benefits 
Rural model 
Po = 41.58  
(scheme 1) 3552.6 5550.73 
1998.13 
(6.8%) 
Po ≈ 44.05 
(scheme 2) 3552.6 4389.09 
836.49 
(2.3%) 
Poverty level 
 
Po = 41.49 
(scheme 3) 3552.6 5601.60 
2049.29 
(6.9%) 
Urban model 
Po = 21.42 
(scheme 1) 355.26 569.78 
214.52 
(2.8%) 
Po ≈ 16.68 
(scheme 2) 355.26 855.73 
500.47 
(11.5%) 
Poverty level 
Po = 21.00 
(scheme 3) 355.26 571.90 
216.64 
(2.8%) 
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. Direct benefits are measured as the amount by which 
an untargeted program would have to be increased in order to achieve the targeted poverty level P0. The 
budget available for poverty reduction is set at US$30 million for the rural model and US$3 million for 
the urban model. The figures in brackets indicate the additional reduction of poverty achievable with the 
direct benefits. Cost estimates are given in million Malawi Kwacha (MK) using 2005 prices. US$1= MK118.42.  
Table 7 suggests that targeting Malawi’s poor is potentially beneficial; with a targeted 
program, fewer resources can achieve the same post-transfer poverty as a universal coverage 
of the population. Furthermore, Table 7 indicates that the higher the impact on poverty (i.e. 
the lower the post-transfer poverty), the higher the benefits from targeting. In other words, the 
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scheme that reduces poverty incidence the most yields the highest targeting benefits. For 
example, to achieve a post-transfer poverty of about 44% (scheme 2) in rural areas, a 
universal coverage would cost about MK4.40 billion, whereas a targeted program 
(progressive targeting) would cost only MK3.553 billion. Thus, the benefits from targeting 
are estimated at MK836.49 million. On the other hand, achieving a lower post-transfer 
poverty (i.e. higher poverty reduction) of 41.58% under uniform targeting would result in total 
benefits of MK1.998 billion compared to universal coverage. Further simulations show that 
the benefits derived from uniform targeting (scheme 1) would further reduce the poverty 
incidence by 6.8%, whereas the benefits from progressive and fair targeting (schemes 2 and 3) 
would reduce the poverty incidence by 2.3% and 6.9%, respectively if these benefits were 
uniformly targeted at the poor. As concerns the urban model, the same trend applies. 
However, the benefits from targeting are much lower compared to the rural model. This may 
be explained by the lower budget and lower number of urban poor.  
It appears from the overall results that using proxy indicators to reach the poor is more 
target-, cost-, and impact-effective than universal provision of benefits in Malawi. 
5.3 Efficiency of targeted agricultural support programs versus the new system  
Table 8 compares the targeting efficiency of the new system (rural model) to the 
performances of Starter Pack and AISP programs, both of which were administered through a 
community-based targeting system. 
Table 8. Targeting efficiency of Starter Pack, AISP, and new system 
Program type Poverty accuracy (%) Undercoverage (%) Leakage (%) 
2000/2001 Starter Pack1 65.02 34.98 61.81 
2006/2007 AISP2 54.00 46.00 54.00 
New system (rural model) 71.48 28.52 26.65 
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. 1Main cropping season and rural areas estimates. 
2Estimates based on Dorward et al. (2008). 
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Table 8 indicates that under the new system, about 71% of the poor would be correctly 
targeted and would receive agricultural inputs, while only 65% and 54% of the poor received 
benefits under the Starter Pack and AISP programs, respectively. As a result, the 
undercoverage of the new proxy system is lower compared to the targeted programs. More 
importantly, Table 8 suggests that the Starter Pack and AISP programs leaked substantial 
quantities of fertilizer and seeds to non-poor households as their leakages rates amount to 
62% and 54%, respectively, against 27% under the new proxy system. This result implies that 
under the new system, a program’s leakage can be cut down by two-thirds. In conclusion, the 
new system is more target-efficient than the Starter Pack and AISP programs. Is the system 
also more cost-efficient than these programs? Table 9 estimates the cost-effectiveness of the 
programs under the new proxy system and community-based targeting.  
Table 9. Costs and transfer efficiency of Starter Pack and AISP versus new system  
                 Costs  
Programs 
Total 
transfer 
to the poor3 
Costs of 
leakage 
Administra- 
tive costs 
Hidden 
costs 
Total 
costs F F1 F2 
2000/2001 
Starter Pack 
562.61 
(772.11) 534.84 195.39 9.77 1302.62
1 51.27 1.32 43.19 
Starter Pack under 
new system 
649.97 
(811.33) 242.33 390.79 19.54 1302.62 72.84 1.00 49.90 
2006/2007AISP 2777.51 (4397.33) 2940.89 1018.11 50.91 6787.41
2 48.57 1.44 40.92 
AISP under 
 new system 
3386.71 
(3825.58) 1262.67 2036.22 101.81 6787.41 72.84 1.00 49.90 
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. The cost estimates are given in million Malawi Kwacha (MK).  
1The cost of the targeted Starter Pack is estimated at US$11 million based on Smith (2001). 2The results are 
based on the net cost of the main component (Urea and NPK) of the AISP program and are estimated at 
US$57million. 3The average transfer per household (in brackets) is given in MK. 
Table 9 shows that the Starter Pack program (under community-based targeting) 
transferred an average amount of MK772 (input equivalent) to the poor against MK811 under 
the new system. Likewise, the costs of are cut down by 55% compared to Starter Pack; from 
MK535 million to MK242 million. Estimates of the transfer efficiency measures also suggest 
that administering the Starter Pack program with the new system would have been more 
efficient, transferring 72% of total transfer to the poor (i.e. 50% of program costs) compared 
to 51% (i.e. 43% of program costs) under community-based targeting. Likewise, under the 
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new system, MK1 is spent for every MK transferred to the poor against MK1.32 under 
community-based targeting of Starter Pack. The same trend applies to the AISP program with 
one exception. Under the new system, the average transfer per poor decreases though the total 
transfer to the poor increases: more poor have been covered by the program and increases in 
total transfer (in percentage terms) to the poor are less than increases in program’s coverage. 
These results show that the new proxy indicator system can potentially improve the 
cost and transfer efficiency of targeting compared to the currently used mechanisms for 
identifying the rural poor and smallholder farmers in Malawi. 
6. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
This paper estimates the cost-effectiveness and impacts of targeting by proxy 
indicators in Malawi. Two proxy means test models are developed for rural and urban 
Malawi based on quantile regression. The costs, benefits, and impacts of targeting under the 
proxy system are compared to the performances of universal interventions and the 
community-based targeting system. 
There is compelling evidence in favor of targeting since considering all costs does not 
make a targeted program cost- and impact-ineffective. Findings suggest that the new system is 
fairly accurate and more target-efficient than the currently used mechanisms for targeting 
agricultural inputs in the country. Likewise, simulation results indicate that targeting the poor 
and smallholder farmers is more cost- and impact-effective than universal coverage of the 
population. Though administrative costs increase with finer targeting, the results indicate that 
the overall benefits outweigh the costs of targeting. Targeting concentrates resources on the 
poor and produces the highest impact on poverty. Furthermore, the newly designed system 
appears to be more cost-efficient than the 2000/2001 Starter Pack program and the 2006/2007 
Agricultural Input Support Program (AISP). Thus, under the new system it is possible to 
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reduce leakage and undercoverage rates considerably and improve thus the cost and transfer 
efficiency of development programs in the country.  
The performances of the new system can be further improved in various ways. 
Administrative costs can be cut by sharing the same system between several programs. 
Likewise, the costs of leakage can be reduced by recouping through taxation. The proxy 
system can also be combined with other targeting methods. For example, the system can be 
combined with geographical targeting to target regions with disproportionate numbers of poor 
and then target poor households within these regions. The estimation of separate models for 
urban and rural households in this research illustrates such a combination. Proper 
implementation and management can also help reduce targeting errors and program costs. 
If well implemented, the proxy system developed has the potential of reducing the 
displacement of agricultural subsidies in the country. Finally, the research could be applied in 
other developing countries with similar targeting problems. 
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Annexes 
Annex 1. Malawi’s poverty rates by region and poverty line (status as of 2005)39 
Poverty rate 
(in percent of people) 
Poverty rate 
(in percent of households) Type  of poverty lines 
Poverty lines 
(MK*) national rural urban national rural urban 
Extreme 29.81 26.21 28.66 8.72 19.94 22.08 5.95 
National 44.29 52.40 56.19 25.23 43.58 47.13 19.67 
International 59.18 (US$1.25 PPP) 69.52 73.59 40.26 61.04 65.20 33.08 
    Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data, Chen and Ravallion (2008), and the World Bank  
    (2008). *MK denotes Malawi Kwacha, national currency. PPP stands for Purchasing Power Parity. 
Annex 2. Results of Quantile regression calibrated to the national poverty line (rural model)  
Wald statistic = 3377.251***                                                        Likelihood ratio: 3082.501*** 
Point of estimation: 56.408                                                            Number of observations= 6560 
Indicator set Parameter estimates 
Standard 
errors T-values 
          Intercept 4.337*** 0.045 96.88 
Agricultural development district is Mzuzu  -0.015 0.048 -0.32 
Agricultural development district is Kasungu   0.184*** 0.042 4.38 
Agricultural development district is Salima   -0.028 0.048 -0.59 
Agricultural development district is Lilongwe  0.090** 0.044 2.07 
Agricultural development district is Machinga  -0.237*** 0.043 -5.53 
Agricultural development district is Blantyre -0.156*** 0.043 -3.66 C
on
tro
l v
ar
ia
bl
es
 
Agricultural development district is Ngabu -0.154*** 0.055 -2.80 
1. Household size -0.154*** 0.004 -43.25 
2. Wireless radio ownership  0.109*** 0.014 7.60 
3. Floor of main dwelling is predominantly made  
    of smoothed cement 0.360*** 0.022 16.16 
4. Bicycle ownership  0.148*** 0.016 9.32 
5. Lighting fuel is electricity 0.631*** 0.065 9.69 
6. Panga ownership 0.084*** 0.015 5.75 
7. Highest educational qualification acquired in  
    household is Junior Certificate of Education (JCE) 0.120*** 0.028 4.31 
8. Does any household member sleep under a bed net? 0.121*** 0.015 8.32 
9. Rubbish disposal facility is public rubbish heap -0.082*** 0.019 -4.32 
Be
st
 1
0 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 
10. Household head can read in Chichewa language 0.117*** 0.015 7.87 
    Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. *** denotes significant at the 99% level.  
    ** denotes significant at the 95% level. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
39 These rates differ slightly from the official statistics because of errors in the weights of the IHS2 report. 
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Annex 3. Results of Quantile regression calibrated to the national poverty line (urban model)  
Wald statistic = 880.603***                                                        Likelihood ratio: 1017.934*** 
Point of estimation: 24.685                                                          Number of observations= 960 
Indicator set Parameter estimates 
Standard 
errors T-values 
               Intercept 4.467*** 0.112 40.04 
Lilongwe city    -0.052 0.066 -0.79 
Zomba city -0.324*** 0.080 -4.05 
Co
nt
ro
l 
va
ri
ab
le
s 
Blantyre city -0.187*** 0.065 -2.89 
1. Household size   -0.220** 0.015 -14.52 
2. Household has no toilet facility  -0.289** 0.113 -2.56 
3. Household has a cellular phone in working   
    condition 0.625*** 0.064 9.81 
4. Number of separate rooms occupied by 
    household excluding toilet, storeroom, or garage 0.124*** 0.022 5.74 
5. Household head can read in Chichewa language   -0.134** 0.065 2.06 
6. Sewing machine ownership 0.243*** 0.093 2.62 
7. Highest class level ever attended by members is  
    superior or post-secondary   0.492*** 0.098 5.03 
8. Main source of cooking fuel is collected  
    firewood -0.317*** 0.058 -5.50 
9. Lighting fuel is electricity 0.366*** 0.060 6.12 
Be
st
 1
0 
in
di
ca
to
rs
 
10. Floor of main dwelling is predominantly made  
      of smoothed cement 0.181*** 0.050 3.65 
    Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. *** denotes significant at the 99% level.  
    ** denotes significant at the 95% level. 
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Annex 4: Pre- and post-transfer consumption expenditures under different transfer schemes (rural model).  
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Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. For a better viewing, the upper 10% of the distribution is not 
shown in the graph. 
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CHAPTER V 
GENERAL CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1 Comparative Analysis of Model Results  
We analyze in this section the overall results of the models. Table 8 compares the 
performances of different regression methods used to develop proxy means test models for 
rural Malawi.  
Table 8. Rural model’s results under different estimation methods  
Targeting ratios 
Poverty  
Line       Method 
Cut-off 
values 
(MK) 
Poverty  
accuracy 
(%) 
Under-
coverage 
(%) 
Leakage 
(%) 
PIE 
(% points) 
BPAC 
(% points) 
WLS 3.85 72.00 (69.7; 74.2) 
28.00 
(25.8; 30.3) 
26.32 
(23.4; 29.1) 
-0.79 
(-2.4; 1.0) 
70.32 
(64.9; 73.5) 
WL 0.48 71.61 (69.6; 74.0) 
28.39 
(26.0; 30.4) 
27.10 
(25.3; 30.82) 
-0.61 
(-3.5; 0.2 
70.32 
(59.7; 69.6) 
WL 
categorical 37 
68.52 
(66.1; 70.6)) 
31.48 
(29.4; 33.9) 
28.00 
(69.6; 74.0) 
-1.64 
(69.6; 74.0) 
65.03 
(69.6; 74.0) N
at
io
na
l 
W Quantile 3.90 71.48 (69.3; 73.6) 
28.52 
(26.4; 30.7) 
26.65 
(23.7; 29.6) 
-0.88 
(-0.0; 0.8) 
69.61 
(64.5; 72.9) 
WLS 4.03 82.33 (80.9; 83.9) 
17.67 
(16.1; 19.1) 
16.60 
(14.7; 18.4) 
-0.70 
(-2.3; 1.0) 
81.27 
(77.7; 83.3) 
WL 0.56 82.61 (81.1; 84.2) 
17.39 
(15.8; 18.9) 
16.18 
(14.4; 18.1) 
-0.79 
(-2.2; 0.9) 
81.40 
(77.9; 83.6) 
WL 
categorical 40 
84.52 
(78.8; 82.9)
15.48 
(14.0; 17.1)
18.87 
(17.0; 21.1)
2.23 
(0.6; 3.8) 
81.13 
(78.9; 83.0)In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
W Quantile 4.30 80.38 (78.8; 82.1) 
19.62 
(17.9; 21.2) 
16.92 
(15.0; 18.8) 
-1.77 
(-3.3; -0.1) 
77.69 
(74.2; 81.4) 
WLS 3.56 49.93 (46.4; 53.4) 
50.07 
(46.6; 53.6) 
39.21 
(34.2; 44.4) 
-2.44 
(-3.9; -1.0) 
39.08 
(30.9; 48.1) 
WL 0.36 53.05 (49.6; 56.7) 
46.95 
(43.3; 50.4) 
38.54 
(33.5; 44.1) 
-1.89 
(-3.4; -0.4) 
44.64 
(35.9; 53.7) 
WL 
categorical 18 
46.13 
(42.3; 49.8)
53.87 
(50.2; 57.7)
38.13 
(33.3; 44.0)
-3.54 
(-5.0; -1.9) 
30.39 
(21.9; 39.6)
Ex
tre
m
e 
W Quantile 3.30 48.71 (45.2; 52.4) 
51.29 
(47.6; 54.8) 
40.57 
(35.4; 46.1) 
-2.41 
(-4.0; -0.9) 
37.99 
(29.6; 47.2) 
Source: Own computations based on Malawi IHS2 data. Bootstrapped prediction intervals in brackets. Cut-off 
values are expressed in Logarithm Malawi Kwacha (MK) under the WLS and probability for the WL method. 
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Table 8 indicates that when calibrated to the national poverty line, the estimation 
methods achieve similar levels of targeting performances with minor exceptions. The 
categorical indicators model (WL categorical) achieves the lowest performances. For 
example, the latter yields a poverty accuracy of about 69% against an average of 72% under 
the other methods. This result is explained by the model’s transformation after estimation. 
Indeed, the untransformed model’s performances are comparable to the other methods. For 
example, its poverty accuracy and BPAC are estimated at 72.19% and 70.13% points, 
respectively (see annex 3, page 101).  
The same trend emerges when the model is calibrated to the international and extreme 
poverty lines. Furthermore, irrespective of the estimation method, the performances of the 
model improve with the calibration to the international poverty line. For example, the poverty 
accuracy is set at just over 80%, whereas the estimated leakage is lower than 20%. The BPAC 
ratio also improves considerably; it is estimated at about 80% points. However, the estimated 
performances drop considerably with the extreme poverty line which is lower. The results of 
the urban model follow the same pattern (appendix 10).  
Therefore, we conclude from the above results that there are no sizable differences in 
terms of targeting performances between the estimation methods. Apart its key features, such as 
simplicity and easy use, the categorical indicators model does not enjoy any major advantage 
compared to the other methods. Though the number of indicators was limited to ten, such a 
categorical model embeds much more information than any estimated model. Nonetheless, 
categorical indicators are less prone to measurement errors and easier to use than continuous 
variables. Hence, when the risk of measurement errors is high so that it may render the system 
ineffective, we strongly suggest using a categorical indicators model for targeting the poor.  
 
 
Chapter 5: General conclusions 
 
131
5.2 Summary and Conclusions 
This research analyzes the targeting the poor and smallholder farmers. The study 
explores potential models that might improve the targeting efficiency of development policies 
and assesses the cost-effectiveness and poverty impact of targeting in Malawi. The general 
problematic of targeting the poor is discussed with special emphasis on Malawi. The basic 
rationale behind targeting is to maximize the coverage of the poor with limited fiscal and donor 
resources. Focusing resources on those who need them the most is likely to result in higher 
marginal impact and foster economic growth. Moreover, historically public spending tends to 
exclude the lower strata of the population. Therefore, without active efforts to target resources 
at the poor, even the so-called “universalist programs” will miss the poor (Grosh, 2009).  
In Malawi, there exist a large number of development and safety net programs, most 
of which are uncoordinated short-term relief or emergency responses (Smith, 2001). Most of 
these programs are administered through community-based targeting in which local 
authorities select program beneficiaries based on their assessment of the household living 
conditions. However, they have been characterized by poor targeting: they cover a limited 
number of poor and smallholder farmers and leak program benefits to a significant number of 
non-poor. For example, the Starter Pack of 2000/2001 failed to reach 35% of rural poor and 
wrongly targeted 62% of non-poor. Furthermore, a recent evaluation of the Agricultural Input 
Support Program (AISP) of 2006/2007 suggests that 46% of the poor received no fertilizer 
subsidy, whereas 54% of non-poor were wrongly targeted by the program (Dorward et al., 
2008). On top of this, the report emphasizes that subsidized fertilizer received by these 
households appeared to have displaced a large proportion of commercial purchases typically 
made by these households in the absence of subsidy. Almost all interventions have targeting 
problems in the country (GoM and World Bank, 2007). In the period 2003-2006, including 
emergency aid and disaster response, the combined safety nets/social protection system 
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amounted to an average of more than US$134 million per year; that is about 6.5% of the 
country’s GDP. Therefore, there are compelling reasons to ensure that targeted programs 
effectively reach the poor (World Bank, 2007).  
Low targeting efficiency combines with poor implementation can seriously impede 
progress toward achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), long-term food 
security and sustainable poverty reduction in the country. The level of funding for different 
programs is not necessarily inadequate, but many programs do suffer from limited beneficiary 
coverage, mis-targeting and significant leakages (World Bank, 2007). To reverse this trend 
and ensure that development policies reach their intended beneficiaries, more accurate and 
operational targeting methods need to be devised for policy makers and development 
practitioners in the country. One such method is targeting by proxy means tests. These tests 
seek a few indicators that are less costly to identify, but are sufficiently correlated with 
household income to be used for poverty alleviation (Besley and Kanbur, 1993).  
Compared to the currently used targeting methods in the country, proxy means tests 
have the merit of making replicable judgments using consistent and visible criteria (Coady et 
al., 2002). They are fairly accurate and less prone to criticism of politicization or randomness. 
They are also less costly than verified means tests and appropriate for large and long term 
programs. The use of proxy means tests extends well beyond targeting and their efficacy is 
demonstrated in various studies (Coady et al., 2009; Johannsen, 2009; Narayam and Yoshida, 
2005; Schreiner, 2006; Benson et al., 2006; Zeller et al., 2006; Zeller et al., 2005a, b; Zeller 
and Alcaraz V., 2005a, b; Coady et al., 2004; Ahmed and Bouis, 2002; Baulch, 2002; 
Braithwaite et al., 1999; Grosh and Baker, 1995; Grosh, 1994; Glewwe and Kanaan, 1989). 
Though the results from previous researches exhibit some targeting errors, a systematic 
comparison of these studies is hampered by a number of factors, including differences in the 
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number and type of variables, their practicality, the poverty rate, the estimation method, and 
whether the models are validated out-of-sample or not.  
Targeting the poor presupposes first the definition of a target group, i.e. the poor and 
second, the establishment of mechanisms or methods to reach this target group in the 
population. Therefore, in the introductory chapter, we define poverty first and establish its 
profile in Malawi. We then review available targeting methods, including their advantages 
and limitations. In this respect, we emphasize the use of proxy means tests and survey the 
main targeted programs in Malawi. Poverty is defined today as a state of long-term 
deprivation of well-being considered adequate for a decent life (Aho et al., 2003). It is 
synonymous of a deficit in consumption and expenditures and does not refer to people in 
temporary needs. This definition is standard although narrow view of poverty (Benson, 2002). 
Nevertheless, the concept of monetary poverty is adopted by the GoM and the MDGs.  
This research draws on the Malawi Second Integrated Household (IHS2) survey data 
of 2004/2005. The IHS2 is a nationally representative survey which covered 11,280 
households and a wide range of household socioeconomic indicators (NSO, 2005b). In total, 
about 800 variables were prepared from the IHS2 dataset. The criteria for the selection of 
indicators were based on Zeller et al. (2006) and included practicability criteria regarding the 
ease and accuracy with which information on the indicators can be quickly elicited in an 
interview as well as considerations regarding the objectiveness and verifiability of an 
indicator. Likewise, the number of indicators was limited to the best ten in order to allow for 
an operational use of the models and keep the costs of data collection low.  
Using a variety of estimation methods, such as Weighted Least Square, Weighted 
Logit, and Quantile regressions along with stepwise selection of variables, we propose 
empirical models for improving the poverty outreach of agricultural and development policies 
in rural and urban Malawi. Furthermore, the research analyzes the out-of-sample 
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performances of different estimation methods in identifying the poor and smallholder farmers. 
Out-of-sample tests gauge the robustness or predictive power of the models. They ascertain 
how well the models will likely perform when used to identify the poor and smallholder 
farmers on the field. As such, they can be regarded as good substitutes for direct field-tests. 
To conduct the validation tests, the initial samples were first split into two sub-samples 
- a calibration and a validation samples – following the ratio 67/33 and the same stratification 
as the original sample. This design mimics the initial sample selection process and ensures 
that all strata are adequately represented in the model calibrations. With the 67:33 split, we 
put more emphasis on the model calibrations than validations. Splitting the initial sample 
implies a loss in degree of freedom. Instead, one can estimate the models based on the full set 
of observations and validate those using bootstrapped samples of the total sample. However, 
by using a third of the sample not used in the model calibrations, we envisioned the worst 
case scenario for the predictions. 
In addition, the model robustness was assessed by estimating the prediction intervals 
using bootstrapped simulation methods. Bootstrap is the statistical procedure which models 
sampling from a population by the process of resampling from the sample (Hall, 1994). Unlike 
standard confidence interval estimation, bootstrap does not make any distributional assumption 
about the population and hence does not require the assumption of normality. The developed 
models were calibrated to three different poverty lines - the national, international, and extreme 
lines - as a set of policies or different development institutions might explicitly target different 
poverty groups in the population.  
It is often argued that targeting is cost-ineffective and once all targeting costs have 
been considered, a finely targeted program may not be any more cost-efficient and may not 
have any more impact on poverty than a universal program. We assessed whether this is the 
case using the models developed for Malawi. Based on the principles of targeting, we 
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estimated the cost-effectiveness and impacts of targeting the poor. Three targeted schemes 
were considered. The first one is a uniform targeting or equal distribution of benefits to the 
poor, the second scheme consists of a progressive targeting or distribution of benefits to the 
poor starting from the bottom welfare spectrum, whereas the third scheme or fair targeting 
distributes transfers to the poor while respecting the initial welfare ranking of the population. 
These schemes were compared to a universal distribution of benefits or complete coverage of 
the population (untargeted program).  
In order to fit with the existing institutional capacity necessary for handling a targeted 
program, we assumed a realistic transfer scheme to cover 20% of the population and set the 
total annual budget available for targeting at US$33 million (US$30 million for the rural 
population and US$3 million for the urban population). This amount is approximately 
equivalent to the total costs of the SPI and represents just about 1% of Malawi’s GDP in 
200540. With respect to administrative and hidden costs of targeting, they were set following 
Smith and Subbarao (2003), Smith (2001), and Besley and Kanbur (1993) who hypothesize 
that the finer the targeting, the higher the costs. Furthermore, we assessed whether the newly 
developed system is more efficient both in terms of targeting performances and costs than the 
targeted Starter Pack program of 2000/2001 and the Agricultural Input Subsidy Program 
(AISP) of 2006/2007, both of which were administered through community-based targeting 
mechanisms. 
The main results of the study are presented in three chapters organized in research 
articles. Estimation results provide pertinent conclusions about the potential contributions of 
targeting by proxy means tests in Malawi. Under the new system, mis-targeting is 
considerably reduced and the targeting of development policies improves compared to the 
currently used mechanisms in the country. Findings suggest that all of the estimation methods 
achieve approximately the same level of targeting performances out-of-sample. The rural 
                                                 
40 Malawi’s GDP was estimated at US$2.9 billion in 2005 (World Bank, 2008). 
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model achieves an average poverty accuracy of about 72% and a leakage of 27% when 
calibrated to the national poverty line of MK44.29. On the other hand, the urban model yields 
on average a poverty accuracy of about 62% and a leakage of 39% when calibrated to the 
same poverty line. These results suggest that any of the estimation methods is appropriate for 
developing proxy means test models, as far as targeting performances are concerned. They 
also indicate that the estimation methods cannot be discriminated based on targeting 
performances alone. Other factors, such as algorithm complexity and knowledge 
requirements, etc. should be considered in choosing the best method for developing a proxy 
means test model. Nonetheless, when the risk of measurement errors is high, the categorical 
indicators model is more appropriate for targeting the poor. 
The results are also confirmed by the Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) curves 
of the models which show that there is no sizable difference in aggregate predictive accuracy 
between the methods. The ROC curve is a powerful tool that can be used by policy makers 
and project managers to decide on the number of poor a program or development policy 
should reach and ponder on the number of non-poor that would also be wrongly targeted. 
Likewise, the results show that calibrating the models to a higher poverty line improves their 
targeting performances, while calibrating the models to a lower line does the opposite. For 
example, under the international poverty line of US$1.25 (i.e. MK59.18 PPP), the rural model 
covers about 82% of the poor and wrongly targets only 16% of non-poor, whereas the urban 
model covers about 74% of the poor and wrongly identifies 26% of non-poor. On the other 
hand, using an extreme poverty line of MK29.81 disappointingly reduces the model poverty 
accuracy and leakage: the rural model yields a poverty accuracy of 51% and a leakage of 39% 
while the urban model yields a poverty accuracy of about 48% and a leakage of 68%. These 
findings are relevant for decision makers and program managers, national and international 
institutions as they consider which categories of poor to target in the population.  
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In all of the estimations and under the same poverty line, the rural model performs 
better than the urban model. This result is partly driven by the low level of poverty rate in 
urban areas. Estimates of the variance show that the result may be explained by the greater 
variability in the welfare indicator for urban households and between different urban centers 
in the country. Nevertheless, even though undercoverage and leakage are high in urban areas, 
these errors amount to a relatively small number of households; less than 15% of Malawians 
live in urban areas. Likewise, estimates of the prediction intervals suggest that the urban 
model is less robust than the rural model. This is due to the lower size of the sample used to 
validate the urban model. 
Furthermore, irrespective of the estimation method and poverty line applied, the 
models yield some targeting errors, though the errors decrease with increasing poverty line. 
These errors can be attributed to the estimation method idiosyncratic error or probable 
measurement errors in the dependent variable and model covariates. Nonetheless, a 
breakdown of targeting errors by poverty deciles indicates that the models perform well in 
terms of those who are mistargeted; covering most of the poorest deciles and excluding most 
of the richest ones. These results have obvious desirable welfare implications for the poor and 
smallholder farmers. They suggest that targeting using the newly developed system will be 
progressive, concentrating benefits on the poorest and leaking few resources to the least poor.  
The presence of targeting errors does however, point to a fundamental issue: proxy 
means tests can improve the poverty outreach of a development policy, but like any other 
targeting method, they are not a perfect device for identifying the poor. The level of these 
errors will affect the decision as whether to target or not, how to target, and which method to 
use for targeting. It is all important to emphasize that a core objective of this research is to 
predict, but not to infer a causal relationship on poverty. Therefore, the models selected can 
only predict poverty, but cannot explain it.  
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There is compelling evidence in favor of targeting under the redistribution schemes 
applied. Simulation results suggest that targeting Malawi’s poor and smallholder farmers is 
more cost- and impact-effective compared to universal coverage. Better targeting not only 
reduces the Malawian Government’s direct costs for providing benefits, but also reduces the 
total cost of a targeted program. With a targeted transfer program, fewer resources achieve the 
same post-transfer poverty as a universal coverage of the population. Finer targeting 
concentrates resources on the poor, whereas under universal coverage, benefits spread thin. 
With respect to the rural model, the transfer to the poor as a percentage of total transfer 
increases from 54.48% under universal coverage to 87.54% under progressive targeting.  
Though administrative costs increase with finer targeting, the results indicate that the 
overall benefits outweigh the costs of targeting. Incorporating administrative and hidden costs 
does not make finer targeting cost-ineffective. Likewise, finer targeting reduces the costs of 
leakage by a sizable margin and produces the highest impacts on poverty compared to 
universal regimes. Considering the rural model, the leakage of the program is cut down by 
about 80% under progressive targeting and 65% under uniform and fair targeting. Likewise, 
simulation results suggest that a fair redistribution scheme reduces rural poverty incidence by 
13% against 8% under universal coverage.  
However, the finest redistribution doesn’t consistently yield the best transfer 
efficiency, nor does it consistently improve post-transfer poverty. While none of the targeted 
schemes consistently yields the best transfer efficiency and post-transfer poverty in rural 
areas, progressive targeting appears to be the best scheme in urban areas. These findings 
imply that the transfer efficiency of a targeted program may depend on the welfare 
distribution of the population covered. Nonetheless, the redistribution schemes applied are not 
exhaustive and the range of transfer options is broader, but they do provide some insights on 
the comparison of welfare gains from different policy choices.  
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More importantly, the newly designed system appears to be more target- and cost-
efficient than the 2000/2001 Starter Pack and the 2006/2007 Agricultural Input Support 
Program (AISP). While the Starter Pack and the AISP transferred about 50% of total transfer, 
under the new system about 73% of transfer are delivered to the poor and smallholder 
farmers. Likewise, under the new proxy system the costs of leakage are cut down by 55% and 
57% for the Starter Pack and AISP, respectively. Thus, with the new system it is possible to 
reduce leakage and undercoverage rates and improve the cost and transfer efficiency of 
development programs in the country.  
In general, the sets of proxy indicators selected capture the multidimensionality of 
poverty. Likewise, they reflect the local communities’ understandings of the phenomenon. 
They broadly include the poverty indicators perceived by Malawian households as important 
correlates of their welfare (see for example Benson et al., 2006). They consist of variables 
related to dimensions, such as household demography, education, housing, and asset 
ownership. These indicators are objective and most can be easily verified. They do not 
include any monetary or subjective variables. While subjective indicators can be powerful 
poverty indicators, they can hardly be verified. Thus, such indicators allow strategic answers 
by the respondent depending on his or her expectations from the interview. Likewise, with the 
lack of market transactions, estimations of monetary values (e.g. assets) often result in 
imprecise measurements.  
All of the coefficients on the parameters exhibit signs which are consistent with 
expectations and economic theory. Information on the best indicators can be collected with a 
fairly high degree of accuracy. However, the collection of such information might entail an 
effective verification process to reduce bribery, misreports and fraudulent information from 
the enumerators as well as potential beneficiaries who may intentionally provide false 
information to qualify for program benefits. In this respect, one could also set up a 
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supervisory system with incentives, such as bonus and malus for the enumerators. The system 
should facilitate the verification of the information provided by the beneficiary through e.g. 
random home-visits, triangulation, etc. Likewise, households can be interviewed using 
random models in order to mitigate the effects of strategic behaviors. This process implies 
that potential beneficiaries do not know in advance which indicators will be used to evaluate 
whether they qualify for program benefits or not. A pool of models with different 
combinations of indicators can be developed for that purpose.  
There are various ways on how to reduce the observed targeting errors and costs and 
further improve the efficiency of targeting by the proxy means test system. Administrative 
costs could be cut by sharing the same system between several programs or by combining 
different targeting methods. As mentioned earlier, in Malawi there exist a large number of 
development programs targeted at the poor and vulnerable households. Sharing the system 
between those programs would considerably cut down the costs of targeting and would 
further improve the targeting efficiency of the system if a better coordination is established 
between programs. Likewise, as others have mentioned, the costs of leakage can be reduced 
by recouping through taxation of the non-poor if feasible.  
If new estimation methods that improve the indicator correlation with poverty are 
found, undercoverage and leakage rates can also be reduced. To this end, currently existing 
options, such as two-step methods (see for example Grootaert et al., 1998; Zeller et al., 2005) 
and poverty minimization algorithms (see for example Ravallion and Chao, 1989; Glewwe, 
1992) are more complex compared to the methods applied in this research. Ultimately, they 
compromise the practicality of proxy means testing.  
Furthermore, proper implementation mechanisms and management options can help 
reduce targeting errors and program costs. Indeed, implementation is an important 
determinant of targeting performance (Coady et al., 2004). Local awareness through the 
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media can improve the coverage of the poor. As underlined by Coady et al. (2002), no matter 
how well or badly the statistical formula works, if the poor don’t register for the program, it 
will have high undercoverage. Likewise, costs can be reduced by ensuring that potential 
beneficiaries have easy access to offices, are well informed about the program and the rules 
and documentation required. Qualification to the program can also be made conditional upon 
the participation to other targeted programs, such as nutrition, education, public works, etc. 
Stigma is a powerful means for reducing leakage to non-poor, but it can also discourage 
participation among the poor and work against the promotion of dignity and self-worth as an 
outcome of development (Coady et al., 2002). 
Valid proxy indicators are difficult to establish. The fact that we stress the use of 
proxy means tests in this research does not imply that other potential targeting methods 
should be disregarded. Indeed, targeting methods are not mutually exclusive and may work 
better in combination as long as this is feasible (Coady et al., 2002). Therefore, the system 
developed can be combined with other methods in a multi-stage targeting process. For 
example, geographical targeting can be used to select regions with disproportionate number of 
poor within Malawi and then the proxy means system can be used to screen households 
within the selected regions. In this context, it is worth mentioning that the fact that we 
estimate separate models for rural and urban areas of Malawi, combined with differences in 
poverty rates between both areas implies to some extent a combination of geographical and 
proxy means targeting. Similarly, after selecting program beneficiaries with the proxy 
indicators, the results can be discussed with community members to integrate their assessment 
of who deserves benefits and who does not. Region-specific models can also be devised. 
The models developed offer a better alternative for targeting the poor and smallholder 
farmers in Malawi. They can be used in a wide range of applications, such as: 
 identifying and targeting poor and smallholder farmers;  
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 improving the existing targeting mechanisms of agricultural input subsidies which rely 
on community-based targeting systems;  
 assessing household eligibility to welfare programs and safety net benefits; 
 producing estimates of poverty rates and monitoring changes in poverty over time as 
the country and donors cannot afford the costs of frequent and comprehensive 
household consumption expenditure surveys;  
 estimating the impacts of development policies targeted to those living below the 
poverty line and;  
 assessing the poverty outreach of microfinance institutions operating in the country.  
This broad range of applications makes the models potential policy tools for the country’s 
decision makers and program managers. 
5.3 Some Policy Implications and Outlook 
There is a long standing belief that better targeting of public policy can play a major role 
in alleviating poverty. However, better targeting is not a panacea that would end poverty, but a 
means to reach the poor and smallholder farmers. Given the widespread and deep poverty in 
Malawi, targeted development policies, such as input subsidies, food-for-work, public work 
programs, etc. need to be well designed and sustained for a substantial amount of time in order 
to have a meaningful impact on the country’s poor population. Malawi can achieve a lot with 
the current level of funding if programs are better targeted and rationalized (World Bank, 2007). 
The newly developed system, if well implemented can help accomplish such a goal. 
In any targeted interventions, there are operational challenges. Lessons from previous 
experiences can greatly help policy makers and development practitioners improve the 
targeting and implementation of ongoing and future programs in the country. Likewise, these 
programs should be flexible enough to accommodate further improvements. Similarly, the 
system can be designed in a way that it allows potential beneficiaries to appeal after selection 
if they believe that they meet the eligibility criteria. Policies directed toward the promotion of 
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a stronger civil society and empowerment of local communities can help achieve a fairer and 
effective appeal process. Such a process can also improve the program management as it 
unfolds. Targeting can be a politically sensitive issue; the system developed does not take into 
account the reality that policy makers, program managers, or development practitioners may 
adjust eligibility criteria due to political, administrative, budgetary, or other reasons. 
Though the models developed have proven their validity, there is scope for further 
improvements. They remain to be tested for robustness across time and space. Therefore, more 
could be learned with additional validations if suitable data were available. These validations 
could also shed some light on the model validity across time given that potential structural 
changes could occur in the socio-political context and the household consumption behavior (e.g. 
changes in tastes, preferences, etc.). Likewise, this research considers the budget available for 
targeting the poor as exogenously determined. It does not consider the implications of financing 
targeted programs through the taxation of non-poor.  
This research provides a framework for developing and evaluating a simple system for 
reaching the poor and smallholder farmers in Malawi, but the methodology can also be 
employed in other areas of applied research and replicated in other developing countries with 
similar targeting problems. In designing future tests, researchers should ensure that targeting 
criteria are grounded to the local perceptions of poverty. One preliminary step in designing 
such tests could be a qualitative survey on household perceptions of poverty and welfare in 
order to select the most important indicators for the purpose of the research. Subsequently, 
representative data should be collected on these poverty indicators to develop the proxy 
means test models.  
A number of other potential estimation methods can be explored to develop proxy 
means test models. These include: Classification and Regression Trees (CART), Support 
Vector Machines (SVM), neural networks, etc. Reducing poverty requires first identifying the 
Chapter 5: General conclusions 
 
144
poor. However, the proxy indicator system developed is not sufficient. It must also be coupled 
with investments in education, rural infrastructure, economic growth related sectors, and 
strong political will to impact on the welfare of Malawians. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1. Sample size and number of potential indicators by model types and estimation methods 
Sub-samples Rural model Urban model Total 
Total sample size 9,840 1,440 11,280 
Calibration sample (2/3 observations) 6,560 960 7,540 
               Validation sample (1/3 observations) 3,280 480 3,760 
Number of indicators    
          Weighted Least Square Regression 148 112 - 
         Weighted Logit Regression 148 112 - 
        Weighted Logit Regression  with categorical 
        predictors only 98 79 - 
         Weighted Quantile Regression 148 112 - 
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. All estimations include seven regional dummies for the rural 
model and three city dummies for the urban model. 
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Appendix 2. Descriptive statistics of variables used in the rural model (full sample)  
Variable label Minimum Maximum Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Full sample (9,840 observations) 
Logarithm of per capita daily expenditures 1.36 7.25 3.86 3.83 0.62 
Agricultural development district is Karonga 0 1 0.05 0 0.21 
Agricultural development district is Mzuzu 0 1 0.10 0 0.30 
Agricultural development district is Kasungu  0 1 0.12 0 0.33 
Agricultural development district is Salima  0 1 0.05 0 0.23 
Agricultural development district is Lilongwe  0 1 0.21 0 0.41 
Agricultural development district is Machinga  0 1 0.20 0 0.40 
Agricultural development district is Blantyre 0 1 0.20 0 0.40 
Agricultural development district is Ngabu 0 1 0.07 0 0.26 
Household size 1 27 4.57 4 2.34 
Number of members who can read in English 0 9 0.87 0 1.2 
Highest educational qualification acquired in  
household is Junior Certificate of Education (JCE) 0 1 0.10 0 0.31 
Household head can read in Chichewa 0 1 0.62 1 0.48 
Number of male adults in the household 0 8 1.08 1 0.82 
Household grew tobacco in past five  
cropping seasons 0 1 0.20 0 0.40 
Floor of main dwelling is predominantly made   
of smooth cement 0 1 0.14 0 0.34 
Number of separate rooms occupied by  
household, excluding toilet, storeroom, or garage 0 16 2.50 2 1.30 
Any household member sleeps under a bed net? 0 1 0.37 0 0.48 
Cooking fuel is collected firewood 0 1 0.84 1 0.36 
Bed ownership 0 1 0.27 0 0.44 
Tape, CD player, or HiFi ownership 0 1 0.12 0 0.33 
Electric, gas stove, or hot plate ownership 0 1 0.01 0 0.09 
Bicycle ownership 0 1 0.38 0 0.49 
Paraffin lantern ownership 0 1 0.64 1 0.48 
Panga ownership 0 1 0.30 0 0.46 
Wireless radio ownership 0 1 0.55 1 0.49 
Lighting fuel is electricity 0 1 0.02 0 0.14 
Rubbish disposal facility is public rubbish heap 0 1 0.19 0 0.39 
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. Panga is a large heavy knife used for cutting the vegetation. 
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Appendix 3. Descriptive statistics of variables used in the rural model (calibration sample) 
Variable label Minimum Maximum Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Calibration sample (6,560 observations) 
Logarithm of per capita daily expenditures 1.36 7.25 3.87 3.83 0.61 
Agricultural development district is Karonga 0 1 0.05 0 0.22 
Agricultural development district is Mzuzu 0 1 0.10 0 0.30 
Agricultural development district is Kasungu  0 1 0.12 0 0.33 
Agricultural development district is Salima  0 1 0.06 0 0.23 
Agricultural development district is Lilongwe  0 1 0.21 0 0.41 
Agricultural development district is Machinga  0 1 0.20 0 0.40 
Agricultural development district is Blantyre 0 1 0.20 0 0.40 
Agricultural development district is Ngabu 0 1 0.07 0 0.26 
Household size 1 18 4.61 4 2.33 
Number of members who can read in English 0 8 0.87 0 1.20 
Highest educational qualification acquired in  
household is Junior Certificate of Education (JCE) 0 1 0.10 0 0.30 
Household head can read in Chichewa 0 1 0.62 1 0.48 
Number of male adults in the household 0 8 1.08 1 0.82 
Household grew tobacco in past five  
cropping seasons 0 1 0.20 0 0.40 
Floor of main dwelling is predominantly made   
of smooth cement 0 1 0.14 0 0.34 
Number of separate rooms occupied by  
household, excluding toilet, storeroom, or garage 0 16 2.52 2 1.32 
Any household member sleeps under a bed net? 0 1 0.37 0 0.48 
Cooking fuel is collected firewood 0 1 0.84 1 0.36 
Bed ownership 0 1 0.27 0 0.44 
Tape, CD player, or HiFi ownership 0 1 0.12 0 0.33 
Electric, gas stove, or hot plate ownership 0 1 0.01 0 0.09 
Bicycle ownership 0 1 0.38 0 0.49 
Paraffin lantern ownership 0 1 0.65 1 0.48 
Panga ownership 0 1 0.30 0 0.46 
Wireless radio ownership 0 1 0.54 1 0.50 
Lighting fuel is electricity 0 1 0.02 0 0.14 
Rubbish disposal facility is public rubbish heap 0 1 0.18 0 0.39 
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. Panga is a large heavy knife used for cutting the vegetation. 
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Appendix 4. Descriptive statistics of variables used in the rural model (validation sample) 
Variable label Minimum Maximum Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Validation sample (3,280 observations) 
Logarithm of per capita daily expenditures 2.00 6.76 3.87 3.83 0.63 
Agricultural development district is Karonga 0 1 0.05 0 0.22 
Agricultural development district is Mzuzu 0 1 0.10 0 0.30 
Agricultural development district is Kasungu  0 1 0.12 0 0.33 
Agricultural development district is Salima  0 1 0.05 0 0.22 
Agricultural development district is Lilongwe  0 1 0.22 0 0.41 
Agricultural development district is Machinga  0 1 0.20 0 0.40 
Agricultural development district is Blantyre 0 1 0.20 0 0.40 
Agricultural development district is Ngabu 0 1 0.07 0 0.26 
Household size 1 27 4.50 4 2.34 
Number of members who can read in English 0 9 0.86 0 1.19 
Highest educational qualification acquired in  
household is Junior Certificate of Education (JCE) 0 1 1.1 0 0.31 
Household head can read in Chichewa 0 1 0.62 1 0.49 
Number of male adults in the household 0 6 1.07 1 0.81 
Household grew tobacco in past five  
cropping seasons 0 1 0.20 0 0.40 
Floor of main dwelling is predominantly made   
of smooth cement 0 1 0.13 0 0.34 
Number of separate rooms occupied by  
household, excluding toilet, storeroom, or garage 0 13 2.46 2 1.27 
Any household member sleeps under a bed net? 0 1 0.37 0 0.48 
Cooking fuel is collected firewood 0 1 0.83 1 0.37 
Bed ownership 0 1 0.27 0 0.44 
Tape, CD player, or HiFi ownership 0 1 0.13 0 0.33 
Electric, gas stove, or hot plate ownership 0 1 0.01 0 0.09 
Bicycle ownership 0 1 0.39 0 0.49 
Paraffin lantern ownership 0 1 0.63 1 0.48 
Panga ownership 0 1 0.31 0 0.46 
Wireless radio ownership 0 1 0.57 1 0.50 
Lighting fuel is electricity 0 1 0.02 0 0.14 
Rubbish disposal facility is public rubbish heap 0 1 0.19 0 0.39 
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. Panga is a large heavy knife used for cutting the vegetation. 
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Appendix 5. Descriptive statistics of variables used in the urban model (full sample)  
Variable label Minimum Maximum Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Full sample (1,440 observations) 
Logarithm of per capita daily expenditures 2.53 7.65 4.45 4.36 0.81 
Mzuzu city 0 1 0.17 0 0.37 
Lilongwe city 0 1 0.33 0 0.47 
Zomba city 0 1 0.17 0 0.37 
Blantyre city 0 1 0.33 0 0.47 
Household size 1 15 4.36 4 2.32 
Number of members who can read in English 0 12 1.83 1 1.81 
Household head can read in Chichewa  0 1 0.85 1 0.36 
Highest class level ever attended by females   
in the household is secondary/post primary 0 1 0.31 0 0.46 
Highest class level ever attended by members is 
superior or post-secondary 0 1 0.08 0 0.28 
Household has a cellular phone in working 
condition 0 1 0.17 0 0.38 
Household owns a landline telephone in working 
condition 0 1 0.05 0 0.22 
Cooking fuel is collected firewood 0 1 0.15 0 0.35 
Lighting fuel is electricity 0 1 0.32 0 0.47 
Bed ownership 0 1 0.67 1 0.47 
Television & VCR ownership 0 1 0.18 0 0.39 
Electric, gas stove, or hot plate ownership 0 1 0.15 0 0.35 
Sewing machine ownership 0 1 0.04 0 0.20 
Number of separate rooms occupied by   
household, excluding toilet, storeroom, or garage 0 10 2.53 2 1.28 
Dwelling construction material is traditional 0 1 0.21 0 0.41 
Household head sleeps on Mat (grass) on floor 0 1 0.27 0 0.44 
Household has no toilet facility 0 1 0.03 0 0.17 
Floor of main dwelling is predominantly made  
of smoothed cement 0 1 0.63 1 0.48 
Is there a place to purchase common medicines, 
such as panadol in this community? 0 1 0.93 1 0.25 
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. 
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Appendix 6. Descriptive statistics of variables used in the urban model (calibration sample)  
Variable label Minimum Maximum Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Calibration sample (960 observations) 
Logarithm of per capita daily expenditures 2.53 7.50 4.48 4.37 0.83 
Mzuzu city 0 1 0.17 0 0.37 
Lilongwe city 0 1 0.33 0 0.47 
Zomba city 0 1 0.17 0 0.37 
Blantyre city 0 1 0.33 0 0.47 
Household size 1 15 4.24 4 2.26 
Number of members who can read in English 0 10 1.72 1 1.69 
Household head can read in Chichewa  0 1 0.84 1 0.36 
Highest class level ever attended by females   
in the household is secondary/post primary 0 1 0.30 0 0.46 
Highest class level ever attended by members is 
superior or post-secondary 0 1 0.09 0 0.28 
Household has a cellular phone in working 
condition 0 1 0.17 0 0.37 
Household owns a landline telephone in working 
condition 0 1 0.05 0 0.22 
Cooking fuel is collected firewood 0 1 0.14 0 0.35 
Lighting fuel is electricity 0 1 0.31 0 0.46 
Bed ownership 0 1 0.67 1 0.47 
Television & VCR ownership 0 1 0.16 0 0.37 
Electric, gas stove, or hot plate ownership 0 1 0.14 0 0.34 
Sewing machine ownership 0 1 0.05 0 0.21 
Number of separate rooms occupied by   
household, excluding toilet, storeroom, or garage 1 10 2.53 2 1.31 
Dwelling construction material is traditional 0 1 0.22 0 0.41 
Household head sleeps on Mat (grass) on floor 0 1 0.27 0 0.44 
Household has no toilet facility 0 1 0.02 0 0.15 
Floor of main dwelling is predominantly made  
of smoothed cement 0 1 0.63 1 0.48 
Is there a place to purchase common medicines, 
such as panadol in this community? 0 1 0.93 1 0.25 
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. 
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Appendix 7. Descriptive statistics of variables used in the urban model (validation sample)  
Variable label Minimum Maximum Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Validation sample (480 observations) 
Logarithm of per capita daily expenditures 2.64 7.65 4.40 4.35 0.77 
Mzuzu city 0 1 0.17 0 0.37 
Lilongwe city 0 1 0.33 0 0.47 
Zomba city 0 1 0.17 0 0.37 
Blantyre city 0 1 0.33 0 0.47 
Household size 1 14 4.62 4 2.41 
Number of members who can read in English 0 1 2.04 2 2.01 
Household head can read in Chichewa  0 1 0.86 1 0.35 
Highest class level ever attended by females   
in the household is secondary/post primary 0 1 0.32 0 0.47 
Highest class level ever attended by members is 
superior or post-secondary 0 1 0.08 0 0.27 
Household has a cellular phone in working 
condition 0 1 0.19 0 0.39 
Household owns a landline telephone in working 
condition 0 1 0.05 0 0.21 
Cooking fuel is collected firewood 0 1 0.15 0 0.36 
Lighting fuel is electricity 0 1 0.35 0 0.48 
Bed ownership 0 1 0.67 1 0.47 
Television & VCR ownership 0 1 0.22 0 0.41 
Electric, gas stove, or hot plate ownership 0 1 0.16 0 0.37 
Sewing machine ownership 0 1 0.04 0 0.19 
Number of separate rooms occupied by   
household, excluding toilet, storeroom, or garage 0 8 2.52 2 1.23 
Dwelling construction material is traditional 0 1 0.20 0 0.40 
Household head sleeps on Mat (grass) on floor 0 1 0.28 0 0.45 
Household has no toilet facility 0 1 0.04 0 0.20 
Floor of main dwelling is predominantly made  
of smoothed cement 0 1 0.62 1 0.49 
Is there a place to purchase common medicines, 
such as panadol in this community? 0 1 0.93 1 0.26 
Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data. 
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  Appendix 8. Household housing conditions 
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 Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data.  
 Type of floor material: 1=sand, 2=smoothed mud, 3=wood, 4=smoothed cement, 5=tile. 
  Material of outer wall: 1=grass, 2=mud “yomata”, 3=compacted earth “yamdindo”, 4=wood, 5=mud brick 
  unfired, 6=burnt bricks, 7=concrete, 8=iron sheets. 
  Appendix 9. Targeting efficiency of development policies 
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
6%
7%
8%
9%
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Deciles of consumption expenditures
Ta
rg
et
in
g 
ef
fic
ie
nc
y 
of
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t p
ol
ic
ie
s
Free distribution of lukuni
Supplementary feeding
Scholarship/busaries
Tertiary loan scheme
Direct cash transfer
 
 Source: Own results based on Malawi IHS2 data.  
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Appendix 10. Urban model’s results under different methods  
Targeting ratios 
Poverty  
line          Method 
Cut-off 
values 
(MK) 
Poverty 
accuracy 
(%) 
Under-
coverage 
(%) 
Leakage 
(%) 
PIE 
 (% points) 
BPAC 
(% points) 
WLS 3.92 62.16 (53.3; 71.0) 
37.84 
(29.0; 46.7) 
38.74 
(26.3; 52.8) 
0.21 
(-3.5; 3.8) 
61.26 
(40.9; 66.5) 
WL 0.39 61.26 (51.7; 70.5) 
38.74 
(29.5; 48.3) 
39.64 
(27.3; 53.5) 
0.21 
(-3.2; 4.0) 
60.36 
(40.9; 66.0) 
WL 
categorical 20 
63.96 
(55.0; 72.3) 
36.04 
(27.7; 45.0) 
36.94 
(24.8; 52.0) 
0.21 
(-3.5; 3.8) 
63.06 
(42.9; 67.7) N
at
io
na
l 
W Quantile 3.63 60.36 (51.5; 69.2) 
39.64 
(30.8; 48.5) 
48.65 
(34.3; 67.3) 
2.08 
(-1.9; 6.2) 
51.35 
(32.7; 62.9) 
WLS 4.18 74.57 (68.3; 81.2) 
25.43 
(18.8; 37.1) 
24.86 
(17.4; 34.2) 
-0.21 
(-3.8; 3.7) 
73.99 
(59.5; 77.6) 
WL 0.43 73.99 (67.7; 79.9) 
26.01 
(20.1; 32.3) 
26.59 
(18.6; 36.2) 
0.21 
(-3.6; 4.0) 
73.41 
(59.5; 76.6) 
WL 
categorical  22 
76.30 
(69.9; 82.5) 
23.70 
(17.5; 30.1) 
27.17 
(19.2; 36.9) 
1.25 
(-2.5; 5.4) 
72.83 
(62.0; 77.6) In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
W Quantile 4.06 78.04 (71.8; 84.0) 
21.97 
(16.0; 28.2) 
34.10 
(24.2; 44.5) 
4.38 
(-0.2; 8.1) 
65.90 
(55.5 ; 74.9) 
WLS 3.52 50 (31.8; 67.7) 
50 
(32.3; 68.2) 
73.53 
(43.7; 123.0) 
1.67 
(-0.8; 4.2) 
26.47 
(-23.4; 50.5) 
WL 0.30 47.06 (31.0; 64.7) 
52.94 
(35.3; 69.0) 
61.77 
(32.1; 104.4) 
0.63 
(-1.9; 3.1) 
38.23 
(-5.61; 51.7) 
WL 
scorecard  8 
64.71 
(43.4; 80.0) 
35.29 
(20.0; 52.6) 
94.12 
(57.6; 152.0) 
4.17 
(1.7; 7.1) 
5.88 
(-52.0; 42.0) 
Ex
tre
m
e 
W Quantile 2.93 47.06 (29.1; 65) 
52.94 
(35; 70.9) 
73.53 
(40.5; 123.8) 
1.46 
(-1.3; 4.2) 
26.47 
(-22.8; 50.0) 
Source: Own computations based on Malawi IHS2 data. Bootstrapped prediction intervals in brackets. Cut-off 
values are expressed in Logarithm MK under the WLS and probability for the WL. PIE is defined as the Poverty 
Incidence Error. BPAC is defined as the Balanced Poverty Accuracy Criterion. 
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